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International law regulating the protection of the environment has grown exponentially 
over the years, with the adoption of many conventions covering the protection of specific 
environmental issues at the global, regional and bilateral levels. The variety of rules and 
types of protection is vast, and the question then is how to resolve potential conflicts.  
Within the field of interstate dispute settlement, the mechanisms that exist to solve 
international environment conflicts present a critical pressure point. Instead of a smooth 
process of adjudication, conducive to timely judgments that benefit all parties, a 
disjointed system offering more stumbling blocks than solutions seems to exist. There is 
this idea that the interstate judicial settlement is old-fashioned, and therefore inadequate 
to respond to the new legal developments in international environmental law. This 
pessimistic view on the existing mechanisms and the development of parallel theories 
on how to achieve greater compliance with environmental rules have consequently led 
to the creation of alternative types of conflict resolution mechanisms, labelled as non-
compliance procedures. 
Indeed, it is true to say that the roles of international courts and tribunals in 
environmental disputes have been challenged by certain specific features of 
environmental disputes, bringing into question their usefulness and effectiveness. 
However, we should not be too hasty in dismissing the role of courts and tribunals in 
this context. This thesis seeks to investigate whether there is a place on the international 
stage for international courts and tribunals when it comes to solving environmental 
disputes. In doing so, the analysis focuses on the design of interstate adjudication and 
arbitration. Some judicial mechanisms which are often not considered could be 
adequately used in the context of international environmental law. By concentrating on 
the various relevant legal tools available to international judicial bodies, this thesis argues 
that international courts and tribunals can be used favourably in an environmental 
context. 
This thesis adopts three main perspectives from which the role of international courts 
and tribunals is assessed. First, the analysis concentrates on how the judicial procedures 
ii 
 
can be triggered (or the question “how to get in”). Then it looks at the mechanisms and 
procedural problems attached to the judicial bodies (or “once you are in”). Finally, the 
research focuses on the location of judicial bodies within the broader dispute settlement 
regime relevant for the application of international environmental law (or “in/out 
relationships”). With these three elements, it is then possible to evaluate the role 





In the international arena, a centralised system of adjudication does not exist. Rather, 
many different types of international courts and tribunals have been created over the 
decades. There are global and regional courts, some being only able to judge on 
interstate disputes, either with general or limited mandates, as well as tribunals where 
individuals can claim their rights.   
However, the application of international environmental law – as it focuses largely on 
the creation of specific obligations towards states themselves – is more likely to be 
questioned by the other bearers of the same obligations, the other states. Therefore, the 
specific courts and tribunals analysed in this thesis are those able to hear interstate 
disputes over environmental conflicts. 
These environmental conflicts raise certain specific challenges for international courts 
and tribunals: they are the object of this research. The challenges are largely procedural 
in nature and they relate to how the judicial procedures can be triggered (or the question 
“how to get in”), the role of courts in assessing scientific evidence and the remedies that 
may be prescribed at the end of the case (or questions relating to “what happens once 
you are in”). The thesis tackles each individual procedural hurdle and investigates the 
extent to which international courts and tribunals have shown some ability to adapt or 
could adapt better in the future. The thesis also discusses the relationship between 
judicial bodies and other dispute settlement mechanisms relevant for the application of 
international environmental law, with a view to suggesting when it might be appropriate 
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“In every legal system law and procedure constantly react upon each other. 
Changes in the substantive law call for new procedures and remedies; new 
procedures and remedies make possible changes in the substantive law. So it is 
in international law; if we wish so to develop the law as to respond to the 
challenges of our times our procedures and remedies must be sufficiently varied 
and flexible for the purpose.”
1
 
1. The problem of environmental dispute settlement 
Environmental discourse has motivated the development of international environmental 
law through various means, through for instance the adoption of the Stockholm 
Declaration
2
 during the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 and the 
creation of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP)
3
 in the aftermath of the 
conference, followed twenty years later by the adoption of the Rio Declaration.
4
 Both 
texts are the result of political summits where representative of states showed their will 
to commit to certain environmental goals. Then, the international community has gone 
further than just admitting the protection of the environment is a goal to achieve and 
established environmental protection as a legal and administrative field in its own right. 
International agreements multiplied, with no formal hierarchy and few links to one 
another, with the adoption of many conventions covering the protection of specific 
environmental issues, such as climate change with the UNFCCC,
5
 environmental impact 
assessments with the Espoo Convention,
6
 the conservation of biodiversity with the CBD,
7
 
the protection of the marine environment with the UNCLOS
8
 and of certain species 
such as the Whaling Convention
9
 and many more. These evolutions show the changes 
                                                 
1
 Clarence Wilfred Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication (Stevens & Sons 1964) 184. 
2
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, concluded on the 16
th
 June 
1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
3





 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, concluded on the 13
th
 June 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I); 31 ILM 874 (1992). 
5
 United Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992).  
6
 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (1991). 
7
 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992).  
8
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1992). 
9
 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (1946). 
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in the perception of international environmental law towards a global and all-
encompassing legal framework. States find in law an appropriate way to fight for 
environmental protection. The variety of rules and possible types of protection is vast, 
culminating in myriad potential disputes. This begs the central question, therefore: how 
may these be resolved?  
The foundations of this thesis rely on the assumption that procedural matters are 
interrelated with substantive matters: they have to respond to each other. Therefore, this 
thesis seeks to explore the relationship between the relatively new corpus of international 
environmental rules and the established international courts and tribunals. 
Within the field of interstate dispute settlement, the mechanisms that exist to solve 
international conflicts over the environment present a critical pressure point. Instead of 
a smooth process of adjudication, conducive to timely judgments that benefit all parties, 
there seems to exist a disjointed system offering more stumbling blocks than solutions. 
Often the interstate judicial settlement is stigmatised as old-fashioned, and therefore 
inadequate to respond to the new legal developments in international environmental 
law.
10
 This pessimistic view of existing mechanisms and the development of parallel 
theories analysing how to achieve greater compliance with environmental rules have 
consequently led to the creation of alternative types of conflict resolution mechanisms, 
labelled as non-compliance procedures.
11
 Such developments raise the question of the 
relationship between judicial settlement and these alternative mechanisms. 
                                                 
10
 The term “adequacy” is preferred to the term “efficiency” as it emphasises the need for judicial bodies 
to correspond to the specificities of international environmental protection. This discourse does not help 
answer the questions asked in this project as the meaning of effective judicial bodies does not automatically 
correlate with the efficiency of the legal framework. Neither may it also be assumed to correlate with the 
procedural mechanisms constituting international courts and tribunals. 
11
 See chapter 5 of this thesis for further discussion. 
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2. Background to the thesis and research questions 
2.1 The alleged inadequacy of international courts and tribunals in 
environmental disputes 
In general, the UN Charter obliges states to settle their disputes “in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”.
12
 Whenever a dispute 
arises, it has to be settled through a range of mechanisms, enumerated in article 33 UN 
Charter – adjudication being one of them.
13
 It is indeed important to bear in mind that 
international litigation is a part of a broader dispute settlement process. Furthermore, 
article 33 shows that legal mechanisms are optional, and are not meant to be used in the 
first place. Nevertheless, there is a tension nowadays between a certain legalisation of 
dispute settlement procedures and the emergence of many non-binding mechanisms. 
Judicial dispute settlement has been used increasingly over the years, voluntarily or 
through membership to certain treaties and institutions (spanning from the World 
Trade Organisation Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO DSU), the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), to the obligation to accept a binding settlement 
of disputes in order to join a community such as the European Union (EU)). Meanwhile, 
an increasing number of non-binding mechanisms have been created through the 
adoption of many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). In this context, it has 
been admitted there is “ambivalence in state practice and in scholarly commentary 
concerning the role of international environmental litigation”.
14
  
Two phenomena occurring over the last decades have triggered the need for this 
research. On the one hand, the judicialisation of international law
15
 forces international 
tribunals to enhance their procedures as they grow in importance.
16
 On the other hand, 
                                                 
12
 Article 2(3) UN Charter. 
13
 Possible resolution can be found in negotiation, inquiry, conciliation or the use of non-compliance 
procedures for instance.  
14
 Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (CUP 2009) 2. 
15
 See Gleider I Hernández, ‘The Judicialization of International Law: Reflections on the Empirical Turn’ 
(2014) 25 The European Journal of International Law 919. He reviews three main contributions to the 
scholarship on the judicialisation of international law. 
16
 This aspect will be dealt with in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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multiple forms of dispute settlement have grown in importance,
17
 potentially destabilising 
judicial institutions, but also requiring some reinforcement and adaptation from those 
judicial institutions.
18
 In other words, an augmentation of competent courts and tribunals 
(i.e. the International Court of Justice (ICJ), ITLOS, WTO, International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), European Court of Justice (ECJ), Inter-American Human Rights Court 
(IACHR)) has been noted and yet, it is often concluded that, despite playing some role 
in environmental conflicts, the advantages of non-contentious procedures over litigation 
are preferred. The reasons for this choice are based on several elements, of which the 
most prominent ones are the vagueness of environmental rules due to the high degree 
of compromise in the building-process of MEAs, the highly scientific issues raised by 
environmental issues and the multifaceted feature of environmental claims.19  
It is true that environmental protection has needs that are not easily reconcilable with 
the traditional conception of judicial settlement in international law. Some concepts on 
which environmental protection is based go beyond what traditional international law 
can do. The concerns raised about the inadequacy of judicial procedures are mainly 
related to the nature of international courts and tribunals. Some of their features seem 
to be in opposition with the developments in international environmental law.
20
 
In particular, judicial dispute settlement has been criticised for being inherently bilateral 
and adversarial, rendering the integration of third parties difficult and as a result 
obstructing a polycentric approach to solving environmental problems.
21
 International 
environmental law does not only contain reciprocal obligations – the most suited for 
                                                 
17
 See for an overview Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Catherine Redgwell, ‘Environmental Non-Compliance 
Procedures and International Law’ (2000) 31 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 35. 
18
 This aspect will be dealt with in chapter 6. 
19
 Philippe Sands, ‘International Environmental Litigation and Its Future’ (1999) 32 University of 
Richmond Law Review 1619, 1637–1639. 
20
 Tim Stephens, ‘International Environmental Disputes: To Sue or Not to Sue?’ in Natalie Klein (ed), 
Litigating International Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (CUP 2014) 291; Daniel Bodansky, The 
Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2010) 247. 
21
 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Third 





 – but puts a strong emphasis on collaboration between the 
different states, and creates integral obligations. It is often the view that greater 
environmental protection is achieved through better collaborative actions, therefore 
opposing the concept of adjudication. 
Another concern has been raised about the high dependence on scientific knowledge of 
environmental issues, which judicial tribunals can find hard to address.
23
 The complexity 
of the factual settings of environmental disputes and the technical character of such 
disputes create a barrier from a procedural point of view, but also from a financial point 
of view. International litigation can become even more costly.  
It is also often argued that the different remedies provided in judicial decisions do not 
correspond to the preventive nature of environmental protection, which aims primarily 
at avoiding irreparable harm to the environment.
24
 In this context, the length of the 
procedure becomes an issue for effectively reacting to an environmental harm. 
Additionally, the legal standards applied by the courts and tribunals (e.g. the law on state 




Moreover, the nature of certain international obligations can also affect the impact of 
international litigation negatively. Some rules of international environmental law are 
unsettled as to their binding nature or as to their global applicability which can create 
further problems for international courts.
26
 
                                                 
22
 Gerard Hafner, ‘The Physiognomy of Disputes and the Appropriate Means to Resolve Them’ in United 
Nations (ed), International Law as a Language for International Relations. Proceedings of the United 
Nations Congress on Public International Law (Kluwer Law International 1995) 563. 
23
 Philippe Sands, ‘Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive 
Development of International Environmental Law’ in Tafsir Malik Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), 
Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. 
Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 315. 
24
 Richard Bilder, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the International Law of the Environment’ 
(1975) 1 Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours 140, 154–155. 
25
 Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (n 14) 68–69; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell 
(n 21) 236–237. 
26
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 21) 211. 
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Although the ill-suited nature of international courts and tribunals has been broadly 
claimed, states have submitted in the past few years a significant number of cases 
involving environmental protection to various interstate tribunals, namely the ICJ, the 
ITLOS, or arbitration, such as the Whaling case,
27
 the Pulp Mills case,
28
 the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna cases,
29
 the Land Reclamation case,
30
 the Indus Waters Kishenganga 
arbitration,
31
 the Certain Activities in the Boarder Area case,
32
 the Mauritius/UK case,
33
 
and the South China Sea arbitration,
34
 among others. This increase in number of cases 
shows that states themselves are disposed to bring a case to an international tribunal. 
The fact that states accept the character of such entities as judicial organs, and accept 
that judicial bodies have inherent powers and are neither subordinate nor subsidiary to 
any other body is critical for the success of the international judiciary. Sands and Treves 
also explore the implications of this by emphasising the increasing role of courts and 
tribunals in the application of international environmental law.
35
 
Besides, interstate adjudicatory bodies have created frameworks intended to include 
environmental claims as part of their competences, such as the International Court of 
Justice and the creation of the Chamber for Environmental Matters in 1993 
(subsequently closed in 2006 because it had never been used), or the Permanent Court 
                                                 
27
 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan) (Merits) [31 March 2014] ICJ Rep 2014. 
28
 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) [20 April 2010] ICJ 
Rep 2010. 
29
 Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v Japan/Australia v Japan) Provisional Measures, Order of 
27 August 1999) ITLOS Reports 1999. The arbitration was held at ICSID (see www.worldbank.org/icsid). 
30
 Case concerning Land Reclamation in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore) 
(Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003) ITLOS Reports 2003. The dispute was settled on the 
merits under the PCA on the 26 April 2005 (see www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1154). 
31
 Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v India) Final Award (20 December 2013) 
<http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpageb106.html?pag_id=1392>. Under the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
32
 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Merits) [16 
December 2015] ICJ Rep 2015. 
33
 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom) PCA Case No 2011-3 (Final 
Award) [18 March 2015] <http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/11>. 
34
 South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v The People’s Republic of China) PCA 
Case N
o
 2013-19 (Merits) [12 July 2016]. 
35
 Sands, ‘Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive Development of 
International Environmental Law’ (n 23) 317–319. Tullio Treves, ‘Disputes in International 
Environmental Law: Judicial Settlement and Alternative Methods’ in Yann Kerbrat and Sandrine Maljean-




of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources 
and the Environment adopted in 2001 (also never used). These attempts demonstrate 
the tribunals’ willingness to hear environmental cases and their intention to give them a 
special forum. The lack of engagement with those particular developments shows that 
the problem is not about the definition of what environmental disputes are (see below). 
States are willing to use the same fora for disputes concerning the environment, 
emphasising the need for this research.  
2.2 Can we still talk about inadequacy today? If yes, how to resolve it? 
The wider research question at the heart of this thesis is therefore whether international 
courts and tribunals have a meaningful and justifiable role to play in the context of 
environmental law. Can the above arguments against the submission of environmental 
disputes to adjudication be refuted, and to what extent? The central argument and main 
original contribution of my thesis is that, despite many limitations and disadvantages of 
judicial settlement as exemplified above, the mechanisms provided by judicial 
institutions can be used in order to adequately answer violations of international 
environmental law, if the tools and procedures available are used at their full potential. 
Indeed, international courts and tribunals have the potential to solve environmental 
disputes adequately despite the fact that their roles have been challenged. The inherently 
dynamic nature of procedures within international courts and tribunals is at the core of 
the arguments developed in this thesis. Indeed, the gist of the thesis relies on the 
assertion that international courts and tribunals have tools at their disposal that – if used 
appropriately and creatively – can be adapted to the needs of environmental disputes. 
This assertion is substantiated in every chapter by tackling certain critical procedural 
aspects, which altogether form the meat of the argument. In other words, the structure 
of international courts and tribunals is flexible enough to allow developments needed 
for the appropriate handling of environmental disputes, and there is evidence shown 




3. Scope of the thesis 
3.1 Environmental disputes 
What makes a dispute environmental? Some scholars have taken the risk to give a 
definition of environmental disputes: for instance, in 1975, Bilder defined them as “any 
disagreement or conflict of views or interests between States relating to the alteration, 
through human intervention, of natural environmental systems” and enumerated nine 
factors determining in which category a dispute would fall.
 36
 These factors will further 
imply the choice of the adequate resolution mechanism. Cooper, in 1986, gave another 
definition of this kind, enlarging the categories to transnational disputes.
37
 But as 
Romano stressed, the notion of environmental dispute has a changing nature. A rigorous 
definition would not be useful in a broader context.
38
 Sands avoided defining the exact 
content of an environmental conflict by saying that it is useless to define it since parties 
will unlikely agree on characterising a dispute as environmental. For lack of anything 
better, Sands here preferred to talk about “disputes which have an environmental or 
natural resources component or which relate to that”.
39
 
It is important to note that there is no binding decision from an international court or 
tribunal which relates only to environmental law. All judicial decisions contain some 
environmental aspects as well as other aspects. That is why we need objective criteria to 
determine how to recognise an environmental dispute from other disputes.  
The question of defining environmental disputes is intrinsically linked to the question 
of what international environmental law is. Because its sources are disparate, and can 
also contain elements of different areas of international law, disputes follow the same 
pattern. The matter is complicated further by the fact that in certain cases, states may 
have a political incentive to avoid classifying a dispute as environmental, as in the case 
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of Slovakia in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute. Since parties disagree on the nature 
of the dispute, any provisional definition may be useless or inapplicable.  
The definition of a dispute as environmental does not carry many consequences per se. 
Indeed, when parties to a dispute bring a claim to an international court or tribunal, they 
do not name the conflict beforehand. It might partly explain as well why the Special 
Chamber for Environmental Matters in the ICJ had never been used.  
But there have been problems about the impact of international environmental rules on 
other areas of law, such as trade law or human rights law. In this case, whether the 
obligation breached determines the nature of the conflict or the determination of the 
factual situation is the key element in deciding the environmental nature of a dispute. It 
will have consequences on the scope of the dispute. For example, the WTO Panel in 
Canada – Certain Measures affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector did not 
qualify the dispute as related to the environment, rather as a “investment and trade 
dispute”, yet the subject matter of the dispute – the domestic content requirements that 
certain generators of electricity utilizing solar photovoltaic and wind power technology – 
is obviously linked to the protection of the environment.
40
 In this case, the parties’ claims 
did not include any environmental aspects and legitimised the tribunal to reject 
arguments on the basis of environmental protection. Sands confirms this view by saying 
that “at the root of international environmental conflict lies the actual or perceived failure 




The status of such disputes arising under specific treaties that are not environmental 
remains ambiguous, and it is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis to resolve this 
uncertainty. The scope of this thesis indeed is limited to international courts and 
tribunals that can apply international rules directly related to the protection of the 
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environment, excluding other rules that have a tangential relationship to the 
environment.  
3.2 Interstate courts and tribunals 
As said above, the research is focused primarily on interstate judicial bodies which 
directly apply international environmental legal rules. Indeed, a body of international 
rules relating to the environment has grown and can now be described as a field of 
international law. It includes all multilateral and bilateral agreements concluded until 
now concerned with any environmental aspect. It includes all multilateral environmental 
agreements, and any bilateral agreement establishing some environmental obligation to 
a state. 
The application of such environmental rules requires certain procedural adaptations in 
order for international courts and tribunals to render a better judicial interpretation. The 
idea is to understand if and how the judicial institutions established on prevailing 
understandings of the traditional limits of international law can adapt to the specific 
changes required by environmental protection. The scope is therefore determined by 
the application by the courts and tribunals of the environmental rules themselves. Other 
courts like human rights courts, investment tribunals or the World Trade Organisation 
dispute settlement system have to deal with environmental law issues. While they are 
focusing on the integration of environmental regulations into their framework, this thesis 
is interested in the reaction of the institutions of interstate litigation which have to deal 
directly with international environmental law. In order to achieve this, other interstate 
tribunals will be analysed as a comparative tool. 
The international legal system has witnessed a proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals,
42
 but there are not many whose remit includes hearing cases based on 
international environmental rules. However, the existence of different international 
courts and tribunals still offers states different fora to bring their disputes to. There are 
courts of general jurisdiction or more restricted jurisdiction. Some can apply any 
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 or some can only apply a certain area of law (such as the ITLOS
44
). 
Indeed, the extent of the competences of the courts can vary according to some limits, 
namely to the “subject-matter (jurisdiction ratione materiae), person appearing 
(jurisdiction ratione personae), geographical scope (jurisdiction ratione loci), time 
(jurisdiction ratione temporis).”
45
 In particular, the limitations of standing  especially 
concerning the participants in a judicial procedure are of high importance in 
environmental matters. This question will be analysed in the second chapter, as it raises 
issues with substantial environmental rules in regard with standing. Despite this 
proliferation of international courts and tribunals, the fact is that the courts that are 
competent to hear cases based on international environmental law are fewer, precisely 
because of the limitations on the jurisdiction ratione materiae. Courts such as the WTO 
DSU, the ICC or the human rights courts cannot hear cases directly based on 
environmental rules because their jurisdiction is limited to specific areas (trade, criminal 
or human rights law). The remit of this thesis will consequently be limited to the courts 
that can apply directly international environmental law: the ICJ, the ITLOS and 
arbitration.  
This thesis includes both permanent courts and arbitration, because it is the existence 
of certain powers and characteristics exercised through their contentious jurisdiction that 
makes an institution judicial, including arbitration. In order to decide whether the court 
or tribunal has jurisdiction, it must exercise the “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” either 
provided by a treaty or through its inherent powers.
46
 The sources of their inherent 
powers can be explained differently, but all courts agree they are given some inherent 
powers.
47
 The use of this Kompetenz-Kompetenz by the international courts and 
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tribunals themselves is a determinative element in establishing the judicial character of a 
certain court. Accordingly, both permanent courts and arbitration have judicial powers 
that are scrutinised in this research. Moreover, a large number of multilateral 
environmental agreements specially mention arbitration as a means to settle disputes, 
sometimes in conjunction with other fora such as the ICJ, sometimes as a compulsory 
means to settle them.
48
 
4. Structure of the thesis 
The broad argument developed in this thesis takes different forms. It is shaped in order 
to emphasise at each procedural step where the pitfalls are and how they can be tackled. 
The thesis is centred on the idea that international courts and tribunals have a role to 
play in the protection of the environment, and it seeks to define the contours of their 
role. Indeed, within the given scope of international adjudication, there are ways of 
interpretation, mechanisms and procedures that can be developed. These often prove 
helpful for enhancing environmental protection through traditional adjudication. 
Indeed, by analysing the most contentious procedural aspects of international litigation, 
this thesis will be able to assess the suitability of such litigation for environmental 
disputes. It will conclude that the procedural changes necessary to a more understanding 
judicial system can be done within the existing legal boundaries of current international 
courts and tribunals. 
But before tackling each individual procedural pitfall, the thesis defines what roles 
international courts and tribunals can play in environmental disputes. Therefore, the 
first chapter considers the different functions of international courts and tribunals and 
how the specificities of environmental disputes affect those functions. 
Once the roles of international litigation have been established, the thesis focuses on 
three main procedural steps at stake in environmental disputes. In the second chapter, 
the analysis concentrates on how the judicial procedures can be triggered (or the 
question ‘how to get in’). In chapters three and four, it looks at the mechanisms and 
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procedural problems attached to the judicial bodies (or ‘once you are in’). Finally, the 
fifth chapter focuses on the location of judicial bodies within the broader dispute 
settlement regime relevant for the application of international environmental law (or 
‘in/out relationships’). With these three broad elements, it is then possible to evaluate 
the role international courts and tribunals play, and to establish their limitations and 
advantages.  
In particular, the second chapter concerns the rules on standing to access international 
adjudicatory bodies and how they can be interpreted in different ways: is there potential 
for broader applications, including the defence of public interests? Public interest 
litigation will be contextualised within the field of international environmental law. This 
body of rules will be defined as a multi-layered set of rules, layers that will be correlated 
with the structure of international litigation. On this basis, the implementation of 
international environmental law in judicial procedures will be analysed. Jurisprudence 
particularly shows that both other non-state actors and states can participate and 
contribute to the defence of public interests in interstate disputes. Given the centrality 
of global commons to international environmental law, this chapter deserves special 
emphasis. It focuses on the potential compatibility of the international judicial system as 
a traditionally state-centric system with developments in international environmental law, 
and offers an original interpretation of the ways to overcome the discrepancy with 
disputes over areas and resources beyond national jurisdiction and global environmental 
problems. 
The third chapter scrutinises how facts are established in an environmental dispute. This 
task is of paramount importance for the good functioning and relevance of international 
dispute settlement. Complex environmental cases based on contradictory and 
controversial scientific evidence require more developed judicial procedures, but are the 
international courts and tribunals equipped for those? The uncertainty around the 
accuracy of scientific facts will be reviewed, examining the types of evidence that can be 
brought before international courts and the way these courts judge on the evidence. 
 Moreover, even though international courts and tribunals were not designed as a 
preventive mechanism at first – rather as a reactive system of dispute resolution, the 
fourth chapter of the thesis will demonstrate how provisional measures as a preventive 
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judicial mechanism can adjust this assumption. In the context of the current law on 
remedies as stated in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, provisional measures of 
protection can fill an important gap.  
Lastly, because of the existence of non-compliance procedures and judicial dispute 
settlement within most multilateral environmental treaties, the question of what kinds of 
relationships exist between the two procedures is highly significant. While there has not 
been a case where both procedures were triggered at the same time, conceptually, it is 
important to develop a model of how the relationship should be and what consequences 
are attached to each model. This will also reinforce both the role of international dispute 
settlement in environmental conflicts and the overall enforcement of international 
environmental obligations. 
The analysis will be concluded by emphasising that the existing resources available to 
international courts and tribunals can be used and interpreted in a manner adequate and 
coherent with environmental disputes. The thesis indeed shows how certain 
developments necessary for environmental disputes have already been used in certain 
instances. Although the future use of international courts and tribunals cannot be 
predicted, this thesis argues that the procedural rules as they stand can be interpreted 
and used in a favourable way for judging environmental disputes in a coherent manner. 
Indeed, the opening of judicial litigation to non-state actors and the recognition of certain 
public interests in the current jurisprudence shows that international courts and tribunals 
are capable to evolve in this direction. The use of science in international litigation can 
also be adapted to the needs of environmental disputes. Similarly, the use of provisional 
measures in a compatible way with environmental disputes can be noticed, and therefore 
pushed further in the future, without the need of formal reform. Finally, the potential 
collaboration between non-compliance mechanisms and international courts and 
tribunals also enhances the judicial protection and adequacy of international courts and 
tribunals.  
5. Methodology 
The choice of methodology stems from the type of questions this research is asking. 
Indeed, because of the research is focused on what are the issues potentially preventing 
international courts and tribunals in applying environmental law and how international 
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courts and tribunals can use their judicial tools in order to accommodate specific 
demands of international environmental law, the methodology therefore can only be 
doctrinal. My theoretical approach does not aim at analysing the law as it should be 
through a particular lens – it rather analyses how the law is interpreted in a certain 
context. This research is based on a pragmatic approach. The focus is on the 
development of the law. Therefore, the objective of the thesis is to examine the 
development of the law and practice in a particular context. Such objective will be 
achieved by also focusing on good practices, even if they are a minority. Such good 








1. THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION  
This chapter seeks to explain the different functions of international adjudication when 
confronted with cases related to international environmental law. The fact that 
international courts and tribunals can serve different purposes exemplifies the pluralistic 
nature of adjudication. It is not limited to one task; rather it has to juggle multiple facets 
of its role. Indeed, international courts and tribunals have not only settled particular 
environmental disputes, but also developed a body of decisions that have helped to 
shape international environmental law.
49
 This chapter will explore how they have done 
this. 
As written in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the function of the Court is “to decide in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it”. This sentence 
summarises the essence of the judicial power and introduces the two main roles 
international courts and tribunals fulfil. They are meant to settle disputes in a particular 
manner: based on international law. Other functions lurk around international courts 
and tribunals: can they create new law? Can they use their authority to solve cases in the 
public interest? Can they enforce certain international rules? The exact extent of powers 
given to international judicial bodies is not as clear as often portrayed. Many different 
factors play a significant role in shaping the way international courts and tribunals will be 
used by litigants and the way courts themselves choose how to exercise their powers.
50
  
Within this context, what can international litigation do? This chapter argues that 
international judicial bodies’ roles can vary depending on different factors: the context 
in which they were given jurisdiction; the nature of the judicial institution itself; the 
domestic politics affecting the choice to use international litigation; the nature of the legal 
obligations to be implemented; the fact that international adjudication is part of the 
international legal system as a whole – and due to its particular position it will have to 
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answer to broader public interests. These different factors will be analysed in light of the 
different functions performed by international courts and tribunals. 
The existence of such varied factors affecting the judicial process and its aims is the 
reason why adjudication needs to be flexible.
51
 There is no single appropriate answer for 
all environmental disputes and it is the judicial capacity of international courts and 
tribunals that allows them to bring different solutions according to different needs of 
each environmental dispute.  
This chapter will review the different functions judicial bodies can perform, and highlight 
the specific challenges or factors that influence them in carrying out these functions in 
environmental cases. It firstly offers an account of what it means for international courts 
to give an authoritative determination of the legal disputes, focusing on both the 
identification of customary international law and the process of treaty interpretation by 
tribunals. It then investigates whether that leads towards a judicial law-making function. 
The chapter also analyses the dispute settlement function and its limits, as well as how 
public interests can be integrated in international litigation. Finally, it looks at the impact 
of domestic and international politics on the overall role of international courts and 
tribunals in an environmental context. 
1.1 The legal context of international environmental disputes 
International environmental law is a relatively young legal field, encompassing many 
different political and legal issues, which do not develop evenly. In addition, conventions 
are ratified at every level; globally, regionally and bilaterally. As a consequence, the 
content of similar obligations can vary between legal instruments. Some areas of 
protection are more developed for some states than for others.  
 At the global level, international environmental law tends to have a more diluted content 
due to the high degree of compromise required for the negotiation of multilateral 
environmental agreements. Indeed, it is important to bear in mind the consensual nature 
of most of the treaties related to the protection of the environment, such as the 
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UNFCCC. It follows that multilateral treaties often contain ambiguities and 
uncertainties. Besides, treaties are not the only source of international environmental 
law. More and more soft law instruments are being used to develop further 
environmental principles, through various actors. Soft law can be found in a variety of 
instruments and is often the product of actions by international organisations and 
NGOs, as well as states. It encompasses weak treaty provisions, declarations following 
international conferences, recommendations taken by treaty bodies, and codes of 
conducts or standards, the common denominator between these varied instruments 
being that they are non-binding.
52
 All these actions taken together might or might not 
create customary rules, a task often left for international courts to decide (see below 
1.2.i).  
Rules on environmental protection are also mixing with other fields of international law, 
such as investment law, trade law or human rights law. All these elements have an impact 
on how international courts can solve a dispute and also require a particular law-making 
function. In particular, this means that international courts and tribunals will be faced 
with legal questions about the relationships between these bodies of rules, such as the 
challenges of interpretation of specific non-environmental rules in the light of further 
environmental legal developments.
53
 International courts and tribunals can offer nuance, 
affirm principles, and confirm trends that affect the whole field; they assure a dynamic 
response to change.  
The nature of the environmental obligations under judicial scrutiny will also affect the 
success of the settlement of the dispute. Vague rules make it more difficult for 
international courts and tribunals to end a dispute (see below section 1.3.iii). 
Consequently, the nature of international environmental rules will have different impacts 
on how international courts and tribunals perform their functions. These specificities 
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will affect both how international courts and tribunals determine the law authoritatively, 
settle the dispute, and integrate public interests into the judicial procedure. 
1.2 The authoritative determination of the law 
The authoritative determination of the law is part and parcel of the dispute settlement 
function of any judicial body, but it is a distinct step towards the resolution of the dispute, 
which entails the performance of specific functions. Indeed, there is a difference 
between a court interpreting legal rules and applying them to a concrete case, although 
they often are exercised together: by applying rules to a certain case, an international 
tribunal has to first give an interpretation of those rules.
54
 Although a judicial decision is 
created through the exercise of both functions, this section will only focus on the 
particular aspect of the determination of the law. 
By defining the applicable law the different constitutive treaties imply that international 
courts and tribunals have the capacity to judge according to the law. A judicial institution 
must have the power to declare what the law is to be called “judicial”. It assumes that the 
judges know the law and that they can determine it.
55
 As an autonomous body, although 
tied to the subject matter defined by the parties to the dispute, a judicial court or tribunal 
is not bound by the parties’ arguments and can assess the state of the law itself.
56
 Indeed, 
the ICJ reinforced a pre-existing principle in the Arrest Warrant case whereby: 
“it is the duty of the Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final 
submissions of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not included 
in those submissions […]. While the Court is thus not entitled to decide upon 
questions not asked of it, the non ultra petita rule nonetheless cannot preclude 
the Court from addressing certain legal points in its reasoning”.
57
 
                                                 
54
 Stephan Wittich, ‘The Judicial Functions of the International Court of Justice’ in Isabelle Buffard and 
others (eds), International Law Between Universalism and Fragmentation: Festschrift in Honour of 
Gerhard Hafner (Brill/Nijhoff 2008) 991–992. 
55
 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Makane Moïse Mbengue, ‘A Propos Du Caractère Juridictionnel 
de La Procédure de Non-Respect Du Protocole de Kyoto’ in Sandrine Maljean-Dubois (ed), 
Changements climatiques: les enjeux du contrôle international (Centre d’études et de recherches 
internationales et communautaires, Université Pau-Cézanne 2007) 85–86. 
56
 Dinah Shelton, ‘Form, Function, and the Powers of International Courts’ (2009) 9 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 537, 543. 
57
 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) (Merits) [2002] ICJ 
Rep 2002, p 3, par. 43. 
21 
 
International courts and tribunals will therefore base their reasoning on international 
law, which means that they will use the different sources of international law to formulate 
their decisions as displayed in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, including treaty rules, 
customary rules and general principles. Regarding international environmental law, they 
can be summarised as followed: statements issued by international conferences such as 
the Rio Declaration concluded in 1992; different governmental policy statements; many 
non-binding instruments containing recommended standards, such as the guidelines and 
procedures adopted by the COP/MOP of different multilateral environmental treaties; 
global, regional or bilateral treaties; international customs. Moreover, international law 
as understood in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute includes international judicial decisions, 
even as a subsidiary means.
58
 Judicial decisions indeed are part of the body of 
international environmental law, as they represent authoritative interpretation of the law, 
and will be used as such throughout the body of existing international environmental 
rules. Through the settlement of specific cases, the various judicial bodies have clarified 
and developed both treaty obligations and customary obligations related to 
environmental protection.
59
 This is an important feature of international courts and 
tribunals that must be emphasised, representing one of the strengths of international 
courts and tribunals instead of a weakness.  
Judicial bodies have always had to fill existing gaps in the law, and this broader function 
is to be understood in this context in the sense of developing, adapting, modifying, filling 
gaps, interpreting, or even branching out a new direction.
60
 The following two sections 
will focus primarily on the role of international courts in identifying customary 
international rules and then their roles in relation to treaty disputes. 
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i. Identification of customary international law 
The exact content and process of creation of international custom occupies the centre 
of the international legal scholarship,
61
 yet still remains to be agreed on unanimously. 
The judges illustrated this in the Iron Rhine arbitration through the assertion that “there 
is considerable debate as to what, within the field of environmental law, constitutes 
“rules” or “principles”; what is “soft law”; and which environmental treaty law or 
principles have contributed to the development of customary international law.”
62
 
This section highlights the important role of international courts in the identification of 
customary rules in relation to international environmental law, a process that requires 
the courts and tribunals to adapt to the “new” models of customary law-making. Indeed, 
international environmental law consists of different types of rules, and this must be 
reflected in the judicial practice.  
Generally, previous cases have shown the willingness of the ICJ to recognise some work 
of the ILC as representing customary rules;
63
 UNGA resolutions and declarations have 
also been identified as playing a role in the identification of custom,
64
 as well as 
multilateral treaties, especially when they are reached by consensus.
65
 
In particular, the ICJ recognised in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
reproduced in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration were of customary nature, as “part of 
the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.
66
 This was further 
confirmed in the Iron Rhine arbitration where the tribunal stated that the duty to prevent 
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significant harm to the environment “has now become a principle of general 
international law”.
67
 By doing so, the tribunal clearly develops the concept under scrutiny 
and confirms its legal status. Moreover, the achievement of the recognition of an 
international court of a concept as legal is a reflection of the conduct of many different 
actors.  
Another example of the judicial identification of a customary environmental rule is 
found in the now famous Pulp Mills case, stating that  
“the obligation to protect and preserve, under Article 41 (a) of the Statute [of 
the River Uruguay], has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which 
in recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be 
considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed 
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary 
context, in particular, on a shared resource.”
68
 
What is most interesting in this case is that in the analysis of the existence of such an 
obligation to make an environmental impact assessment, the Court mentioned different 
texts, namely the ESPOO Convention, the UNEP Goals and Principles of 
Environmental Impact Assessment and the ILC 2001 draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.
69
 Although the ESPOO Convention 
and the ILC draft articles were excluded from the court’s reasoning, the principle 5 of 
the UNEP Goals and Principles was used by the court as a tool to identify a customary 
rule on environmental impact assessment. The non-binding nature of the document did 
not prevent the court from using it directly.
70
 This is a great example of the court 
acknowledging and integrating soft law instruments as part of the formation of customary 
law.  
In the Certain Activities case, the ICJ reinforced its findings in the Pulp Mills case and 
added that the obligation to exercise due diligence to avoid causing significant 
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transboundary harm is generally applicable to all activities undertaken by States, and not 
only to industrial activities: 
Although the Court’s statement in the Pulp Mills case refers to industrial 
activities, the underlying principle applies generally to proposed activities which 
may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context. Thus, to fulfil 
its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant transboundary 
environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on an activity having the 
potential adversely to affect the environment of another State, ascertain if there 
is a risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the requirement 
to carry out an environmental impact assessment.
71
 
Another area where international courts and tribunals have offered some positive 
insights is related to sustainable development. Several decisions have mentioned the role 
of sustainable development in international law, although not as a customary rule. But 
the fact such an extended web of cases using the concept of sustainable development 
exists is a great contribution to its evolution. Important decisions include the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case, the Pulp Mills case, the Iron Rhine arbitration,
72
 and the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber’s 2011 Advisory Opinion.
73
 
By using soft law instruments in their decisions, judicial bodies give them normative 
force. They can identify what is legal in a soft law instrument.  Indeed, in international 
environmental law in particular, there is a “diffusion of participation in the development 
of interstitial norms”,
74
 as the development of the concept of sustainable development 
shows. All sorts of actors, from scientists to political organs have framed the concept 
little by little.
75
 The work of these actors is paid back when an international court 
recognises a concept as part of international law. 
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ii. Treaty interpretation and application 
International courts and tribunals are particularly relevant in the interpretation and 
application of international environmental agreements. Although it rarely constitutes a 
compulsory method of resolving disputes that arise in the context of those agreements, 
judicial dispute settlement is mentioned as one of the main ways to do so. Importantly, 
ad hoc arbitration is often a preferred judicial forum within multilateral environmental 
agreements,
76
 the alternative being that states can choose between the ICJ and 
arbitration.
77
 Cases arising under the UNCLOS will be heard either by an ad hoc /special 
arbitral tribunal or by the ITLOS, or by the ICJ.
78
 
Moreover, many – if not all – recent cases involving aspects of international 
environmental law have been based on specific treaties. For instance, the Pulp Mills case 
was brought to the court under the bilateral Statute of the River Uruguay; the 
Kishenganga Arbitration was brought under the Indus Waters Treaty between India and 
Pakistan; the Whaling case under the multilateral ICRW. The UNCLOS has also been 
a source of many environmental disputes (such as the Land Reclamation case,
79
 the 
Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitration,
80
 the MOX Plant case,
81




Specific, treaty-related dispute settlement clauses exist for the sole purpose of solving 
disputes arising under the particular treaties. They aim to make the treaty function well 
through interpretation, application, and execution. In doing so they take into account 
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the purposes of the treaty in question, giving a limited jurisdiction to the specific judicial 
bodies mentioned.  
In the context of the interpretation and application of treaty rules, judicial decisions have 
a special role: they give coherence to the treaty system. Courts also have a role to play in 
the preservation of the integrity of the treaty.
83
 The judicial machinery is used as an 
external independent reviewer deciding upon internal questions raised within the 
application of the treaty. In this case scenario, having an identified body to review the 
interpretation and application of the treaty guarantees its integrity against diverse and 
opposite views.
84
 A good example is given by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
This treaty is special because it was negotiated as a “package deal”, as an integral whole. 
It makes the protection of the convention’s integrity even more important than in any 
treaty. Therefore, they introduced tools to preserve its integrity. First, the possibility of 
making reservations to the convention is prohibited (Article 309 UNCLOS). Second, a 
compulsory dispute settlement clause is introduced (Article 286 UNCLOS).
85
 Such a 
compulsory mechanism has been established with the aim of offering a collective 
authoritative body to interpret the Convention and therefore stabilise it. This 
compulsory jurisdiction affects the general role that the international tribunal will take. 
By conferring such jurisdiction, the treaty confers the judiciary the task of looking after 
it by offering one unique forum for a homogenous application of the treaty.
86
 
Moreover, especially since the multiplication of treaties concerning the environment, 
international courts and tribunals are a cornerstone for a more harmonious international 
environmental legal framework.
87
 International litigation can have an impact on the 
fragmentation of international law, especially in the context of international 
environmental law. Because of the variety of its sources and the importance of non-
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binding developments, international courts are an important forum where all these 
sources can come together. Indeed, global, regional and bilateral environmental treaties 
are often interpreted with the help of non-binding instruments. This is why the ILC 
Report on Fragmentation emphasised the role of a systemic integration as a tool for 
harmonisation.
88
 In this context, courts have resorted to extraneous rules in interpreting 
treaties.
89
 For example, in the Pulp Mills case, the identification of a new customary rule 
developed after the conclusion of the River Uruguay Treaty made it possible to update 
the meaning of the treaty to the current legal developments (see section above 1.2.i). 
Such coherence given by judicial decision through holistic and updated interpretations 
of the existing international environmental legal framework is reinforced by the 
acceptance by an individual tribunal of the other tribunals’ jurisprudence. The fact that 
many judicial institutions flourished rapidly and have been quite active (some more than 
others) not only proves their influence on the development of legal concepts but also 
that there is a level of interaction between them. For example, the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber of the ITLOS referred to the ICJ Pulp Mills case several times as the law at 
the time.
90
 The tribunal in the Iron Rhine arbitration also quoted the ICJ Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case in relation to the concept of sustainable development.
91
 The fact that 
they are different jurisdictions did not prevent them from acknowledging the relevant 
developments made by other tribunals. These interactions not only stem from Article 
38 (1)(d) of the ICJ Statute and the understanding that judicial decisions have an impact 
on the formation of international law, but also show the willingness of each court not to 
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In sum, coherence within a treaty system and systemic coherence between all the 
relevant rules related to a specific problem are two sides of one coin: articles 31-33 of 
the VCLT aim at achieving both.
93
 The role of the courts in deciding environmental 
cases is affected precisely by how they understand what treaty interpretation means. For 
example, the fact that “old” treaties have to be interpreted in light of current state of the 
law and include the later developments (evolutionary approach) is a vague principle that 
can be applied in many ways.
94
 Indeed, it can be about the applicability of a certain treaty 
to modern use – in order to create coherence within the treaty system – or about the 
need for a renewed meaning of a treaty rule in light of new developments in other part 
of international law, in order to create systemic coherence. 
The jurisdiction ratione materiae of the particular tribunal also affects how it will 
understand and shape its mandate in interpreting and applying the law to the dispute: 
“Specific treaty-based tribunals will validly pursue a judicial policy that stresses the 
general objectives of the constituent treaty and the regime created by it”.
95
 In this respect, 
the ICJ’s general jurisdiction means the court does not have to conform to a specific 
institutional setting. Its interpretation is not bound to a single treaty, such as the ITLOS. 
The process itself of interpreting treaties, broadly regulated by articles 31 to 33 of the 
VCLT, has occupied scholars over the years.
96
 In particular, how international courts 
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and tribunals will perform their interpretative function has been described as 
paradoxical: the paradox lies in the fact that there is 
“more demand for treaty interpretation, given ambiguity and rigidity of treaties, 
yet less supply of treaty interpretation, given the reluctance of states and (more 
often than not) tribunals to deal judicially with highly contested questions 
between sovereign states (sensitivity of treaties).”
97
 
The need for judicial bodies to clarify and interpret treaties clashes with the will of states 
to be in control of their own obligations. And the role of international courts and 
tribunals takes place within this context. They are themselves aware of this tension and 
need to balance between how innovative they are and how the states will receive their 
decisions. 
The performance of an international tribunal in relation to a treaty dispute will also 
depend on the nature of the rules invoked in the judicial procedure and how precise or 
vague they are. For example, the UNFCCC is almost impossible to breach since it is an 
umbrella Convention and its rules are meant to be broad and vague. The fact that the 
rules themselves are not precise affects how international courts and tribunals function. 
Overall, by interpreting international law, especially environmental treaties, bilateral or 
multilateral, the statements made by courts have a broad impact on the international 
community. As Lowe said, “litigation is there to strengthen the international legal system 
as such. It reasserts and strengthens the rules and principles applied by the tribunal”.
98
 
iii. Between development of the law and law-making 
How far can international tribunals go in developing and filling the gaps? Where is the 
line beyond which a tribunal oversteps its judicial function?  
There is a “golden rule” when it comes to judicial law-making. The principle according 
to which international courts and tribunals cannot legislate is well established in the 
jurisprudence. The ICJ affirmed in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
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Weapons Advisory Opinion that “it is clear that the Court cannot legislate”.
99
 In addition, 
the ICJ said in the Interpretation of the Peace Treaties Advisory Opinion that “it is the 
duty of the Court to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them”.
100
 It also said in the 
Armed Activities case that “the task of the Court must be to respond, on the basis of 
international law, to the particular legal dispute brought before it. As it interprets and 
applies the law, it will be mindful of context, but its task cannot go beyond that.”
101
 This 
is the reason why the ICJ has rejected some arguments put forward by the parties over 
the years, as it did in the South West Africa case: “the whole necessity argument appears, 
in the final analysis, to be based on considerations of an extra-legal character, the product 
of a process of after-knowledge”.
102
 This shows understanding from the Court that it will 
not expand its role to that of a lawmaker. The authoritative determination of the law is 
a broader function than the settlement of a dispute, but the judicial power is clearly 
distinct from the legislative power. This latter power is left for the states and any other 
institutions states confer the powers to do so, but not judicial institutions.  
Nonetheless, international courts and tribunals have a role to play in the development 
of international law. It is undeniable to acknowledge the role of litigation in making 
international law, especially in the field of international environmental law. Indeed, the 
judge may have no choice but to make law. Gaps in the law are inevitable. Judicial law-
making is therefore a reality. However, a distinction can be drawn between general law-
making in the legislative sense and creating a rule applicable to the parties to a particular 
dispute.
103
 A court’s law-making powers must stem from the case in hand; they are 
shaped by the specific circumstances under dispute and by the parties’ requests. They 
cannot be conceived a priori.
104
 By doing that, we can see that while courts do tweak the 
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rules, they do not make new law. In this context, advisory opinions, although non-
binding, can be very relevant.
105
 The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS for 
instance explained why the advisory jurisdiction exists: 
“[i]n order to exercise its functions properly in accordance with the Convention, 
the Authority may require the assistance of an independent and impartial judicial 
body. This is the underlying reason for the advisory jurisdiction of the Chamber. 
In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the Chamber is part of the system in which 
the Authority’s organs operate, but its task within that system is to act as an 
independent and impartial body.”
106
 
When the Court pronounces an advisory opinion, it effectively “makes law for all 
member (and non-member states)”.
107
 In the field of international environmental law, 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was 
asked to precisely clarify “the legal responsibilities and obligations of State Parties to the 
Convention with respect to the sponsorship of activities in the Area”. By completing this 
task, the Chamber developed key concepts and gave an understanding which goes 
beyond the mere question requested by the Council of the International Seabed 
Authority (ISA). French highlights the importance of the decision outside the scope of 
the delimited request therefore defining and giving some teeth to some key concepts, all 
regrouped under the concept of sustainable development.
108
 This opinion is a good 
example of the proactive role of an international court in developing environmental 
concepts. For instance, the Chamber notes that: 
“Judicial bodies may not perform functions that are not in keeping with their 
judicial character. Nonetheless, without encroaching on the policy choices a 
sponsoring State may make, the Chamber deems it appropriate to indicate some 
general considerations that a sponsoring State may find useful in its choice of 
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measures under articles 139, paragraph 2, 153, paragraph 4, and Annex III, 
article 4, paragraph 4, of the Convention”.
109
 
However, controversies exist in relation to the limits of this law-making power attributed 
to international courts and tribunals. Distinctions between “authoritative determinations 
of legal questions” and “judicial activism” have arisen where judicial activism was 
considered as a step too far, going beyond the judicial function of international 
adjudication.
110
 In the same decision, the Seabed Disputes Chamber specifically gives 
policy advice to the ISA in relation to the creation of a trust fund, which could fill the 
gap in liability previously identified.
111
 The legal incentive for the Seabed Dispute 
Chamber to do so is article 235 (3) UNCLOS, which affirms that “[…] States shall 
cooperate in … the development of criteria and procedures for payment of adequate 
compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds”. The Chamber 
also highlights that article 304 UNCLOS expressly foresees the development of “further 
rules regarding responsibility and liability under international law”.
112
 Whether or not 
these suggestions made by the tribunal extend beyond the realm of its judicial powers is 
a contentious issue. 
Given the scope of the questions asked to the Chamber and the purpose of the advisory 
jurisdiction, it can be argued this statement does not exceed the judicial powers of the 
Chamber, yet occupies a position at the very edge of its judicial powers. It was indeed 
requested to define “the extent of liability of a State Party for any failure to comply with 
the provisions of the Convention by an entity whom it has sponsored”.
113
 In answering 
this question, the tribunal can only recognise a gap in the existing legal framework, which 
it does not try to fill itself. It merely mentions the possibilities offered by the convention 
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itself. Moreover, these policy suggestions are a reflection of the existing legal rules, not 
a new addition to the law. 
The Bering Sea Fur Seal arbitration is a special case where the parties to the dispute 
specifically asked the tribunal to “determine what concurrent Regulations, outside the 
jurisdictional limits of the respective Governments, are necessary, and over what waters 
such Regulations should extend”.
114
 The arbitrators adopted a series of articles that 
should apply to the waters in question in the future. This process is exceptional, but was 
expressly asked and agreed on by the parties since the beginning of the judicial 
procedure.
115
 It demonstrates how the will of the parties can affect the role of 
international courts and tribunals. 
However, some dangers in relation to judicial activism must be underlined. The 
question of the democratic foundation of law-making in a broad sense by the judiciary 
is relevant in this debate. Scholars distinguish between “surrogate law-making” and 
“independent law-making”, where the former seems inappropriate and the latter seems 
to comply the most with democratic principles. The difference between the two lies in 
the fact that courts and tribunals should not be influenced by or dependent on powerful 
states using them in their own interest.
116
 Indeed, it is only by making sure that 
international courts and tribunals keep their independence from states’ interests that 
their law-making capacities are guaranteed. 
Another counter-argument to the view that judicial law-making should exist is about the 
transfer of powers. Some scholars criticise the courts’ judicial activism and say that law-
making through traditional sources of law has been transferred to decision-making by 
courts.
117
 International courts and tribunals might be used as instruments for achieving 
other aims. Furthermore, a judicial answer might not be the best option in hand. There 
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can be many flaws to the system. 
118
 Judges can overcome their power and render a 
decision legally unjustified.
119
 It can happen either when they are considered as lacking 
deference to the lawmakers or when their conducts are not considered as following what 
the judiciary should do.
120
 
As an example of this tension, in the Nuclear Tests II case, the limits of the judicial 
powers of the Court were questioned. New Zealand asked to re-open the 1974 case 
against France’s nuclear testing. France, however, had withdrawn its consent to 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Although it was decided to dismiss the case, few 
judges dissented and argued the Court should have taken a more proactive approach. 
In particular, Judge Palmer summarised the tension as follows: 
“In this case the Court had an opportunity to make a contribution to one of the 
most critical environmental issues of our time. It has rejected the opportunity for 
technical legal reasons which could in my opinion have been decided the other 
way, fully consonant with proper legal reasoning. It is true that much of the 
jurisdiction of this Court rests upon the consent of States. It is true that France 
has withdrawn the consent that allowed the 1974 case to be heard. That is not 
an adequate reason to refrain from re-opening the case, a possibility that the 
Judgment in 1974 expressly contemplated. The case is one the Court had the 




Moreover, he sustained on the basis of Lauterpacht and Fitzmaurice’s theories that the 
courts are here to promote and generally develop international law, because on the one 
hand the questions asked are of a greater interest of the international community and 
global environment (based on a sociological approach) and on the other hand the role 
of international courts is to “advance human purposes”.
122
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After understanding what international courts and tribunals can do, it is important to 
know why they can do it. What makes international courts entitled to fill the gaps left by 
the legislative process? On the one hand, article 38 of the ICJ Statute says that judicial 
decisions are only “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”, which means 
that as such, judicial decisions are not part of the formal sources of law. On the other 
hand, the decisions made by international courts and tribunals are persuasive, especially 
when the jurisprudence is constant. From the court’s perspective, it is clear that judges 
want to reach a broader impact on the international community as a result of the fact 
that they can write general and abstract statements (obiter dicta).
123
 Lauterpacht 
acknowledges this function, saying: “it is proper to search not only for the law behind 
the cases decided by the Court, but also for the wider legal principle behind the legal 
rules authoritatively laid down by it”.
124
 It is also true from the actors’ perspective. They 
expect courts to deliver their judgements according to the past decisions. They “develop 
their expectations along generalisations based on elements of the decision”.
125
 
Several scholars have analysed why international courts and tribunals have the potential 
to make law. Von Bogdandy and Venzke note that: 
“Robert Brandom […], has shown that every decision concerning the use or, 
which is the same, interpretation of a concept contributes to the making of its 
content. The discretionary as well as creative element in the application of the 
law makes the law. He refines this position by suggesting that this moment of 
volition is tamed by the fact that judges are tied to past practices by the 
prospective reception of their claims. Pragmatism does not mean that anything 
goes. Applications of the law in the present have to connect to the past in a way 
that is convincing in the future (footnotes omitted).”
126
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This triggers the question of a systemic precedential effect influencing all states subjects 
to a tribunal’s jurisdiction. What weight is given to precedents? The WTO for instance 
is quite clear on the question in its decision on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages:  
“Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are 
often considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations 
among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where 
they are relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with 




It is worth noting that the Statute of the International Court of Justice has an 
explicit provision, Article 59, to the same
 
effect. This has not inhibited the 
development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in which 
considerable
 
reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible.”
127
 
As de Brabandere summed up, “[n]o precedential value is attached to judicial and 
arbitral decisions in international law and the case law of the ICJ and ITLOS has 




But the system is made so that judgments contribute to building a body of international 
jurisprudence and to norm-developing. Lauterpacht said that “judicial law-making is a 
permanent feature of administration of justice in every society.”
129
  In sum, international 
courts and tribunals have contributed to the clarification of certain environmental 
obligations, customary or treaty-based. Although their role is very limited in the 
development of new environmental practices, judicial decisions have consolidated, 
updated and integrated certain environmental rules. 
iv. Factors affecting the legal development function 
There are different views on the relationship between judges on the one hand and the 
existing legislation on the other. The notion that judicial bodies will give substance to 
existing rules on investment protection was a key reason for the creation of the ICSID. 
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Indeed, the idea of “procedure before substance” was a driving force in the conception 
of the ICSID. It was argued that “the substance, i.e. the law of investment protection, 
would follow in the practice of adjudication”.
130
 The consequence is that the whole 
regime of investment law will be infused by this approach. International tribunals might 
then experience more freedom to use their judicial powers to expand on the law. 
This shows that different jurisdictions might have different incentives to act in certain 
ways. A distinction can be made between permanent institutions and ad hoc tribunals. 
In the latter case, the tension is less visible since there is no possibility of a future similar 
case arising under their jurisdiction – the tribunal dissolves automatically. Moreover, 
because the state parties choose the arbitrators themselves, they are not as legitimated as 
judges on permanent courts, who are elected collegially. There is nonetheless a caveat 
inasmuch the arbitrators themselves can influence the outcome of the arbitration. In 
permanent courts, although the balance between the best outcome for the parties and 
the best outcome for the broader international community is harder to find, they are 
expected to protect other interests beyond the ones at stake in the case.
131
 
Currently there is a move towards the legalisation of international institutions, including 
international courts and tribunals, but not limited to judicialisation. It also includes the 
work of the other actors on the international scene at every step from the creation of 
new rules to their implementation. In particular, the process through which norms are 
created impacts the way in which international courts and tribunals come to a decision. 
Indeed, the precision of the rule in question, and the degree of obligation contained in 
it, are factors that have to be taken into account in assessing the roles of international 
courts and tribunals in an environmental context.
132
 
For example, the Southern Bluefin Tuna case shows the correlation between the 
substantive law and the role of the tribunal. As the subject matter – the management of 
tuna stocks – is proceduralised without a substantial agreement among the parties, it 
leaves the tribunal in an awkward position. Should the tribunal leave it to the parties to 
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decide on the substantive obligations, taking up the role of a conciliator and advising the 
parties to negotiate further? The ITLOS, in its provisional measures award, follows this 
path in requiring the states to negotiate further.
133
 It can, however, be argued that since 
the parties to the CCSBT could not agree on substantive management of stocks, they 
delegated the work to the Commission – the political branch of the CCSBT’s 
proceduralisation process – as well as to the ITLOS (the legal branch of the CCSBT’s 
proceduralisation process). This delegation can then allow the ITLOS to have a more 
proactive role, acknowledging that agreement on some substantive issues was not 
possible, but agreeing on a judicial resolution of the potential conflicts. 
However, the vagueness of the rules and their potential lack of content has been seen as 
a problem for international litigation. Sands clearly states that the compromised 
character of many international environmental agreements poses a problem for 
international courts as they do not want to overstep their judicial competences and be 
blamed for illegitimately legislating.
134
 The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case exemplifies 
perfectly this dilemma as the bilateral treaty’s provisions at the source of the dispute were 
not clear. Consequently, the Court avoided clarifying the meaning of the treaty and 
instead decided that the parties should renegotiate instead.
135
 
Another example can be taken from the Icelandic Fisheries case, where the Court’s 
conclusion was not providing the parties with a solution. Indeed, the parties wanted the 
Court to interpret a customary international rule, which was not clear enough and not 
widely accepted. Judicial settlement is sometimes the wrong forum to address an issue 
where rules are too imprecise.
136
 Indeed, the dispute finally ended when states started to 
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draft the EEZ principle as a legal principle, which was the appropriate solution in this 
case. 
Moreover, it has been argued, as a corollary of the view that legal standards can be 
relatively indeterminate, the personality of the judges matters in the decision-making 
process.
137
 The impact of both the political context and the particular judges on the panel 
are not negligible and must be acknowledged. Whether the vagueness of the rule 
invoked will have a positive or negative impact on the court is not consistent. 
1.3 The dispute settlement function 
The role of an international tribunal as a dispute settler is uncontested, yet the exact 
meaning of the “settlement of a dispute” has been subject to controversies. Although the 
notion is vague and open on purpose, leaving the decision on how to perform the task 
open to the tribunal in each case, it is constrained within the boundaries of the 
constitutive texts and dependant on other factors. What is certain is that an international 
tribunal will pronounce a legally-binding decision that the parties undertake to respect, 
with the purpose of solving the conflict brought by the parties. It acts as an impartial 
third party decision-maker. The dispute is therefore individualised and based on rules 
consented by the states. 
In general, this function is seen as retrospective because the tribunal decides on “who 
was right and who was wrong in doing whatever was done”.
138
 It is also described as 
private, since the tribunal is interested mainly in settling the dispute between the parties, 
without considering other external elements.
139
 
i. Contours of the notion of dispute settlement 
It is clear that every international tribunal has a specific mandate to settle a dispute, but 
this mandate is not formulated in the same terms. Each court or tribunal does not 
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exercise the powers given by their constitutive treaty in the same fashion.
140
 The 
understanding of what they mean as dispute settlers varies according to how the 
constitutive treaties framed their mandate. For instance, for the ICJ or the ITLOS, the 
function of settling a particular dispute, as emphasised by Article 36(3) of the UN 
Charter for the ICJ, or by Annex VI of the LOS Convention for the ITLOS, it seems 
that the emphasis is on the power to end legal disputes arising between states. In the case 
of the WTO as well, the article 3(4) of the DSU confirms that “[r]ecommendations or 
rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the 
matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under 
the covered agreements”. This article illustrates the importance of the framework within 
which the DSU operates, indicating an approach to dispute settlement that takes into 
account more contextual information.  A substantial difference exists: before stating that 
the DSB should aim at settling the dispute between the parties, it first emphasises its role 
of “providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system”
141
.  
By contrast, the settlement of the dispute is not always the first function of an 
international tribunal. Article 19 of the ECHR, for example, states that “[t]o ensure the 
observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the 
Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human 
Rights”. Its preponderant function is therefore more oriented towards the general 
compliance of states regarding human rights through individuals’ complaints against 
their state. It is therefore impossible to understand the notion of “dispute settlement” in 
the same way for the ICJ and the ECtHR.
142
 
However, two elements are necessary to all jurisdictions in order for a dispute to be 
justiciable in front of an international court or tribunal. First a dispute must exist. Indeed, 
the use of international adjudication is subject to the precondition of the existence of a 
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dispute. The Interpretation of Peace Treaties case affirmed that “[w]hether there exists 
an international dispute is a matter for objective determination. The mere denial of the 
existence of a dispute does not prove its non-existence.”
143
 Article 53 of the ICJ Statute 
confirms this position, as it allows the court to proceed even if one party does not 
participate in the proceedings. The Court further confirmed in the same Interpretation 
of Peace Treaties case that “a situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views 
concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain treaty 
obligations” is an international dispute.
144
 Moreover, the fact that the existence of a 
dispute is determined objectively means that even in the absence of a dispute due to the 
fact that the two parties agree on the breach of the obligation or when one does not 
respond, it does not prevent a court to exercise its jurisdiction.
145
 The explanation of the 
Court’s assertion in the South West Africa cases that “[i]t must be shown that the claim 
of one party is positively opposed to the other”
146
 was further given in the Headquarters 
advisory opinion whereby even in the case  
“where one party to a treaty protests against the behaviour or a decision of 
another party, and claims that such behaviour or decision constitutes a breach of 
the treaty, the mere fact that the party accused does not advance any argument 
to justify its conduct under international law does not prevent the opposing 
attitudes of the parties from giving rise to a dispute […]”.
147
 
The objective determination of the existence of a dispute means that it is to be judged 
by the tribunal itself, on the basis of the submissions made by the parties to the dispute, 
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Second, the dispute must also be legal, as opposed to political.
149
 However, the ICJ has 
never rejected a case for being a part of a broader political context. For example, the 
Court stated in the Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case that “legal disputes 
between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in political contexts, and 
often form only one element in a wider and long-standing political dispute between the 
States concerned”.
150
 It did not prevent the court from having jurisdiction over the 
dispute.  
The dispute settlement function of an international court also entails the settlement of 
the facts at the basis of the legal dispute. In order to proceed with the settlement of a 
dispute legally, an international court has to settle the facts first. Indeed, the 
Mavrommatis case defined a dispute as being “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, 
a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons” (emphasis added).
151
 The 
Serbian Loans case developed this statement by affirming that  
“it would be scarcely accurate to say that only questions of international law may 
form the subject of a decision of the Court. It should be recalled in this respect 
that paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute provides that States may recognise 
as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in legal disputes concerning “the 
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation”. […] Clearly, amongst others, disputes concerning pure 
matters of fact are contemplated, for the States concerned may agree that the fact 
to be established would constitute a breach of an international obligation; it is 
unnecessary to add that the facts the existence of which the Court has to establish 
may be of any kind.”
152
 
This dimension of the dispute settlement function has become particularly prominent 
in environmental disputes and will be examined further in the thesis. Indeed, getting the 
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facts right is an important part of disputes brought before international courts and 
tribunals. The establishment of facts can become controversial, especially when they 
involve scientific expertise, and because the question of whether there is a breach of an 
international rule directly results from the ascertainment of the facts, factual 
disagreements become crucial to the settlement of the dispute. In the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna case, for example, Japan argued the matters in contention were purely scientific 
and therefore could not be admissible before the tribunal.
153
 This argument was 
vehemently rejected by Australia and New Zealand, who made the connection between 
the legal obligations and the role of scientific facts to prove the breach of those 
obligations.
154
 Unfortunately, the tribunal did not engage with this question as it dismissed 
its jurisdiction on other grounds, only mentioning that the “analysis of provisions of 
UNCLOS that bring the dispute within the substantive reach of UNCLOS suggests that 
the dispute is not one that is confined to matters of scientific judgment only.”
155
 
Overall, in contentious cases, international courts and tribunals will always be considered 
ultimately as dispute settlers because of the effect of their decisions. Indeed, once they 
decided on a case, it cannot be judged again according to the res judicata principle. The 
arbitral tribunal in the Trail Smelter Arbitration said that  
“[t]he sanctity of res judicata attaches to a final decision of an international 
tribunal is an essential and settled rule of international law. If it is true that 
international relations based on law and justice require arbitral or judicial 
adjudication of international disputes, it is equally true that such adjudication 
must, in principle, remain unchallenged if it is to be effective to that end”.
156
  
Hence, decisions of a court or a tribunal apply the law to a concrete case conclusively. 
In other words, as an independent body, a judicial court or tribunal pronounces final 
judgments within the scope of its powers previously agreed on by the states. The 
existence of this principle confirms the function of international courts and tribunals as 
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dispute settlers, but also can create situations where new facts arise yet the tribunal 
cannot re-open the case.
 157
 
ii. Enforcement, compliance and remedies 
It is important to highlight that international law does not automatically imply the use of 
adjudication at all. Normally dispute resolution occurs without it,
158
 and the enforcement 
of international environmental law encompasses all means of effective implementation 
of the rules, including litigation.
159
 It is indeed achieved through different mechanisms, 
one of them being judicial dispute resolution.
160
 Moreover, states, international 
organisations and non-state actors have a role to play in the enforcement process of the 
law.
161
  This is particularly applicable to international environmental law, which requires 
a comprehensive approach from all parties. The role of domestic courts should also not 
be neglected. This observation is supported by the liberal theory which argues that 




But international courts and tribunals are themselves empowered to enforce 
international rules. Indeed, states can ask an international judicial body to determine the 
other state’s compliance with international rules.
163
 Generally, the point of enforcement 
means the non-complying state complies again if the obligation is ongoing or repairs the 
situation. It is about rectifying the wrong. Moreover, it is clear that “even when the law 
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is certain states may not adhere to it. In such circumstances, litigation becomes primarily 
an enforcement mechanism, to bring a wayward state into compliance”.
164
 
However, such enforcement power is not often used to its full potential. For example, 
the South China Sea award illustrates us that the tribunal did not want to go further than 
to declare the breach of certain international obligations. As part of its dispute settlement 
function, it did not consider that it should take measures affecting the future conduct of 
the parties, despite a clear submission by the Philippines asking that  
“China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines under the 
Convention, shall comply with its duties under the Convention, including those 
relevant to the protection and preservation of the marine environment in the 
South China Sea, and shall exercise its rights and freedoms in the South China 
Sea with due regard to those of the Philippines under the Convention.”
165
 
In response, the tribunal said: 
“The root of the disputes presented by the Philippines in this arbitration lies not 
in any intention on the part of China or the Philippines to infringe on the legal 
rights of the other, but rather — as has been apparent throughout these 
proceedings — in fundamentally different understandings of their respective 
rights under the Convention in the waters of the South China Sea. In such 
circumstances, the purpose of dispute resolution proceedings is to clarify the 
Parties’ respective rights and obligations and thereby to facilitate their future 




By affirming that the purpose of the tribunal is to give a clarification of the existing law, 
it clearly bypasses what the Philippines were asking, i.e. precise “prospective” measures 
to limit unilateral actions of China, as these actions have brought “chaos and 
insecurity”.
167
 The fact the tribunal did not engage at all with this particular request by 
the Philippines can be explained by the fact China did not participate in the proceedings 
and therefore gave no counter-arguments. However, it is not the only time a tribunal has 
chosen to only clarify the law, without pursuing further measures. The Court in the Pulp 
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Mills case also rejected a request by Argentina because there were no special signs from 
Uruguay’s behaviour that it would breach the law again.
168
  
If anything, the mere fact that a dispute settlement mechanism exists forces States to 
comply with the existing rules. Knowing that a State violating an international rule is 
subject to review before a judicial body will compel it to follow the rules. It is also called 
the “deterrence role” of an international court or tribunal.
169
 Indeed, international courts 
and tribunals also act as facilitators of diplomatic relations between parties. The mere 
fact that a dispute resolution machinery exists constitutes an incentive for States to avoid 
a dispute in the first place or negotiate a solution. It is like the sword of Damocles 
hanging over the parties to a dispute. By further developing their role in settling disputes, 
international courts and tribunals become more effective at preventing disputes. 
Increasingly, judicial decisions are expected to make tangible change. This is best 
exemplified by the proliferation of non-compliance mechanisms. Enforcement and 
compliance are correlated, and because the concrete implementation of the rules has 
become a key question in international environmental law, when international courts are 
triggered, there are pre-existing expectations they will help to stop the alleged ongoing 
harm.  
As a result of this pressure to have an impact, provisional measures can become a major 
tool for judicial bodies when it comes to enforcing environmental obligations. Judges 
will not decide on the wrongdoing of a state but instead use the principle of precaution 
to prevent any potential future harm. By promoting compliance, judicial decisions can 
effectively end certain behaviours that may later be found illegal on the merits (see 
chapter 4). Consequently, the importance of non-compliance procedures created within 
multilateral environmental agreements will be analysed further in this thesis. The 
interactions between these non-compliance procedures and international courts and 
tribunals must be analysed as they can enhance the enforcement system of international 
environmental law (see chapter 5). 
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But how can international courts and tribunals ensure the enforcement of claims put 
forward by the parties? International courts and tribunals have at their disposal certain 
remedies (Article 31 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts). Any state responsible for a violation of international law has the 
“obligation to make full reparation”.
170
 This obligation can be fulfilled by diplomatic 
means, but may also be decided by an international court.  
According to the law on state responsibility, the determination of a breach of an 
international obligation triggers the obligation of reparation. Therefore, when an 
international court decides on an environmental case, it can be asked by the parties to 
award certain remedies.
171
 A tribunal can also reject to award remedies asked by the 
parties, as shown above in the South China Sea arbitration and the Pulp Mills case.  
The existence of remedies is not manifest in constitutive texts of many international 
courts and tribunals. The ICJ Statute mentions them explicitly only under the optional 
clause jurisdiction;
172
 the UNCLOS generally states that states are responsible for their 
wrongful acts without prejudice to general rules.
173
 Only the WTO DSU gives account 
for a more developed framework.
174
 Despite the lack of formal recognition, the fact 
judicial institutions are able to decide on remedies is accepted as inherent powers of 
judicial bodies.
175
 The ICJ confirmed its remedial powers as being inherent in the 
LaGrand case, affirming that when jurisdiction is established over a certain dispute, it 
entails the power to decide on remedies.
176
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However, it is not entirely clear if remedies are intended to be punitive, restorative or to 
act as a deterrent. Depending on the answer, the nature of remedies awarded will vary.
177
 
Reparation as developed by the ILC is not meant as a punitive tool, rather as a corrective 
measure, choosing a remedial justice approach.
178
 But is international adjudication tied 
to this approach? Generally, the scope of the powers to award remedies of an 
international court is unclear, and needs to be assessed in relation to its judicial 
function.
179
 Remedies have been conceived differently in other areas of international law. 
The purpose of remedies according to the law on state responsibility, for example, can 
vary substantially from the purpose of remedies in international environmental law. 
Indeed, reparation for breach of international law as understood to restore the status 
quo ante, as often declared by the different judicial bodies and reaffirmed by the ILC 
Articles on State responsibility differs from the idea that remedies exist to promote 
compliance with environmental rules. With the continued evolution of international 
environmental law, the concept of remedies has shifted from reparation to compliance. 
These developments based on divergent approaches to remedies have put international 
courts and tribunals in an uncomfortable position.  
Discussion of the rationale behind remedies reaches to the core of argument about the 
judicial function. At what point do certain conceptions of remedies depart from the 
judicial function of a court? Is there a limit to the scope of remedial powers beyond 
which a tribunal acts outside its judicial functions? While this section will not focus on 
the theoretical answers to these questions,
180
 it seeks to explore the function of judicial 
discretion in awarding remedies. International courts and tribunals have awarded a wide 
variety of remedies, yet it is difficult to find a structured pattern in their decision-making.  
Despite the agreed ability of international courts and tribunals to award remedies, the 
extent of their remedial powers has been questioned.
181
 How can international courts 
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and tribunals use their remedial powers in an environmental context and what is their 
rationale when awarding certain remedies? The answer to this question depends on the 
broader role of international adjudication, which is often defined vaguely by the specific 
courts and tribunals. From the inconsistent judicial practice, it may be surmised this role 
has varied across different cases. Therefore, the affirmation that a judicial procedure 
endorses a winner-takes-all approach is too restrictive.
182
 Indeed, the tools available offer 
a range of solutions that international courts and tribunals have used not only to 
determine a winner and a loser, but also to encompass the particularities of the cases 
under consideration. In other words, international courts and tribunals have used 
remedies to pursue their role beyond determining the outcome of disputes in which 
parties are seen as two antagonist poles. This argument is supported by the fact that the 
concept of reparation itself is a flexible one, depending on substantive rules and 
secondary rules of international law. The issue is not simply a procedural one.
183
 
Moreover, international tribunals will have to juggle between the circumstances of the 
case at hand, the parties’ wishes, and the legal necessities, which allow them to use their 
discretionary powers innovatively in awarding remedies (see chapter 4.1). 
Another issue related to the litigation as a tool for enforcement concerns the way in 
which states comply with judicial decisions.
184
 In particular, it has a critical impact on the 
aftermath of an international court’s judgment, i.e. whether the parties to the dispute 
comply with the judgment. Although it has never been used, the only existing formal 
tool to secure the enforcement of ICJ orders is through the application of article 94 (2) 
UN Charter, an article that enables the Security Council to compel or encourage 
compliance. For the other international courts, such option is not available. Overall, 
however, the record of non-compliance of judicial orders is not high, demonstrating the 
willingness of state parties to the judicial procedure to follow the judgment. 
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iii. Limits to the settlement of the dispute 
The straight-forward understanding of what constitutes a settlement is the end of the 
dispute.
185
 The resolution of a dispute assumes that it is solved and the conflict between 
the parties disappeared. However, in international litigation it is not rare to see cases that 
fail to be resolved in this manner. 
Before engaging in international litigation, states make a cost-benefit analysis that means 
they conduct a wide-ranging assessment of their aims in that particular case (see section 
1.5). They may not have the intention to settle the dispute per se, but instead seek to use 
litigation for other reasons, such as developing an aspect of the law that may have 
consequences for their interests in the future. States may use litigation to fulfil a wide 
range of functions, including for the purpose of exerting influence on their own domestic 
politics. The outcomes of international litigation are multiple, and not limited to the 
settlement of the dispute.
186
 
In this context, there are many cases where an ICJ decision has not directly led to the 
end of the conflict, but instead facilitated negotiations or actions that have resulted in the 
resolution of the dispute. Indeed, the judicial decision acts as a catalyst, helping the 
parties to end the conflict through further negotiations. Cases such as the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case or the Nuclear Tests case are good examples of such a scenario. In 
the first case, Australia, New Zealand and Japan managed to further negotiations and 
agree on specific quotas for Bluefin tuna catches, despite the award on the lack of 
jurisdiction of the tribunal and therefore the abrupt end of the litigation. The judicial 
part of the overall conflict had a role to play, although not a final one. The second case 
was part of a broader political conflict between France and Australia/New Zealand, and 
played a role as such in the overall conflict, without directly putting an end to it.
187
 Indeed, 
international courts and tribunals can still – within their competence – provide material 
and legal justifications that contribute to ending a conflict and therefore act as dispute 
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 The Pulp Mills case is a notable example of this, where judicial intervention 
allowed the parties to return to the negotiating table.
189
 
Other environmental cases were resolved through judicial proceedings, like the Trail 
Smelter arbitral award. In this case, the tribunal created a new regime that both parties 
followed and also awarded compensation to those who suffered some damage. This 
judicial process was considered as a success.
190
 
On the other hand, some cases were not resolved through adjudication. Nor did the 
judicial decisions lead to further negotiations. The infamous example is given by the 
Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case
191
, which is formally still pending. Although this case has led 
to further diplomatic negotiations between Hungary and Slovakia, no final agreement 
on the matter has been reached. The Bering Sea Fur Seals arbitration is a further 
example where the judicial decision did not manage to stop the gradual extinction of the 
fur seals, but was merely a milestone in the broader political issue.
192
 In these cases, 
although the legal content of the case has contributed to the development of certain 
environmental concepts, the dispute itself was not resolved. 
iv. Advisory opinions and dispute settlement 
In general, the ability to give advisory opinions is well within the judicial remit of the 
ICJ
193
, and exists in other jurisdictions.
194
 Even though the competence of each Court is 
different, the core idea is similar. However, differences exist between advisory and 
contentious jurisdictions. In contentious cases, for example, the existence of a dispute is 
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an essential criterion without which the tribunal must decline jurisdiction. This criterion 
supposes some link with concrete behaviours must exist.
195
 States cannot use the 
contentious jurisdiction to ask abstract questions to an international court.
196
 However, 
the advisory jurisdiction is precisely for abstract questions about the law. In other words, 
advisory opinions cannot settle a dispute as such: jurisprudence makes it clear that courts 
cannot solve particular disputes through their advisory jurisdiction. It would be more 
accurate to talk about legal controversies instead of disputes. A dispute may be defined 
as a conflicting claim raised by one party against another on a point of law, whereas an 
advisory opinion can be requested for less than that. 
This has a consequence on the fact that consent from interested states is not relevant. 
Indeed, one major difference from contentious cases is the lack of consent from 
concerned parties. The States whose interests may be affected by the Advisory Opinion 
do not need to give their consent in order for the Court to proceed.
197
 This position is 
justified because of the nature of an advisory opinion. Indeed, it distinguishes itself from 
a contentious case in the fact that it is not binding
198
 upon Member States. The ICJ has 
been consistent on this point. 
An advisory opinion can be requested and granted even though the parties with interests 
at stake are against it. In the case of the Status of Eastern Carelia Advisory Opinion, the 
Court said that this case was not a question of law but a question of facts, therefore 
consent of both parties was required. 
“The question put to the Court is not one of abstract law, but concerns directly 
the main point of the controversy between Finland and Russia, and can only be 
decided by an investigation into the facts underlying the case. Answering the 
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Indeed, consent is not a requirement for advisory proceedings, but if a request for an 
advisory opinion circumvents the obligation to consent to settle disputes in contentious 
proceedings, the court cannot proceed with the case.
200
 The Court considered in the 
Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion that since the request for an opinion was 
within the exercise of the functions of the General Assembly and since the conflict was 
“located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute” it was justified 
for the Court to give an opinion.
201
 Indeed, the questions were drafted in such a manner 
that the court could not settle a particular dispute. Therefore, the lack of consent by 
Israel did not prevent the Court from giving an opinion in this case.  
In other words, even though advisory opinions can be given for any legal question, it 
does not mean that a dispute between two or more parties already exists. It is explicit in 
the wording of Article 102 (3) of the Rules of the ICJ which states that if a dispute is 
pending between two or more parties, Article 31 of the ICJ Statute shall apply. The same 
applies to the Seabed Disputes Chamber. The consequences of having an advisory 
opinion at the same time as a pending dispute can blur the distinction between the 
purpose of an advisory opinion as opposed to a contentious case. However, it does not 
prevent the court from accepting its advisory jurisdiction, as long as the object of the 
request is not on the particular case. Even in cases where bilateral issues exist, it does 
not automatically mean the advisory jurisdiction is moot, precisely because the requests 
are so different. 
Moreover, the advisory jurisdiction of a court also exists in order to assist a specific organ 
or an international organisation to perform its functions. For example, the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction is to assist UN bodies carrying out their tasks, rather than a form of 
jurisdictional recourse.
202
 The court said that “the General Assembly has the right to 
decide for itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs”.
203
 It is 
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therefore clear the ICJ does not take into account the reasons why a body requested an 
Advisory Opinion. The mechanism exists in order to counterbalance the powers of each 
branch of the United Nations. It reiterates this by saying that “the Court cannot substitute 




Overall, the question as to whether advisory opinions can substitute contentious cases 
must be answered negatively. Looking at cases where the Court gives direct advice to 
one party about its wrongful behaviour, as in the Western Sahara case and the 
Construction of a Wall case, it is clear the opinions were not taken into account by the 
wrongdoers. The conflicts were not solved by the ICJ in any of these cases. Tensions 
between Morocco and Algeria did not end; Israel did not change its behaviour. In this 
context, it is difficult to argue that the Court can effectively solve a dispute through an 
advisory opinion, although it would be unfair not to give any credit to the Court. The 
court itself said that “[a] distinction should … be drawn between the advisory nature of 
the Court’s task and the particular effects that parties to an existing dispute may wish to 
attribute, in their mutual relations, to an advisory opinion of the Court, which, “as such 
... has no binding force”.
205
 Moreover, the Court affirmed that “[i]t is not clear … what 
influence the Court's opinion might have on those negotiations: participants in the 
present proceedings have expressed differing views in this regard”.
206
 While an advisory 
opinion has no binding force on states themselves, whether they have a de facto binding 
effect on the requesting international organisation or organ is debated.
207
 That is, the fact 
that judicial decisions are binding – in opposition to advisory opinions – shows why 
advisory opinions cannot be considered as having a function of dispute settlement as 
such. 
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Despite this, advisory opinions can have a role to play in relation to the establishment 
of certain debated facts. Although they do not settle disputes per se, this does not prevent 
them from offering a suitable forum for hearing opposing arguments over relevant facts, 
resulting in useful decisions. The procedure under the advisory jurisdiction allows for 
facts to be debated, heard and decided on.
208
 In particular, article 107(2) of the ICJ Rules 
of the Court expressly mentions that advisory opinions shall contain a statement of the 
facts, implying that the court has to establish them. 
1.4 The public interests function 
The fact that international courts and tribunals have a role to play in relation to the 
defence of public interests must be emphasised, although it has not yet been developed 
extensively in practice. It is a different role that international courts and tribunals would 
endorse by accepting claims made in the public interest. Wittich called it the function of 
“ensuring the observance of the law”.
209
 This function is tied to the idea that the 
international judiciary is part of the broader international legal regime and has a role to 
play within that regime as such. The protection of public interests indeed does not fall 
within the function of dispute settlement per se because its aim is broader than a dispute 
between two parties.  
In particular, as section 1.3.iii above showed, the settlement of a dispute happens in a 
certain context, and cannot be isolated from either the affected people, the political 
decisions on specific public policies or the international community at large. Bilateral 
disputes, for example, can entail different aspects of public interest
210
: a trade measure 
can imply questions of endangered species (such as in the US – Shrimp case); a decision 
to build a pulp mill can affect the biodiversity of the region (see the Pulp Mills case).  
                                                 
208
 Philippe Sands, ‘Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International Law’ 
(2016) 28 Journal of Environmental Law 19, 29–30. 
209
 Wittich (n 54) 996–997. 
210
 Lowe shows how bilateral investment disputes have contained many public interests, such as the 
Tecmed and Methanex cases. Vaughan Lowe, ‘Private Disputes and the Public Interest in International 
Law’ in Duncan French, Matthew Saul and Nigel D White (eds), International Law and Dispute 
Settlement: New Problems and Techniques (Hart Publishing 2010) 7–10. 
56 
 
Bilateral disputes concerning multilateral agreements automatically involve at least the 
interests of the other parties to the agreements, which may have an important role to 
play in acknowledging the settlement of the particular dispute. 
Moreover, international courts and tribunals also have to approach their role differently 
when global problems are brought before them. International environmental law 
especially rests upon various public interests. Indeed, the existence of such common 
interests to the whole community cannot be ignored. A whole strand of multilateral 
environmental agreements stems from the need to recognise certain common concerns 
of humankind (see the Preamble of the UNFCCC or the CBD). The existence of such 
public interests goes together with the existence of any society: “in every society there 
are some common interests and some public weal […]. There is therefore always a part 
of the legal order which gives expression to these types of interests common to the 
members of the society”.
211
  
However, the question of public interest litigation continues to be controversial 
nowadays, and is not fully accepted by either the international community or the 
international courts themselves (see chapter 2.2 below). Nonetheless, there is a role 
beyond the role of settling a dispute attributed to international courts and tribunals so 
far. In other words, international adjudication has both a public and a private function, 
and as an institution carries out the public authority.
212
 Generally, an institution having a 
public authority has been defined as having a “legal capacity to influence others in the 
exercise of [its] freedom, i.e. to shape [its] legal or factual situation”
213
, even without the 
lack of coercive enforcement of its decisions.
214
 In that sense, international courts and 
tribunals ought to recognise their public nature, as well as their private nature. It is the 
reason why a tension exists in each decision between the purpose of settling the dispute 
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concretely (i.e. finding common ground between the parties), asserting the real meaning 
of the law, and integrating public interests.  
Because of the special position of international courts and tribunals within the 
international legal system, and their denomination as belonging to the judiciary,
215
 
international courts and tribunals must respect certain principles, as the publicity of the 
procedure and its transparency.
216
 But there are more to be added, including accessibility 
to the courts and affordability. They are all considered as public values, in contrast to 
private values, and must be maintained within the proceedings before any court or 
tribunal. 
Now that it has been clarified that international litigation cannot be completely separated 
from the issue of public interests, this chapter turns to the analysis of how those public 
interests can be represented. The question of who should be entitled to represent such 
public interests is crucial, and the next chapter will offer detailed analysis of how the 
jurisdiction can be broadened to encompass a bigger range of environmental disputes 
that can be submitted to international courts and tribunals. One important element in 
the representation of public interests is the role of different actors during judicial 
proceedings, knowing that a major drawback of international litigation is the lack of 
openness in the rules of standing in contentious cases.  
It is interesting to note that the different procedural rules attached to the question of 
standing for requesting advisory opinions affect the role international adjudication can 
play particularly in the integration of public interests. In general, it seems that because 
of the nature of the advisory jurisdiction, an international court or tribunal could respond 
to environmental conflicts such as conflicts concerning climate change or any global 
conflict taking place within a multilateral treaty. Indeed, since a bilateral conflict is not 
necessary, an international organisation could ask for clarifications over general 
                                                 
215
 This following article summarises what is entailed in the notion of the ‘judicial function’. Chittharanjan 
F Amerasinghe, ‘Reflections on the Judicial Function in International Law’ in Tafsir Malik Ndiaye and 
Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber 
Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff 2007). 
216
 Neil Craik, ‘Recalcitrant Reality and Chosen Ideals: The Public Function of Dispute Settlement in 




implementation issues and therefore push the law into a more comprehensive shape. 
Since advisory opinions have different trigger mechanisms and are generally requested 
by non-state actors such as international organisations, their role in the pursuit of public 
interests is greater. The procedure leading to the ITLOS Advisory Opinion on the 
Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC), for example, shows how inclusive it can be: along with the documents submitted 
by the SRFC, written statements were received from twenty-two states parties to the 
UNCLOS and six inter-governmental organisations. One non-governmental 
organisation – the WWF – submitted an amicus curiae, despite being later rejected, was 
available on their website. Although not a party to the UNCLOS, the United States of 
America even submitted a written statement, demonstrating that even a state can make 
use of this mechanism.
217
 
This function can be really important for environmental cases. Both because the 
procedure is open to other actors than states, and because the effects of the decisions 
are different from contentious cases. International courts, in particular, are asked to 
provide a decision with legal implications for the future:  
“The purpose of an advisory opinion, if there is to be one, is surely to benefit 
the international community as a whole, by looking forward. What is to be done, 
rather than what has been done (although I recognise there is a connection 
between the two elements).”
218
 
In this context, an advisory opinion on the effects of certain rules concerning climate 
change could have beneficial effects and solidify the existing global commitments to 
prevent climate change, both factually and legally.
219
 
1.5 The political factors affecting the initiation of judicial proceedings 
It is important to acknowledge that international environmental litigation is part of a 
broader political process, at both the international and domestic levels. There are two 
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questions in this context: why are states bringing disputes to international courts and 
tribunals, and what do they want out of international litigation? Some scholars have 
framed the decision made by governments to sue as part of a cost-benefits analysis, the 
elements mentioned above (at 1.3.iii) being part of this broad cost-benefit analysis.
220
 
An important feature of international litigation is consent: the states participating in the 
judicial proceedings need to consent to the proceedings in some way. The whole 
international judicial system is based on the consent of states. One party files a case 
against another, with the consent of both. But this consent can be given in different ways 
and at different times. For the ICJ, consent must be specifically given either through a 
special agreement between the parties, through the forum prorogatum jurisdiction, 
through a compromissory clause or through an optional clause.
221
 ITLOS is also 
dependent on state consent, which can be given through declaration and competent only 
when both states have made such declaration,
222
 and under UNCLOS, arbitration has 
compulsory jurisdiction (Annex VII). Arbitration is also often proposed in MEAs, 
although not often compulsorily. When states sign an optional clause under Article 36 
(2) ICJ Statute or ratify the UNCLOS (unless they opt-out of particular disputes 
according to article 298 (1) UNCLOS), they allow other states to file a case against them 
regardless of their consent at the time of the existence of the dispute. Knowing if the 
state against which a state wants to file a dispute has already consented to the jurisdiction 
of the court is an important element in the decision whether or not to go to international 
litigation. 
Moreover, states have a choice mainly between these three different fora and the 
jurisdiction clause applicable for the potential future dispute is a key factor in deciding 
where – or whether – to file a case. When one tribunal has compulsory jurisdiction 
especially, it gives an advantage to the complaining state as it does not need the specific 
consent of the respondent state. This strategy has been used by New Zealand and 
Australia in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case. Japan claimed they wanted to take 
                                                 
220
 See Scott (n 186) She systematises the decision of a state to go to international litigation into ten specific 
questions. The decision to sue will then depend on the specific answer to each of them. 
221
 Article 36 ICJ Statute. 
222
 Article 287 UNCLOS. 
60 
 
advantage of the compulsory jurisdiction under UNCLOS and tried to reframe the 




Regardless of the jurisdiction clauses, the choice of tribunal is important because, as 
Aust affirmed, “[d]ifferent courts may come to different decisions”. […] It is a mistake 
to think that every international court has to decide a legal question the same way”.
224
 
States will review the past jurisprudence and make a guess about the risk they are taking 
with each tribunal, bearing in mind their ultimate goal. 
In this regard, the decision to go to which court also depends on the characterisation of 
the dispute by the parties, and therefore on their internal politics as much as interstate 
diplomatic exchanges. This element is crucial for two reasons: because the way the 
parties frame the dispute will also frame the way the tribunal will decide on the law, and 
because different tribunals have different jurisdictions ratione materiae. Firstly, the 
tribunal is bound by the states’ declarations, which is one of the most limiting factor to 
its jurisdiction.
225
 The declarations will affect the decision-making process because they 
determine the extent of the powers of the tribunal in that particular case. It must be said 
that international courts can nevertheless use the relevant juridical concepts they need 
regardless of whether the parties invoked them or not (jura novit curia).
226
  Secondly, the 
dispute can be framed in different terms and therefore exclude certain jurisdictions. This 
was the case in the Swordfish dispute which saw Chile oppose the European Union. 
Proceedings both before the ITLOS and the WTO DSU were initiated, the first about 
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a dispute over the conservation and protection of swordfish, the second about a dispute 
over the consistency of Chilean fisheries policy with the GATT.
 227
 
The impact of domestic politics on governments’ decisions whether or not to initiate 
judicial proceedings cannot be underestimated. Importantly, it raises the question as to 
whether cases take place exclusively between states. Stephens shows evidence that grass-
roots environmental and civil society movements, pre-election promises and general 
public pressure have been at the source of various environmental disputes, such as in 
the Nuclear Tests case, the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case, the Pulp Mills case or the 
Whaling case.
228
 These internal pressures play a major role in international litigation and 




Although the general purpose of a judicial procedure is to settle a dispute between two 
consenting parties, this chapter has illustrated that there is more to the judicial function 
than that, especially in relation to legal developments it can bring. By having more than 
one string to their bow, international courts and tribunals may struggle in defining what 
they aim at in a single decision, especially when it comes to the application of 
environmental rules. On the one hand, the court faced with a certain case has to solve 
this particular conflict in the most adequate way possible for the parties involved. On 
the other hand, the court has to take into account its position in the international legal 
system, which may have an impact of what the settlement of this dispute means in the 
international legal system. The roles of international courts and tribunals are polarised 
and they have to balance those roles out in each decision. Knowing that the decisions 
create a certain jurisprudence which the court or tribunal will be asked to respond to in 
the future, the role of international litigation, especially advisory opinions, becomes 
greater.  
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In relation with environmental disputes, international litigation’s role in determining the 
law is in large part successful. International courts and tribunals have helped to precise 
certain environmental obligations, such as the environmental impact assessment rule 
(see the Pulp Mills case). Assessing exactly whether they have used their powers enough 
in developing and interpreting the law is a question of degree and comparison between 
the advancement of the legal framework and judicial decisions which falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
In terms of their dispute settlement function, this chapter has shown that international 
courts and tribunals have not consistently been able to end environmental disputes. 
Moreover, their role as rule-enforcers has been fragmentary. Although judicial bodies 
might be considered at first sight as effective dispute settlers, environmental disputes 
have demonstrated that such conclusion is inaccurate. Moreover, the narrow conception 
of international courts and tribunals as immediate dispute-settlers does not hold against 
the communitarian element attached to many rules in the field of international 
environmental law, and consequently the concept of standing in international law might 
need an update.  
This push towards a communitarian perspective of international litigation can be 
explained by the fact that international courts and tribunals have a public interest 
function. They exist in a broader legal structure that imparts international courts and 
tribunals with the defence of public interests. 
The roles of international courts and tribunals as displayed in this chapter show the 
strengths and weaknesses of judicial bodies as a whole in the context of environmental 
disputes. States are aware of these roles and may instrumentalise judicial institutions. 
However, a systemic component, which should not be forgotten, which is the 
independence of the judicial body. In order for an international court or tribunal to be 
considered an authoritative institutional force by its subjects, developing and enforcing 
the law, it has to be independent. If the court or tribunal is regarded as susceptible to 
63 
 




With a view to enable international courts and tribunals to best perform those functions, 
this thesis will then focus on specific issues arising during judicial proceedings of 
environmental disputes. Indeed, this thesis does not aim at weighing how international 
courts and tribunals fulfil these roles; it rather focuses on individual obstacles particularly 
prominent in environmental cases. This chapter shows that the functions attributed to 
international courts and tribunals may not be optimal, but this thesis is based on the idea 
that the development of particular procedural tools will improve the quality of judicial 
proceedings, therefore impacting on the overall work of international courts and 
tribunals. 
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2. QUESTIONS OF STANDING IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 
This chapter focuses on the requirements attached to the entry into international 
litigation. Who can bring a claim, and will any international tribunal accept it? The 
analysis of this chapter is focused on the potential transformation of interstate dispute 
settlement from being exclusively bilateral towards a procedure allowing public interests 
to be defended. The tension created by the expansion of some concepts to address 
common environmental concerns is apparent in the institution of adjudication. This 
section of the thesis discusses how to deal with such tension. This chapter illustrates the 
first part of the argument of this thesis and aims at refuting the hasty assertion that 
international courts and tribunals have too narrow rules on standing to respond to 
environmental disputes. 
First, it is important to underline the difference between jurisdiction and standing. An 
international tribunal can have jurisdiction over a dispute but legal standing of the 
particular state triggering the procedure can be refused. Standing is a question of 
admissibility, separate from the one of jurisdiction.Generally, it is often noted that 
international adjudication has not been designed to protect common areas or resources, 
neither to be adapted to obligations owed to the international community as a whole. 
Rather, international litigation is generally understood as confrontational, bilateral, and 
having a winner-takes-all approach; characteristics considered to prevent a fitted use of 
international courts and tribunals.
231
 Any evolution in international environmental law 
towards a more holistic protection of the environment will have to find a way around 
this restrictive premise. As Judge Weeramantry said rightly in his Separate Opinion 
concerning the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case, “inter partes adversarial procedures, 
eminently fair and reasonable in a purely inter partes issue, may need reconsideration 
in the future, if ever a case should arise of the imminence of serious or catastrophic 
environmental danger, especially to parties other than the immediate litigants”.
232
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Therefore, the chapter will consider the notion of public interest in international law, its 
stakeholders and its legal implications for international adjudication in order to clarify 
the developments made by the judicial institutions. 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to understand international 
environmental law as a sum of different types of rules creating different relationships 
between states. Depending on the type of obligation, states’ responsibilities will vary and 
therefore affect the potential judicial enforcement. Indeed, public interest litigation relies 
heavily on the developments of the law on state responsibility, as it provides for 
protection against breaches of erga omnes obligations. 
Generally, it is useful to categorise environmental obligations as bilateral, interdependent 
or integral, because this categorisation shows how each type of obligation impacts on the 
way in which states can trigger a judicial procedure. It classifies the objects of protection 
developed in the field of international environmental law according to different rules on 
standing and highlights the specific legal interests states would be able to defend in 
international litigation. 
2.1 International environmental law as a multi-layered regime 
Different types of obligations exist, with a varying degree of interference into state 
sovereignty. In order to understand what environmental protection entails at the 
international level and how adjudication can enforce it, we need to classify the objects of 
the existing legal rights, because these legal rights have procedural implications in judicial 
proceedings (indirect standing before international courts).
233
 
A critical point of analysis is whether specific rules related to the environment broaden 
the scope of action of a state in instituting judicial action before an international court or 
tribunal. Four types of obligations are identified, depending on the degree of sovereign 
states’ rights over areas or resources. These are: the obligations of one state when there 
are potential transboundary effects, the protection of resources shared among several 
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states, the obligations deriving from the protection of areas and resources beyond 
national jurisdiction, and fourthly, of global environmental problems.  
First, I will introduce the framework used for the separation of environmental 
obligations in those four categories. They will indeed all be connected with the work 
done by Pauwelyn on the classification of international obligations. Such classification is 
reproduced here: 
Typology of international obligations
234
 
Bilateral obligations Collective obligations 
 All bilateral treaties 
 Multilateral treaties that are 
‘bundles of bilateral 
relationships’ (e.g., the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations) 
 Certain rules of general 
international law and certain 
unilateral commitments 
I. Obligations erga omnes partes 
 Sub-set 1: ‘interdependent’ or ‘all or 
nothing’ obligations (e.g. 
disarmament or nuclear free zone 
treaties) 
 Sub-set 2: ‘integral’ obligations or 
sacrosanct/ intransgressible 
obligations (e.g. human rights or 
humanitarian obligations and 
certain obligations relating to global 
warming or biodiversity) 
 
 II. Obligations erga omnes 
 Coincides with obligations of jus 
cogens 




These concepts will be explained and used in the context of international environmental 
law as follows. This framework is used because of its connection with the law on state 
responsibility, especially in the context of obligations erga omnes. Such obligations are 
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at the basis of the debate on public interests litigation and will shape the discussion in 
this chapter on how international litigation can address such challenges. 
i. Transboundary impacts 
Environmental rules regulating transboundary impacts from the territory of one state 
onto the territory of another are part of the bilateralist grounding of international law. 
The concept of protection according to spatial territories is clearly linked to the idea of 
states as “organisational units of civil society”.
235
 Even though we are moving towards a 
more comprehensive conception of the international society, it cannot be forgotten that 
many environmental legal obligations are perceived within this bilateralist realm. For 
instance, articles 3 and 5 of the 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context encompass the concept of “good 
neighbourliness”. They specially create an obligation binding on states in the event of 
“significant adverse transboundary impact”.  This general obligation bearing on states 
not to carry activities that might have transboundary effects has now been codified
236
 and 
confirmed by several judicial decisions.
237
 Indeed, this type of obligations fit very well 
with the traditional understanding of international law. States can tolerate an 
infringement to their sovereignty in this case, knowing that these obligations entail full 
reciprocity (do ut des). They accept mutual constrain of their behaviour. It does not 
matter whether the obligation is part of a multilateral treaty, as long as it can be 
individualised between two states, or “bilateralised”. This type of multilateral 
conventions creates a network of bilateral relations that can be considered individually. 
Indeed, a distinction can be made between bilateral and collective obligations within 
multilateral treaties. In this context, bilateral obligations can be described as “multilateral 
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treaty obligations that can be reduced to a compilation or “bundle” of bilateral relations, 
each of them detachable one from the other”.
238
 
Therefore, these obligations are straight forward to enforce judicially. All kinds of 
dispute settlement procedures are apt to respond adequately. There are two opposite 
parties in conflict, even though more than one state can be individually affected by the 
same violation. It is confirmed by the high number of cases dealt by different bodies (for 
example, the Trail Smelter arbitration or the Pulp Mills case). Cases were brought in 
arbitral tribunals or permanent courts, depending on the specificities of the cases, but 
overall the aim was the same. Affected states have personal interests in resolving the 
conflict. The law on state responsibility reaffirms these interests by giving the possibility 
of an injured state to invoke the responsibility of another state and claim reparation for 
the injury. Article 31 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility defines an injury 
as including “any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally 
wrongful act of a state”, no matter if the obligation is part of a purely bilateral or 
multilateral treaty. The Trail Smelter arbitration further underlined that the damage 
should not be “too indirect and remote”.
239
  
These obligations related to specific interests of particular states can also be called 
reciprocal obligations, where there is a purely bilateral relationship.
240
 In this case, the 
judicial institutions will not prima facie refuse a request to settle a dispute, because the 
recipient of the obligation is clearly and narrowly announced. The breach is directly 
related to a specific state. Therefore, a victim-state of transboundary injuries will not 
struggle to use judicial fora, at least not because of the type of the obligation it invokes.
241
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This is reflected in the fact that the majority of cases brought before international courts 
and tribunals belong to this category of obligations. 
ii. Shared resources 
The concept of shared resources stands for resources that are overlapping the territories 
of two or more states, such as some rivers, lakes, forests or wild animals. It entails a 
cooperative element between the states that are sharing the resources, although it does 
not automatically mean all obligations concerning shared resources are removed from a 
bilateral scheme. 
The main consequence stemming from the recognition of a shared resource is a 
common management of the resources among the concerned states. In terms of legal 
obligations, the PCIJ said explicitly that states have created a “common legal right” by 
regulating the navigation of the shared river in the River Oder case: 
“[The] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a 
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all 
riparian States in the user of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of 
any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others”.
242
  
In this case, the river is crossing three states, namely Germany, Poland and Czech 
Republic, and the problem is to know whether the right to passage on a navigable river 
extends to all tributaries and sub-tributaries, i.e. whether these portions of river deriving 
from the Oder river are internationalised or not. In that context, the Court acknowledges 
the existence of a “common legal right […] based on the existence of a navigable 
waterway separating or traversing several States”, which extends to the “whole navigable 
course of the river and does not stop short at the last frontier”.
243
 The fact that several 
states share the same resource – in this case a river – creates an international obligation 
which effects reach all these states sharing the resource. It goes beyond the bilateral 
relationship explained before. The Treaty of Versailles internationalises the 
watercourse, and thereby the watercourse becomes a shared resource. 
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This same element can be found in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. This case is about 
the construction of a system of locks on the Danube between Hungary and Slovakia. 
The project has been described as a “single and indivisible operational system of works”, 
and is a “joint investment,
244
 which was agreed through a joint contractual plan.
245
 In 
article 19 of the 1977 Treaty, the parties also agreed on “ensur[ing] compliance with the 
obligations for the protection of nature arising in connection with the construction and 
operation of the System of Locks”. This obligation can be described as creating a 
common regime in which whenever one state does not comply, the other state has a 
right to demand compliance, regardless of the impacts on its own territory. Despite the 
fact the 1977 Treaty created a bilateral agreement of a synallagmatic type, the obligation 
contained in Article 19 of the 1977 Treaty has the characteristics of the interdependent 
type of obligations. Indeed, “obligations for the protection of nature must be respected 
in connection with the construction and operation of the System of Locks”, which means 
each party must respect these obligations in any circumstance during the 
accomplishment of the project. The parties therefore created a common regime where 
reciprocity is no longer a condition to the respect of the obligation. Although the ICJ 
did not examine what type of responsibility would result from the breach of the 
particular treaty obligation, it was not prevented from hearing the case because of the 
type of obligation at stake. 
Other examples of shared resources can be found in the handling of fish stocks, where 
several countries have to coordinate and establish common fisheries rules,
246
 or in 
creating joint sovereignty over certain territories, as in the Nicaragua-Honduras-El 
Salvador joint sovereignty over the Gulf of Fonseca.
247
 Both of these examples were 
brought to an international tribunal when a conflict arose, showing that judicial 
enforcement is not excluded in cases about shared resources. 
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The difference between these cases and the cases on transboundary harm is that the 
states in question have agreed on restricting their behaviour on their own territory. In 
these cases, as opposed to those on transboundary harm, for the states to be violating 
their obligations there is no need to prove transboundary harm. They have agreed on 
restricting their behaviour. In the context of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the state 
parties agreed to pursue a joint project of a dam construction, and in the River Oder 
case, they agreed to guarantee the most efficient regulation of the river. 
These obligations require limitations on the way states behave and create a common 
responsibility in certain circumstances. There is a limitation of states’ domestic actions 
stemming from an expansion of one state’s responsibility to a community-shared 
responsibility at the global level. But it does not mean there is a collective action from 
the international community at large. Rather, the international community watches and 
attempts to accompany the concerned state in its compliance with environmental 
standards.
248
 However, the concerned states can agree to bind themselves by 
environmental obligations. This is what occurred in a number of cases, as demonstrated 
by the regulation of international watercourses. Indeed, the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention, which entered into force in 2014, reaffirms the principle that international 
watercourses are a shared resource, creating specific obligations of cooperation towards 
the watercourses states (article 8). It indeed regulates international watercourses as a 
whole resource and obliges states to coordinate and cooperate in the non-navigational 
uses of those international watercourses.
249
 
This type of obligation can be described as emerging from the concept of diffuse 
reciprocity, which has been explained as a phenomenon where “participants typically 
view diffuse reciprocity as an ongoing series of sequential actions which may continue 
indefinitely, never balancing but continuing to entail mutual concessions within the 
context of shared commitments and values”.
250
 Moreover, interdependent obligations 
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can only exist when all parties participate: it is a necessary condition for the regime to 
work. In Fitzmaurice’s words, “the participation of all the parties is a condition of the 
obligatory force of the treaty”.
251
  
Obligations relating to shared resources represent interdependent obligations, because 
of the nature of the relationship of the states over the same resources. They are forced 
to enter into interdependent obligations led by the need for long-term mutual 
arrangements. Pauwelyn would categorise these obligations as interdependent.
252
 All the 
states parties have interests in respecting the same obligations as they agreed on sharing 
resources in a mutually beneficial way. 
Although global consensus over shared resources has not been reached, the UNEP has 
addressed the issue and adopted guidelines emphasising the need for collaboration 
between states sharing resources. What stops states from attaining a global consensus is 
their reluctance to limit their sovereign rights over natural resources: the guidelines 
specify that “without prejudice to the generality of the above principle [the sovereign 
right over natural resources], it should be interpreted taking into account, where 
appropriate, the practical capabilities of States sharing the natural resource”.
253
 As this 
affirmation is controversial, it has never been formally accepted by the international 
community.
254
 However, many shared resources have been regulated specifically, as 
exemplified above. 
The main contribution of the UNEP guidelines for the purpose of this chapter is to 
confirm the interdependent nature of obligations over shared resources. Specifically, 
principle 1 enunciates that 
“It is necessary for States to co-operate in the field of the environment 
concerning the conservation and harmonious utilization of natural resources 
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shared by two or more States. Accordingly, it is necessary that consistent with the 
concept of equitable utilization of shared natural resources, States co-operate 
with a view to controlling, preventing, reducing or eliminating adverse 
environmental effects which may result from the utilization of such resources. 
Such co-operation is to take place on an equal footing and taking into account 
the sovereignty, rights and interests of the States concerned.”
255
 
From this conception of shared resources, it is possible to conclude they are obligations 
erga omnes partes, and therefore belong to the category of collective obligations. 
However, since shared resources have been regulated separately and according to the 
specific contexts of the resources, it is possible for international courts and tribunals to 
individualise the dispute. Generally, treaties over shared resources include few states and 
have a defined scope. This indicates the suitability of international courts and tribunals 
to respond to conflicts over shared resources. States will not find it difficult first to show 
they are specially affected by a violation as described in the law on state responsibility 
and second to individualise the violation on one state. Thus, problems of enforcement 
through judicial means will not be related to the type of the obligation as such and can 
be assimilated to conflicts with transboundary impacts. 
iii. Areas and resources beyond national jurisdiction 
Whereas the types of environmental obligations aforementioned were strongly based on 
the sovereignty of states over specific geographic areas or resources within their own 
territory, this section is about areas and resources beyond national jurisdiction. The 
difference with other types of environmental obligations is that there is no need for the 
state to prove an injury. Indeed, they are characterised by the fact no state can claim 
sovereignty over these areas or resources. They do not belong to any state in particular. 
They are common property, which entails all states have open access to these areas and 
are able to exploit their resources, unless international agreement has been made, as in 
the case of the international seabed area.
256
 The resources located in the common areas 
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beyond national jurisdiction need an extra protection since, at the moment, the 
regulation of areas and resources beyond national jurisdiction is partial.  
In relation to marine areas beyond national jurisdiction, the UNCLOS offers some 
protection, such as article 192, obliging states to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, regardless of whether it is in sovereign territory or not. The UNCLOS 
also regulates specifically the deep seabed. Part XI of UNCLOS states that “activities in 
the [Seabed] Area shall […] be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
irrespective of the geographical location of States”.
257
 The Seabed Area is moreover 
governed by an institutional framework; the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was 
created, in charge of organising and controlling activities within the Area. Indeed, article 
137 (2) UNCLOS states that “[a]ll rights in the resources of the Area are vested in 
mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act”. However, the ISA has 
jurisdiction only over activities concerning mineral resources.  
The way the deep seabed is regulated crystallises the concept of common heritage of 
humankind. This concept has been developed in order to play the role of regulator by 
instituting an obligation to share equitably and among all states these resources beyond 
national jurisdiction; it is a concept of exploitation of resources beyond national 
jurisdiction.
 258
 This was confirmed by the Seabed Disputes Chamber in 2011 when it 
said that “the role of the sponsoring State is to contribute to the common interest of all 
States in the proper implementation of the principle of the common heritage of 
mankind”.
259
 Moreover, the creation of the ISA institutionalised the concept of the 
common heritage of humankind. It is there to represent the interests of humankind 
towards the deep seabed. 
In sum, the mere fact states cannot appropriate themselves any of these areas of 
common heritage entails a common and cooperative legal framework. Reciprocity is no 
longer a tool to regulate states’ interactions. The obligations linked to these areas beyond 
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national jurisdiction therefore cannot be associated directly with a direct harm to a 
specific state. They are integral in nature, “in the sense that their binding effect is 




iv. Global environmental problems 
The protection of the global environment is directly linked to the concept of a common 
concern of humankind. It appears in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which mentions 
a “global partnership” of all states “to conserve, protect and restore the health and 
integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem”.
261
 It is expressed especially in the concepts of climate 
change and biological diversity. The two conventions regulating those issues (the 
UNFCCC and the CBD) encompass the globality of the problems, regardless where 
they have direct and visible effects.
262
 For an example of a multilateral treaty 
encompassing public interests, the Whaling Convention states that it is in “the interests 
of the nations of the world” to safeguard “for future generations the great natural 
resources represented by the whale stocks”. It adds that “it is in the common interest to 
achieve the optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as possible without causing 
widespread economic and nutritional distress”.
263
 
Such concept has emerged because the existing framework was not sufficient: “neither 
territorial control, on the one hand, nor the international regulation of areas beyond 
territorial control, on the other, is capable of providing an effective structure for the 
global regulation of environmental problems”.
264
 The existence of a common concern 
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concept is therefore used to fill this gap. Indeed, it adds a layer to international 
environmental protection, not tied by any geographical and territorial criteria. This is 
mainly what differentiates the concept of common concern from the one of common 
heritage of humankind. There is no link between one state’s appropriation of the 
resources and the protection of the resources as a global concern.
265
 The idea of 
common concern can also be compared with shared resources. Although states keep 
their sovereign rights, they accept restrictions on their sovereign rights, regardless of any 
transboundary impacts. The nature of the interests at stake differs however between 
common concerns of humankind and common concerns of certain states. Global 
environmental problems are truly erga omnes, and not just erga omnes partes.  
As for a definition, Brunnée said the common interest
266
 is a “notion of an interest in the 
protection of certain values common to the international community which can only be 
safeguarded by international cooperation and through international law”.
267
 This view of 
having some values inherent to the international community stems from the globalisation 
of the world and therefore the need for protection of certain values from encroachment 
by states. It goes against a more bilateral understanding of international legal 




This expansion of international obligations of states to respect certain environmental 
standards in common areas has been backed up by the notion of global public goods, 
which gives an economic perspective on the need for cooperation between states.
269
 It 
has been used as a framework to achieve the geographical transcendence of global 
environmental problems, representing another way of thinking about interests common 
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to the international community. Global public goods are considered as “common values 
the benefits of which are “indivisibly spread among the entire community” and are 
typically non-rival and non-excludable, so that nobody has a rational economic incentive 
to supply them because everyone equally benefits from these goods and nobody can be 
excluded from their benefits”.
270
 Both international rules and economic concepts 
acknowledge the integral nature of some environmental protection. The label of global 
public goods confirms the existence of certain common concerns of humankind. Boer 
took the example of land degradation, which became a global public good as a physical 
manifestation of a common concern of humankind.
271
 As opposed to the current system 
based on the sovereignty of states, the notion of public good poses problems for the 
roles and the use of international courts and tribunals because its legal substance is not 
clearly defined. 
Common concerns of humankind exist because global environmental issues transcend 
sovereign territories. Political borders do not matter for global environmental issues.
 272
 
This is the reason why pure bilateral or reciprocal obligations analysed before are not 
enough to protect the environment effectively. Instead a more multilateral and 
community response is needed.
273
 This transcendence of geographical boundaries is well 
exemplified in the treatment of the global atmosphere, as the UNGA Resolution 43/53 




Legally, common concerns of humankind have created rules that “impose duties on 
society as a whole and on each individual member of the community”.
275
 More precisely, 
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three consequences have been identified by Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell: first, the 
existence and recognition of common concerns of humankind have brought legitimacy 
over the interests of the international community over those common concerns. 
Secondly, the concept entails placing a responsibility on the international community to 
assist in sustainable development. Finally, it constrains states’ sovereignty over their 
natural resources, as it is no longer absolute and infinite.
276
 
The chapter began by identifying obligations deriving from a common property of all 
states over specific areas and their resources to a more global response to environmental 
problems and the recognition of general concepts binding the community of states, 
regardless whether the actions required by the concerned states lie within their territory 
or not. The fact these obligations are not “bilateralisable” is something they have in 
common.
277
 Despite this last category of international legal obligations being 
controversial, states are reluctant to admit any binding value to it. The principal 
argument is that collective action is necessary. Emphasis is placed on the need for 
cooperation and community response instead of coexistence.
278
 The concept of common 
concern of humankind gives states “delegated powers in the interest of humankind”.
279
 
In other words, their obligations are integral. 
2.2 Public Interests litigation as a means to enforce international environmental 
law 
This section centres on the issue of the judicial enforcement of those environmental 
rules identified in the previous section as integral. Integral obligations require specific 
adjustments in order to be judicially enforced, hence the development of public interests 
litigation.  In other words, because the protection of the environment at large embraces 
the idea of common values without boundaries – from the regulation of shared resources 
to the regulation of areas beyond national jurisdiction, or the norms based on the 
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concept of the common concern of humankind, the concept of public interest litigation 
can help enhance judicial enforcement. Indeed, public interests have been identified 
and exist, but they need specific tools to be judicially enforced. Two legal tools have 
been developed; one relying on the development of erga omnes obligations and the law 
on state responsibility. The second is based on the idea of actio popularis. 
i. Concept of public interests 
It has been observed that international law “has gradually begun to … recognis[e] public 
interests of the world community whose protection transcends mere reciprocal relations 
between states and constitutes an obligation of the individual states vis-à-vis the 
international community as a whole.”
280
  
Norms that contain this community element can be identified and classified in different 
categories. Such identification is not an attempt to class obligations according to higher 
or lower values, but it is rather an attempt to flesh out the structure of community norms. 
For example, jus cogens norms, by establishing a communal foundation of the 
international community as a whole, are representative of the presence of communal 
elements of the international community itself. They first challenge the voluntarist 
perspective that only consented rules bind states. They show that the principle of non-
intervention into state national affairs is not absolute.
281
 As such, they are a straight 
forward example of integral obligations. 
Other examples of public interests that have been integrated in substantive norms can 
be found in the jurisprudence: when the ICJ affirmed in the Icelandic Fisheries case that 
“the former laissez-faire treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas has 
been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the rights of other States 
and the needs of conservation for the benefit of all”,
282
 it recognised that the rule had a 
public interest character. Likewise, the ICJ acknowledged in the S.S Wimbledon case 
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that the Kiel Canal “has become an international waterway intended to provide under 
treaty guarantee easier access to the Baltic for the benefit of all nations of the world.”
283
 
Moreover, while interpreting the Convention on the Prohibition of Genocide, the Court 
recognised that the particular convention is based on a “common interest”.
 284
 This offers 
further evidence that the Court recognises the existence of public interests that benefit 
all states. 
These cases have in common the fact they recognise there are not only individual 
interests juxtaposed but also community concerns that must be protected at a 
community level. However, in those cases, the Court did not attach any particular legal 
mechanism to these public interests rules, whereby these public interests could be 
defended judicially in a different way.  
The existence of public interests rules affects mainly state sovereignty. Indeed, states 
recognising that some public environmental interests exist agree national sovereignty will 
be exerted within the limits imposed by these public environmental interests.
285
 But it 
can also have consequences on judicial litigation.  
ii. Legal effects 
In the context of enforcement of international environmental law, the best way to 
interpret public interests may be to consider them as a frame of reference. Indeed, the 
common interest approach in international environmental law opens a supplementary 
means of addressing serious global environmental problems and is the reason for the 
development of such global environmental protection; it does not displace the bilateral 
enforcement of legal obligations.
286
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Indeed, the public interest character of certain obligations does not automatically 
prevent international litigation. Disputes over interdependent and integral obligations 
can be “bilateralised”, i.e. individualised in such manner that a dispute compatible in the 
judicial context can be formulated.
287
 The prime example of such dispute is the Whaling 
case (see below). However, there are certain consequences particular to collective 
obligations that reflect the public interest character.
288
 This argument is linked to the 
broader purpose of the thesis to refute the claim according to which international courts 
and tribunals cannot adequately adapt to new environmental problems that go beyond 
the strictly bilateral structure.  
The argument developed here is not about whether one rule should become binding 
upon parties that have not consented to the rule.
289
 The point is rather one of looking at 
the impacts of the public interest character on the categorisation of environmental 
obligations with a public interest as either “simple” bilateral obligations, interdependent 
or integral obligations. At the end, this will help clarify what disputes international courts 
and tribunals can hear.  
It is important to remember that rules on standing can be adapted by treaty-based 
obligations; they do not have to follow automatically the general international rules of 
standing.
290
 The law on state responsibility also deals with public interest norms, as will 
be analysed below, which is crucial to the interpretation of the rules on standing in 
judicial institutions, but it can be modified by leges specialis. 
Collective obligations, either interdependent or integral can also be qualified as either 
erga omnes partes or erga omnes obligations. The next section will reflect on their 
meaning and judicial implications. This discussion will then lead to the question whether 
the idea of actio popularis is emerging in international judicial proceedings. 
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a. Erga omnes (partes) obligations 
International environmental law is a major field that has developed several concepts 
representing some public interests, both through erga omnes concepts and multilateral 
treaty-based obligations (erga omnes partes),
291
 as demonstrated in the first part of the 
chapter examining collective obligations.  
The specificity of erga omnes partes obligations is that they do not require an extension 
of the application of those rules on non-parties. Indeed, one of the main challenges of 
obligations that are truly erga omnes is to assess whether public interest norms can be 
binding on non-parties.
292
 Obligations erga omnes partes are collective to the community 
of states who accept to be bound by them, whereas obligations erga omnes apply to all 
states regardless. In other words, obligations contained in multilateral environmental 
treaties are erga omnes partes, therefore collective, and can be seen as encompassing 
the value-based approach to the public interest. Indeed, as Peter explained, erga omnes 
partes obligations can be seen as merely representing the lowest common denominator 
of the state parties, or as representing the core community interest.
293
 The latter means 
states acknowledge the need for a broader agreement on a problem common to a 
plurality of states, since they are seeking for a multilateral accord. This can easily be 
understood as a recognition of the states of the common interest attached to the 
problem.  
Obligations erga omnes must be appreciated as opposing obligations inter partes. 
Indeed, obligations erga omnes are automatically considered as having a public interest 
character, since they are binding upon the whole international community. This has 
been confirmed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case: 
“[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the 
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they 
are obligations erga omnes.  
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Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from 
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles 
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection 
from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of 
protection have entered into the body of general international law (Reservations 
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by 
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character. 
  
Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are 
not of the same category. It cannot be held, when one such obligation in 




Additionally, both obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes will influence the 
secondary rules attached to it.
295
 The standard rule allowing states to invoke the 
responsibility of another state restricts such standing to injured states only, as shown in 
Article 42(a) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It affirms that an injured 
state has to owe individually the obligation breached. There is, however, a possibility of 
triggering the responsibility of a state breaching obligations erga omnes (partes). In 
particular, articles 42(b)(i) and (ii) and 48(1)(a) and (b) can be read as creating 
responsibility for erga omnes (partes) obligations, also referred to as solidarity 
measures.
296
   
Article 42. Invocation of responsibility by an injured State 
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State 
if the obligation breached is owed to: 
 (b) a group of States including that State, or the international community as a 
whole, and the breach of the obligation: 
(i) specially affects that State; or 
(ii) is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States 
to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the 
obligation. 
 
Article 48. Invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State 
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1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: 
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and 
is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or 
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 
Article 42(b) expands the notion of injured states to the violation of obligations owed to 
a group of States, “consisting of all or a considerable number of States in the world or 
in a given region, which have combined to achieve some collective purpose and which 
may be considered for that purpose as making up a community of States of a functional 
character”.
297
 Article 48 creates a legal regime whereby other states that do not qualify as 
injured can invoke responsibility. The commentary to the article 48(1)(a) explicitly refers 
to collective obligations meaning obligations that “apply between a group of States and 
have been established in some collective interest”.
298
 Moreover, the environment is 
specifically mentioned as an example of such obligations. Article 48(1)(b) exists because 
of the ICJ’s statement reproduced above in the Barcelona Traction case. It targets 
directly the truly erga omnes obligations.
299
 
Article 48(1)(b) has been mentioned by a tribunal for the first time in 2011, in the 
Advisory Opinion given by the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS: 
“Each State Party may also be entitled to claim compensation in light of the erga 
omnes character of the obligations relating to preservation of the environment 
of the high seas and in the Area. In support of this view, reference may be made 
to article 48 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.”
300
 
This statement embraces the idea that every state party to the UNCLOS will have a legal 
interest to invoke state responsibility on the basis of Article 48. It reflects the idea that 
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“every state has a procedural right, i.e. locus standi to invoke [the] application [of article 
48] on behalf and for the benefit of the international community as a whole”.
301
 
In sum, erga omnes (partes) obligations as understood in the law on state responsibility 
show that interdependent and integral obligations are taken into account and can be 
upheld for what they are as they offer the possibility for states to act in the collective 
interest. However, obligations erga omnes (partes) should be used cautiously. 
Koskenniemi warned about the dangers of recognising such obligations referred to as 
“solidarity measures”:  
“There is a strong community interest in limiting spontaneous solidarity 
measures. Because the primary rules that govern the field are insufficiently 
precise, the danger of abuse is great. On the other hand, there is a strong 
community interest to force the cessation of acts of which the ICJ once remarked 
that they 'shock the conscience of mankind'. In a domestic society, criminal law 
strikes the balance by striving towards as much precision as possible. But no such 
precision is available in international life.”
302
 
But does that mean such erga omnes obligations should not exist? Is it the role of the 
law on state responsibility to define what community interests are? The fact that the ILC 
Draft articles are vague might not create such uncertainty as they will have to be related 
to other primary rules, those which will have to be defined as interdependent or integral. 
Moreover, obligations erga omnes relating to the protection of the environment are 
increasingly precise. The tribunal in the South China Sea arbitration, for example, 
confirmed that “the environmental obligations in Part XII [UNCLOS] apply to States 
irrespective of where the alleged harmful activities took place”.
303
 This is a prime 
example of an obligation erga omnes. Not only does it cover areas beyond national 
jurisdictions but also any national territory. The protection of the marine environment 
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is not attached to any sovereign claim over territory and therefore considered a public 
interest that needs to be implemented erga omnes.  
Overall, obligations erga omnes as developed in the law on state responsibility contain 
the germs for a greater judicial response in favour of public interests. The consequences 
of recognising obligations erga omnes are multiple
304
, however, and do not automatically 
imply that judicial procedures are open to the defence of public interests. Judges have 
the legal framework to develop the judicial application of erga omnes obligations in the 
future. 
b. The actio popularis 
The concept of the actio popularis – originated in Roman law – relies on the fact that 
under certain circumstances, anyone can claim standing regardless of any personal or 
direct interest, creating a general standing. It translates the normative feature of erga 
omnes obligations into judicial terms.
 305
 Despite its existence in certain domestic legal 
orders, at the international level, its existence is questioned.
306
 
A particular problem posed by the notion of an actio popularis in the context of 
international law is the definition of the international community. In order to apply 
obligations erga omnes through a public interests litigation, we need to know who the 
“omnes” are, so we know who can defend the obligation. Do we mean the interests of 
the community of states as a sum, or do we mean the interests of an international 
community with a separate legal personality? In other words, who is guaranteeing their 
protection? Indeed, the question of whether or not one state alone can defend a public 
interest in the name of the international community is different from the question of 
whether a state as a party to an international dispute settlement procedure can defend a 
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Defining the international community arouses a variety of responses and opinions 
depending on the perspectives of parties involved. But in any case, since there is no 
centralised entity to act in the name of the international community, the question of 
which stakeholders are most able to represent the public interest, or in other words, how 
the public interest is represented – if, at all – in an international dispute, is central. 
The lack of the existence of a recognised notion of the international community prevents 
the existence per se of the actio popularis. But international courts and tribunals have 
been enlarging the notion of standing of states themselves, moving in the direction of the 
actio popularis. 
iii. Role of the tribunal itself in defending public interests 
As has been mentioned in chapter 1.4, the tribunal itself can play a major role in the 
conduct of public interests litigation. Adjudication itself has a public function and 
therefore can be entitled to decide on the basis of a public interest. Because the interests 
the law protects can be either public or private, the judicial system also reflects this 
bipolarity of the legal system.
308
 Through their interpretative choices first, international 
courts and tribunals can put forward public interests over private ones. There is some 
evidence in the recognition of the existence of erga omnes obligations, or even through 
obiter dicta, where courts have favoured common interests over private ones. Indeed, 
in various separate cases, as shown by Kolb in the case of the PCIJ, the courts can prefer 
a public interest interpretation.
309
 Public interests litigation is not only about who is 
entitled to denounce violations of international law. It is necessarily related to the content 
of such public interests and their recognition over other private interests.  
International tribunals have a role to play in the defence of public interests not only 
because of their importance as judicial actors as part of the broader international 
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community, but also because they are the guardians of their own procedures, as the 
ultimate decision-makers on the procedural matters. In particular, international courts 
and tribunals are given certain procedural powers that they can exercise proprio motu, 
meaning that they do not need the specific consent of the states involved in the dispute 
in order to award them. For example, a major decision that international courts and 
tribunals can decide for themselves is their jurisdiction (article 36(6) ICJ Statute).
310
 
Another example is their capacity to award provisional measures proprio motu. Notably, 
ITLOS can proclaim provisional measures in order to protect the environment, to 
“prevent serious harm to the marine environment”.
311
Although their flexibility is not 
without boundaries, these examples show that judicial bodies are entrusted with certain 
powers that they can exercise by themselves and which can make a difference in the 
defence of public interests. 
Indeed, “procedure is not only the transmitter of substance, or protector of intrinsic 
procedural rights, but is co-determinative of what the law is in the first place”.
312
 In this 
regard, through the exercise of their judicial powers, and even more when they have 
proprio motu powers, international courts and tribunals have the chance to reflect the 
substantial changes in international environmental law in their procedures, as well as in 
their legal interpretations.  
2.3 Participation in contentious disputes 
In opposition with this collective understanding of international obligations, the judicial 
settlement of international disputes tackles problems between two (or more) specific 
states. Traditionally, it is only when the conflict is concretely formed between particular 
states and when those states cannot find an agreed solution that they go to court (ex post 
facto adjustment). Indeed, the judicial system is based on the sovereignty of the states. 
But the evolution of the concepts under international environmental law – such as 
common concerns of humankind – challenge substantially such strong basis on state 
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 They therefore require adjustments of the general judicial mechanisms. 
However, in the absence of a clear definition of the international community and the 
lack of support for the actio popularis, other indirect means have to be pursued in order 
to defend public interests.  
In general, the fact of considering litigation as a means to uphold public interests at the 
international level represents the shift from a vertical view of the international society 
where the state is the only subject to international law toward a more horizontal view 
where “the rule of law applies to some extent at least, over and above the role of 
States”
314
. Therefore, the analysis of the roles of international adjudication must be made 
in light of the opening to other actors on the international scene. In particular, the fact 
international courts and tribunals exist for the protection of the common good is very 
important. 
There are other stakeholders involved in the defence of public interests than states. 
Debates around multi-stakeholderism in the process of normative developments can 
give us differing perspectives on why such analysis is necessary also in the enforcement 
of international norms. Upfront multi-stakeholderism is linked to an increased 
democratic legitimacy, leading towards more inclusive structures of governance.
315
 Why 
is it necessary to open up litigation to other actors? “No single approach, no single group 
is capable of adequately representing the complexities of environmental reality.”
316
  
Concretely, however, states are the first actors to be entrusted with upholding public 
interests in international litigation, and it is argued that the range of states who can 
uphold them can be broadened. Indeed, states generally act on the basis of their 
personal interests, but it is also possible that they act as trustees of certain public interests. 
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But other actors also have means to interject in a judicial procedure. These will be 
analysed through the possibility to intervene in judicial proceedings, as well as the 
submission of amicus curiae. Indeed, the impacts of public interests on the procedure 
before an international court or tribunal are expressed in the lesser degree of party 
autonomy. They limit the influence of the parties on the whole judicial process.  
The following part will analyse the different possibilities for the different actors to 
interfere in an international judicial procedure, namely as a party, an intervenor or an 
amicus curiae. The array of possibilities for different actors to represent public interests 
before judicial institutions – although not as broad as it could be – is already a sign of 
progress towards a more encompassing system of judicial enforcement. The fact that 
other non-state actors can intervene during a procedure is an indication that international 
courts and tribunals understand their changing role. 
i. Right to initiate a procedure 
States are the first subjects of international law to be able to institute judicial proceedings. 
Articles 34 (1) of the ICJ Statute, 20 (1) ITLOS Statute, II WTO Agreement all render 
the tribunal competent in cases brought by state parties. The main judicial bodies 
(excluding criminal and human rights courts) are competent in interstate disputes. 
Whereas the ICJ and the WTO cannot open a case on the request of actors other than 
states, the UNCLOS says that “the [ITLOS] shall be open to entities other than States 
Parties in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant 
to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all 
the parties to that case”.
317
  
To become a party to the dispute, the state has to show it has a legal interest to sue. 
Tams explained that a “legal interest” is a vague and flexible notion. Indeed, the 
thresholds to get the standing before a tribunal changed over time and depend either on 
various direct jurisdictional clauses, or derive from the general rules on state 
responsibility, and have to be interpreted in light of the jurisprudence developed by the 
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 This is the reason why international courts and tribunals are 
important in the development of public interests litigation. With their interpretative 
powers (see chapter 1.2), they have a critical role to play in the implementation of erga 
omnes (partes) obligations as described above.  
Moreover, it is not because the judicial system has been created as state-centric and 
bilateral that it is by essence contradictory to some public interests. Some states might 
have a private interest to uphold a public interest. Even though it is an indirect and 
insecure channel, it should not be dismissed. A state is of course expected to be the 
guardian of its own legal interests first and foremost. But it does not exclude any other 
motives, especially when the obligations are considered erga omnes. Although the 
jurisprudence has not been consistent in allowing standing for states acting in the 
common interests (even within a single case)
319
, such standing of states based on common 
interests has clearly been recognised in the Belgium v Senegal case: 
“The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations under the 
Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the 
Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by 
another State party. If a special interest were required for that purpose, in many 
cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim. It follows that any 
State party to the Convention may invoke the responsibility of another State 
party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations 
erga omnes partes, such as those under Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention, and to bring that failure to an end.”
320
 
The Court recognised that Belgium was a state other than an injured state in the sense 
of Article 48(1)(a) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility: “In the view of the 
Court, Belgium is entitled to invoke Senegal’s responsibility before this Court without 
necessarily having a special interest in Senegal’s compliance with the Convention”.
321
 
This was criticised by several judges as too restrictive. Belgium argued for recognition as 
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an “injured state” in the sense of Article 42(b) of the ILC Draft Articles, but the Court 
did not pursue its analysis in this direction. The consequences of such categorisation are 
felt in the way Belgium will be able to ask for remedies.
322
  
Moreover, in the Whaling case, although the case was brought under the jurisdiction of 
Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, the tribunal had to admit Australia legal standing, and 
that on the basis of the collective nature of the obligations invoked. It could have rejected 
Australia’s standing despite having jurisdiction over the case, because of the lack of 
individuality of Australia to the particular case at hand for example – but it did not. 
Indeed, these cases have embraced the idea of a single state upholding collective 
obligations.The Whaling case, which was filed by Australia, and whose interests were 
not primarily focused on the violation of its own physical and material interests, but 
focused on the broader aim of the ICRW, is an example where the court did not reject 
judicial proceedings for lack of standing. Indeed, Australia solely based its legal standing 
on the collective nature of the obligations invoked. Several times during the hearings, 
the councels referred to the dependence of the standing on the erga omnes partes 
character of the ICRW, at the exclusion of any more individual standing based on the 
special injury faced by the state.
323
 
“Australia does not claim to be an injured State because of the fact that some of 
the JARPA II take is from waters over which Australia claims sovereignty rights 
and jurisdiction. … Every party has the same interest in ensuring compliance by 
every other party with its obligations under the 1946 Convention. Australia is 




“In the view of their shared values, as set forth in the 1946 Convention, all States 
parties to that Convention have a common interest in each State complying with 
its obligations under the Convention and the regime deriving from it. … All the 
States parties ‘have a legal interest’ in the protection of the rights involved.”
325
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Despite Australia’s clarity, the Court itself did not reiterate their reasoning in the final 
judgment. As Tams advocated, it was a missed opportunity for the court to clarify that it 
accepts disputes under collective standing. No mention in the final judgment was made 
regarding legal standing.
326
 However, this lack of clarification does not automatically 
mean that the Court dismissed Australia’s argument. It could also be interpreted as a 
tacit continuation of the Belgium v Senegal jurisprudence.
327
 These two cases are 
important as they may confirm the tendency of international courts and tribunals to 
accept legal standing in cases of collective obligations. 
Generally, an important distinction must be drawn between the judicial competence of 
a tribunal and the standing of a state. Indeed, Judge Skotnikov criticised the Court’s 
findings in the Belgium v Senegal case as being broader than the convention in question. 
He argued that it is not possible to deduce “a procedural right of one state party to 
invoke the responsibility of another” from the nature of the obligation as protecting a 
common interest. He used the fact that states can make reservations to the court’s 
jurisdiction as evidence of the misinterpretation of the judgment.
328
 However, this 
argument does not take into account the difference between the standing of state before 
a court and this court’s competence. This lack of distinction between the two also led 
the ICJ to some confusion in the Barcelona Traction case, presenting an apparent 
contradiction between its obiter dictum recognising obligations erga omnes (and 
therefore legal interest to all state parties) and a later paragraph where it recognises that 
some human rights treaties require a nationality link with the state in order for it to file 
a judicial case.
329
 This is not, however, a contradiction as such, but rather an unfortunate 
conflation of concepts. The nature of the obligation and its impact on standing has to be 
distinguished from the trigger mechanism of the competence of the court.
330
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The ability to trigger judicial procedures is limited to states only in the ICJ. However, 
arbitration can have a broader understanding of those rules on standing and can 
accommodate other actors than states as parties. The PCA Optional Rules for 
Arbitrating Disputes between Two States do not contain a clause on the need for a legal 
interest to sue, but only states that “[w]here the parties to a treaty or other agreement 
have agreed in writing that disputes shall be referred to arbitration …, then such disputes 
shall be settled in accordance with these Rules” (Article 1). However, other problems 
are encountered with arbitration affecting the potential public interests angle of litigation. 
Indeed, the fact judicial proceedings are not automatically public and that parties to the 
dispute are directly responsible for funding of the proceedings can impair the role of 
arbitration in the public interest.
331
 
Moreover, the ITLOS can be accessed by other actors than states, as it “shall be open 
to entities other than States Parties in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in 
any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the 
Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case”.
332
 In particular, the ISA as set 
out in Article 137 (2) UNCLOS has a special status in international law, and it is a perfect 
example of a public international organisation acting in the public interest. As mentioned 
above, it is also entrusted with the right to initiate judicial proceedings. However, the 
question remains for other international organisations: whose rights and interests are 
they likely to uphold when they are given locus standi? In addition, whose actions will 
they be held accountable for? 
ii. Right to intervene 
Most international courts are open to third states to intervene in an already instituted 
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the Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
337
. Interventions were 
first instigated to allow third states affected by the case to protect their own interests. 
States have neither used the possibility of intervening nor were accepted by the Court 
very often.
338
 Indeed, there have been ten cases where interventions were requested.
339
 
Interventions – as well as amicus curiae – give some actors the right to have a say during 
a judicial procedure, as opposed to a party to a dispute, who has a direct right to a 
remedy. Their very nature is different.  
However, interventions could be used by states to bring public interest claims, 
depending on how the Court is defining how affected should a third state be. Indeed, 
what exactly do third states have to prove in order to be accepted by the tribunal? In the 
case of the WTO, the third states have to show a substantial interest, which does not 
have to be legal and can be only factual.
340
 In the case of the ICJ, third states have two 
options available.
341
 Either the intervention of a third state has to be supported by a legal 
interest which is decided at the discretion of the Court (article 62 ICJ Statute)
342
 or the 
state has a right to intervene “whenever the construction of a convention to which states 
other than those concerned in the case are parties” (article 63 ICJ Statute).
343
 Only in the 
case of article 63 will the judgment be binding on the intervenor. 
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In the application of article 62, a limit between a third state raising a new dispute and a 
third state intervening in a procedure has to be set, as a result of the nature of the 
intervention. It indeed exists in order to represent other interests within the existing 
judicial procedure. The line between the two can be difficult to draw, as the Libya/Malta 
Continental Shelf case exemplified. The interests of the intervenor must be more 
general than claiming a specific right, otherwise it becomes a party to the dispute. 
However, the interests of the intervenor cannot be too specific as raising legal issues for 
itself, because it would modify the object of the dispute. Indeed, Italy’s request to 
intervene in the Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case was rejected because it would entail 
that the court decide on Italy’s sovereign rights.
344
 Additionally, the purpose of the 
intervention must be given by the third state in order to be accepted by the ICJ.
345
 The 
court said that “the precise object of an intervention must be connected with the subject 
of the main dispute”.
346
 Although third states generally invoked their own interests that 
would be affected by the decision, it might be only a step towards the submission by a 
third state invoking a public interest norm applicable in the dispute. 
Article 62 ICJ Statute (together with article 81 ICJ Rules) gives the opportunity to all 
states with any interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision to 
intervene, regardless if they ratified the litigious convention. In this case, a state could 
bring to the dispute its views on the violation of erga omnes norms, but only if the court 
authorises the intervention. In the case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Litigan and 
Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), the court did not say that it was impossible for a 
third state to bring an interest of a legal nature other than in the subject-matter of the 
case, but it said that in that case, the third state “bears the burden of showing with a 
particular clarity the existence of the interest of a legal nature which it claims to have”.
347
 
                                                 
344
 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta), Application to Intervene (Judgment) [1984] ICJ 
Rep 1984, p 3. “The legal interest of Italy is thus not merely an interest, but the ‘sovereign rights’ over the 
appropriate areas of continental shelf (par. 15). ‘If Italy were permitted to intervene in the present 
proceedings in order to pursue the course it has itself indicated it wishes to pursue, the Court would be 
called upon, in order to give effect to the intervention, to determine a dispute, or some part of a dispute, 
between Italy and one or both of the principal Parties’ (par. 31). 
345
 Article 81 (2(b)) of the Rules of the Court.  
346
 Territorial and Maritime Dispute Case (Nicaragua/Colombia) 2011, par. 44. 
347
 Sovereignty over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Application for Permission to 
Intervene (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 2001, p 575, par. 59. 
98 
 
That would potentially allow third states to bring in the case violations of obligations 
owed to the international community as a whole, without the need to prove the existence 
of a multilateral treaty, as for article 63. 
Relating interventions of third states in judicial proceedings to the defence of public 
interest norms, article 63 ICJ Statute is a great example of the enforcement of erga 
omnes partes obligations. The fact that all parties to a treaty have a right to intervene in 
the case endorses the idea of obligations owed to a group of states. In the Whaling case, 
for example, New Zealand was granted the right to intervene according to article 63 ICJ 
Statute. It intervened “in its capacity as a party to the treaty at the centre of the 
proceedings, the [Whaling] Convention”. It provided the Court with “New Zealand’s 
views on the issues of interpretation under the Convention that are relevant to a 
determination of the case before the Court”.
348
 In this situation, New Zealand did not 
defend its own national interests. It instead took the opportunity to interpret the 
multilateral obligations contained in the ICRW.  
Interventions by states can be used to adapt the procedural rules to the collective nature 
of certain environmental rules, both through article 62 and 63 of the ICJ Statute. 
iii. Amicus curiae 
Another possibility that would see actors other than the two states party to a dispute 
participate in the proceedings is the submission of amicus curiae briefs. Third states are 
allowed to submit amicus curiae,
349
 but it is the only procedure where non-state actors 
(such as international organisations, NGOs or individuals) are introduced in 
international dispute settlement mechanisms. They have a potentially big role to play as 
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defenders of public interests in a specific dispute since they can bring independent 
analysis to the case. A significant difference with the two previous possibilities to 
participate in a dispute is that the submission of an amicus curiae brief is not a right. The 
WTO says explicitly that “participation as amici in WTO appellate proceedings is not 
a legal right, and [it] has no duty to accept any amicus curiae brief”.
350
 
More specifically, the question of allowing private actors, normally not subjects of 
international law in a formal judicial procedure among sovereign states highlights the 
need for a broadening of the scope of international law. Both international tribunals and 
private actors will use the institution of amicus curiae to further their own interests. 
Judicial bodies will use amicus curiae to enhance their legitimacy, whereas private actors 
see them as an opportunity to raise public interests in a normally closed procedure. In 
both cases, an urge to include non-state actors on the international scene is palpable.  
There are several issues regarding the submission of amicus curiae briefs that must be 
tackled. Firstly, it is critical to ask exactly what constitutes a brief and what kind of 
arguments it can contain. Additional central questions to ask are: who is entitled to 
submit a brief? According to what criteria a court should receive or refuse a brief? The 
rules on this are either non-existent or vague.
351
 It may even be characterised as a “free 
zone”, with few written rules.
352
 Over the last decades the types of amicus interventions 
have evolved. I will focus on the evolution of the use by other actors of amicus curiae 
and try to determine what functions amicus curiae briefs can play in order to represent 
public interests, and apply it to an environmental context. Pursuing a more speculative 
line of enquiry, this section will also touch upon the use of amicus curiae by international 
organisations as relevant actors.  
Firstly, the practices of (or lack of) different international tribunals vary from one 
another. The powers through which a tribunal can allow amicus curiae briefs (inherent 
to the constitution of a judicial body or through the consent of state-parties to the 
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foundational treaty) influence the use of amicus curiae briefs by the tribunal.
353
 The 
WTO DSU for instance has an extended case-law on amicus curiae
354
, much more 
defined than in other tribunals such as the ICJ or the ITLOS. Because amicus curiae 
were not discussed at the time of the creation of the ICJ or the ITLOS, it is only through 
judicial decisions that amicus curiae can be created. The WTO DSU however contains 
a specific clause (articles 13 and 12.1), which enables the panels to allow amicus curiae 
without the need to justify why.  
Interstate courts in general have been rather reluctant to accept amicus curiae briefs, 
compared to the practice of human rights and international criminal courts. As a result 
of their jurisdictional scope, human rights and international criminal courts have had to 
endorse broad participation. Their jurisdictions are indeed open to individuals, as 
opposed to interstate courts. Human rights and criminal courts will therefore have a 
more open practice towards the submission of amicus curiae briefs. Interstate courts 
could get inspiration from this practice.
355
 To return to interstate courts, the question of 
what are the different functions amicus curiae can play in an environmental context 
depends on who is the friend of the court. There are two main relevant actors for public 
interests in an environmental context, namely nongovernmental and intergovernmental 
organisations. Both actors have the potential to uphold public interests in interstate 
judicial proceedings, but they do not have the same status as amicus curiae in 
international tribunals. Each tribunal has different procedural standards, determining 
diversely who can be an amicus curiae and how the interests of the amicus curiae should 
be affected. 
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About the ICJ, article 34 (2) of the ICJ Statute authorises public international 
organisations to submit “information relevant to the case” in contentious cases, which 
are understood as excluding NGOs,
356
 but it was suggested that it could be interpreted as 
“encompassing international public interest organisations”.
357
 However, the case law so 
far confirms that NGOs are excluded from direct participation in the judicial 
proceedings. Indeed, the Court was clear in the Asylum case when it rejected the 
submission made by the International League of Rights of Man, because it could not 
“be characterised as public international organization as envisaged by Statute”.
358
 States 
tried to bypass this prohibition of amicus briefs by including them in their own 
memorials as parties to the dispute. It happened in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, 
where Hungary joined a report from the NGO ‘World Wildlife Fund’ (WWF).
359
 
However, this solution is not optimal, as the role of an amicus curiae is to assist the court 
as a “friend of the court”, rather than serve the argument of a party as a “friend of the 
party”.
360
 In advisory proceedings, similar views apply. Practice Direction XII – adopted 
in 2012 – clearly states that  
“1. Where an international non-governmental organization submits a written 
statement and/or document in an advisory opinion case on its own initiative, 
such statement and/or document is not to be considered as part of the case file. 
2. Such statements and/or documents shall be treated as publications readily 
available and may accordingly be referred to by States and intergovernmental 
organizations presenting written and oral statements in the case in the same 
manner as publications in the public domain.”
361
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Judges can therefore read statements written by NGOs, but such statements are not 
formally part of the judicial procedure. It confirms the Court has not changed its 
restrictive approach since 1970. A letter from the Registrar of the court during the Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) case stated that “the Court would be unwilling to open the floodgates to 
what might be a vast amount of proffered assistance”.
362
 Overall, amicus curiae made by 
NGOs are not accepted in proceedings in the ICJ, apart from a very indirect way in 
advisory opinions. However, such restrictions do not apply for intergovernmental 
organisations, as clearly stated in article 34(2). 
In the ITLOS, there is no direct mention of amicus curiae, but according to Article 84 
of the Rules of the Tribunal, “[t]he Tribunal may, […] at the request of a party or proprio 
motu, request an appropriate intergovernmental organization to furnish information 
relevant to a case before it”. Although this article limits the possibility to submit briefs to 
intergovernmental organisations, Article 48 of the Rules offers the possibility to the 
parties to the dispute to modify or add rules, which gives some leeway in the application 
of Article 84 when all parties agree.
363
 In contentious cases, the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber follows the same procedure (article 115 of the ITLOS Rules). As for the 
advisory jurisdiction, both the Tribunal and the Seabed Disputes Chamber follow the 
same procedure as in contentious cases, according to article 130 and 138 (3) of the Rules 
of the ITLOS.  
The ITLOS is therefore open to receive briefs from international organisations, but it 
appears the drafters of the ITLOS Rules excluded voluntarily NGOs by specifying that 
its jurisdiction is open only to intergovernmental organisations, in order to prevent the 
controversy that happened before the ICJ.
364
 Despite this restrictive view, NGOs have 
submitted amicus curiae briefs, but were rejected, as expected. For instance, the tribunal 
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did not accept the submission by Stitching Greenpeace Council and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) in the Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability of 
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, because 
“it had not been submitted under article 133 of the Rules”. It has, however, been 
“transmitted to the States Parties, the Authority and the intergovernmental organisations 
that had submitted written statements”.
365
 In subsequent cases, namely Nos. 21 and 22, 
the WWF International and Stitching Greenpeace Council submitted amicus curiae 
briefs. Both claimed to assist or provide assistance to the tribunal, and none mention on 
what grounds they submitted an amicus curiae brief.
366
 
The WTO dispute settlement system started to enable access to the dispute settlement 
process to amicus curiae in 1998, with the Shrimp-Turtle case
367
, through article 13 DSU, 
which allows panels to “seek information […] from any individual or body which it deems 
appropriate”. It did not totally admit the submission of amicus curiae briefs, but it made 
it possible for the Appellate Body to expand from there – as the submission of amicus 
curiae briefs was only provided in the DSU for the panels’ proceedings,
368
 which it did 
first in the Lead and Bismuth II case,
369
 and especially in the Asbestos case.
370
 Indeed, 
the Appellate Body adopted guidelines on how to submit an amicus curiae brief, setting 
out the conditions under which an amicus curiae brief could be submitted.
371
 The 
Appellate Body also clarified that member-states not parties to the dispute could be 
friends of the court.
372
 Through its extensive practice, the WTO dispute settlement 
system has to some extent defined rules on the submission of amicus curiae briefs, taken 
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directly by the different investment arbitral tribunals (NAFTA and ICSID for 
instance).
373
 It is quite a different perspective from that pursued by the ICJ and the 
ITLOS, which could prove them wrong. Indeed, the concerns expressed by the 
Registrar in 1970 have not become features of the WTO DSU practice, allowing us to 
conclude that they may be unfounded.
374
 
The PCA does not contain any specific rules on amicus curiae, but the parties to a 
dispute are free to accept them if they both agree to do so.
375
 Arbitration is in this context 
less equipped than permanent courts because of the possibility of confidential 
proceedings. It limits here the potential for amicus curiae briefs.
376
 However, because 
procedural rules can be adopted freely by the parties to the dispute, it could allow more 
progressive developments. 
Despite the procedural differences enumerated above, it is possible to draw some 
general comments, especially about the actual contribution of amicus curiae. To what 
extent have they represented public interests and is the current structure suited enough 
to respond to the use of amicus curiae for that purpose? Razzaque says that a friend of 
the court participates in judicial disputes “without any direct interest in the litigation […] 
to make a suggestion to the court on matters of fact and law within his knowledge”.
377
 In 
other words, their role is to be a neutral bystander. Besides, they do not need to have a 
legal interest to participate, since they are not recognised a legal right to participate. The 
judicial body will always have the final word about whether it accepts the brief. It means 
it could be easier to bring to the ongoing dispute public interest norms that might have 
been violated but that no other means allowed upholding, since an amicus curiae does 
not need to prove any particular legal interest. From that perspective, the dynamics 
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between intervenors and amicus curiae are different: an amicus curiae has to prove to 
the tribunal it is useful to it, whereas an intervenor has to prove it has a legal interest 
itself.  
An amicus curiae can be useful in different ways, the most important of which being to 
assist the court, with either specialist legal expertise, factual information,
378
 or by 
providing a measure of due process.
379
 Moreover, the use of these non-state actors (both 
nongovernmental and intergovernmental organisations) in the decision-making process 
regarding environmental protection can be very useful since they already participate in 
the law-making, during treaty negotiations for instance. NGOs working on the defence 
of any aspect of environmental protection and international organisations such as UNEP 
play a large role in the elaboration of new legal frameworks, and should be able to defend 
their cause in litigation. However, the relevant function for the purpose of this chapter 
is the representation of public interests. The problem with the submission of an amicus 
brief by NGOs is that they do not automatically represent the interests of the 
international community as a whole. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that they also 
have their own agenda – each NGO exists to pursue a specific purpose – which could 
undermine their ability to bring forward public interests in general, in the event where 
their own goals differ from more general public interests.
380
 In other words, the 
participation of non-state actors does not automatically equate with the representation 
of public interests. It means instead that participation from civil society is allowed, which 
gives a different perspective on the issues at stake. They represent a particular audience 
with specific interests at stake, which might differ from the two parties to the dispute, but 
not necessarily the broader common interest.
381
 They can merge in some cases, but it is 
not an automatic process. Rather, international organisations correspond better to the 
needs of public interest norms. They can potentially represent the interests of the 
international community but more importantly they are allowed to participate, as 
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opposed to NGOs, both in the ITLOS and in the ICJ proceedings – they have the 
exclusivity to be friends of the court in contentious cases. Especially if a state did not 
take the opportunity to intervene,
382
 an international organisation will be able to use its 
amicus curiae function to bring forward obligations erga omnes partes, for instance those 
within which they were created. It would be for example the case of International 
Whaling Commission submitting a brief in the Whaling case, or the UNEP in other 
environmental cases. However, the absence of submissions of amicus briefs by 
intergovernmental organisations is noticeable. It has been argued that problems related 
to the internal competence to decide when to submit amicus curiae were the reason why 
such practices are absent in practice. Indeed, such uncertainties can dissuade 
international organisations to take action.
383
 
2.4 The Advisory jurisdiction 
Having analysed the different options international judicial bodies offer concerning the 
standing in contentious cases, particular attention must be paid to the advisory 
jurisdiction of these bodies. Indeed, as Chinkin and MacKenzie said, “it is perhaps worth 
noting that the advisory function is closer to the domestic concept of public interest 
litigation than the bilateral contentious jurisdiction where party interests prevail. In its 
advisory jurisdiction the Court gives an opinion on some matter of general international 




There are different factors why the advisory jurisdiction could act as a remedy for the 
relevance of international courts and tribunals in environmental matters. One factor is 
about who can request an advisory opinion. Article 65 (1) of the ICJ Statute says that 
“the Court may give an advisory opinion […] at the request of whatever body may be 
authorised by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a 
request”. In contrast with standing in contentious cases, the ICJ is in this case open to 
other entities than states. Moreover, as we have seen, international organisations can be 
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adequate in bringing up some general or public interests. In ITLOS advisory 
proceedings, international organisations also have the opportunity to request advisory 
opinions. Both the 2011 Seabed Disputes Chamber and the SRFC advisory opinions 
have been requested by international organisations: the ISA in the first instance and the 
Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) in the second. 
Furthermore, the ITLOS has to “give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to 
all States Parties” as well as to “the intergovernmental organisations which are likely to 
be able to furnish information on the question”.
385
 For example, in the request for an 
advisory opinion submitted by the SRFC, the Tribunal made an extensive list of forty-
eight intergovernmental organisations, regional or global, which were considered able to 
submit memorials in the case. These organisations were considered “likely to be able to 
furnish information on the questions submitted … for an advisory opinion”, according 
to article 133 (2) of the ITLOS Rules.
386
 Since the purpose of an advisory opinion is 
different from a contentious case, the fact it is more open to entities other than states 
parties to the procedure is understandable.  
Moreover, although not formally allowed in the ICJ procedure, amicus briefs will 
become accessible through public domain, and will be held on the Peace Palace 
(Practice Direction XII, par. 3). It is a slightly broader rule than in contentious cases. In 
the case of the ITLOS procedure, NGOs are not allowed to submit written statements, 




Since the purpose of the advisory jurisdiction differs from the one in contentious cases, 
advisory opinions are of relevance in environmental matters. For the ICJ and ITLOS, 
advisory opinions are more a matter of interpretation or clarification of the law. The 
purpose is broader than settling a bilateral dispute. In the SRFC opinion, the tribunal 
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recalled that “[t]he object of the request by the SRFC is to seek guidance in respect of 
its own actions”.
388
 Since the overall objective of the Commission is to reinforce fisheries 
policies in the states members’ territorial waters and EEZ,
389
 it is possible to conclude 
that the advisory opinion was requested in the common interests of the member states 
sharing fisheries resources. The 2011 Seabed Disputes Chamber opinion is even more 
striking, because the Seabed Disputes Chamber is competent to hear cases about the 
Seabed Area, which is located beyond national jurisdictions and is the “common 
heritage of humankind”. Since the ISA is responsible for the exploitation of minerals in 
the Area, it is also able to seek advice by requesting an advisory opinion. The existence 
of such proceedings triggered by the ISA is a great example of how an international 
organisation can defend erga omnes obligations, in the interests of the international 
community as a whole. 
The Seabed Disputes Chamber noted that the underlying reason for the political organ 
to ask for an advisory opinion was that it needed the “assistance of an independent and 
impartial body”.
390
 Or the international organisation could come to the conclusion there 
is a legal dispute that may need to be resolved, but cannot be brought to the contentious 
jurisdiction for lack of consent between the two concerned states. The international 
organisation could then request an advisory opinion that will influence the result of the 
existing but not settled dispute. For example, the Court explained why it accepted to give 
an advisory opinion in the case of the Construction of a Wall, and said that “[t]he 
opinion is requested on a question which is of particularly acute concern to the United 
Nations, and one which is located in a much broader frame of reference than a bilateral 
dispute”.
391
 The court thus confirmed that the prerequisite for using judicial settlement 
to solve a dispute, namely the consent of both interested parties, was overridden by the 
general concern raised by the General Assembly. The same can be said about the 
Namibia case. South Africa would never have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in a 
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contentious case. The institution of advisory opinions therefore opens up the court’s 
jurisdiction. It may be very useful for environmental disputes in that regard.  
It has also been argued that the ICJ or the ITLOS advisory jurisdictions would be a good 
forum to hear a case on climate change.
392
 In the first case, the UNGA would be able to 
request an advisory opinion, but other international organisations could do it. In the case 
of an ITLOS advisory opinion, the object of the opinion would be limited to the law of 
the sea because of the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. An advisory opinion on climate 
change would be a prime example of an erga omnes procedure, since the obligations 
created under the UNFCCC are integral in nature and the existence of the UNFCCC is 
based on the nature of the climate change problem as “common concern” of the 
international community. 
The advisory jurisdiction serves the general or public interest in a more satisfactory 
manner. Therefore, it allows issues to be voiced that would otherwise have been kept 
silent in a bilateral contentious case, but does not exist to help solving an existing dispute. 
Indeed, advisory opinions are always non-binding. One of the indirect consequences of 
an advisory opinion can be to prevent a dispute to arise. Indeed, for an advisory opinion 
to be brought to the court, it cannot be a bilateral dispute. It leaves the door open to any 
legal question, regardless of the fact a dispute is shaped as a dispute between two states. 
This may be easier because of the non-binding nature of an advisory opinion.
393
 The 
Western Sahara case and the Kosovo case showed that advisory opinions can also cover 
other disputes than strictly inter-state disputes. In that sense they could even prevent an 
international dispute to arise. 
If we consider the legal effect of advisory opinions, we know they are not legally binding. 
Nonetheless, in practice the effects can go “beyond the scope of the UN Charter”.
394
 
They influence the development of international law, the states’ behaviours, and even 
give precedence on a legal question. But the remaining question is whether the nature 
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of advisory opinions, and the fact they are not binding, enhances or disadvantages the 
outcome. Both sides can be argued. On the one hand, states might be more inclined to 
listen to the Court delivering its interpretation of the law. The court is thus guiding states 
in their effort to comply with the international norms. Their sovereignty is preserved. 
On the other hand, there is little to be done if one state decides not to follow the court’s 
opinion. 
2.5 Conclusion 
There are different layers of protection – international environmental law is a sum of 
multi-layered regimes. This affects the concept of sovereignty as these layers add 
restrictions on each state’s sovereignty. Although states retain their full sovereignty on 
their natural resources,
395
 restrictions are multiple. The fact the state responsibility is 
extended from a narrow individual responsibility to a states’ community responsibility is 
a good example of this evolution.
396
  
In reflection, the categorisation of international environmental obligations as reciprocal, 
interdependent or integral obligations – the element of reciprocity being the key change 
– has been used as a basis for the further analysis of judicial responses to standing. If the 
obligation is reciprocal – bilateral – the interested state, or injured state in the case of a 
violation of an environmental rule will be easily identifiable. It will be possible for the 
affected state(s) to bring a legal claim on the basis of this reciprocal obligation (either 
through the particular dispute settlement clauses or through general state responsibility). 
However, if the obligation is integral, as in the cases where the intention of the rule is to 
protect the global environment, a problem concerning the standing before a judicial 
international body occurs.  
Focusing specifically on bilateral adversarial disputes, there is no reason to object to the 
appropriateness of adjudication. The characteristics of adjudication are no longer 
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problematic in the event of a traditional transboundary dispute. Romano particularly 
emphasised the usefulness of arbitration in the event of transboundary conflicts. 
Amerasinghe even sustained adjudication is one of the “most viable means of 
international dispute settlement” and provides four distinctive features in support to his 
affirmation.
397
 On the whole, the fact the judicial function is by essence independent and 
impartial, that states accept the character of judicial organs as judicial organs, that judicial 
bodies have inherent powers and that they are not subordinate nor subsidiary to any 
other body are the key elements for the success of the international judiciary. 
Focusing on judicial implementation of erga omnes (partes) obligations, when we think 
of public interest enforcement, we need to consider the question whether a state is 
entitled to defend a given community interest without the need to individualise the injury 
(leading towards the acceptance of an international actio popularis) separately from the 
question whether a state can defend a community interest through the traditional dispute 
settlement mechanisms. There are good examples where a judicial procedure was based 
on communitarian standing (theWhaling case being the most recent), or when erga 
omnes standing was recognised (Seabed Disputes Chamber 2011 Advisory Opinion) 
but the existence of an actio popularis cannot be recognised yet. There is indeed room 
for improvement regarding the development of litigation of erga omnes obligations.  
Overall, this chapter highlighted the deficiencies in the rules of standing, and focused on 
how public interests can be upheld by both states and other non-state actors. 
Participation in judicial proceedings can be pursued down different paths. The debate 
on public interests litigation has a major impact on such rules of participation.  By letting 
other actors interfering into a state’s affairs, other interests can be represented. It means 
that not only states have a right to have a say. However, states also play an active role 
since they mainly get the right to a remedy, which can also be influenced by public 
interest norms. States primarily have a right to a remedy as an initiator or intervenor, as 
opposed to other actors who have the right to have a say in judicial proceedings, and not 
even a right but a possibility to be taken into account. Emphasis on intergovernmental 
organisations as potential upholders of public interests of the international community 
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(or a part of) is critical. As demonstrated by the ISA, certain international organisations 
have the potential to play an important role in the defence of public interests. Such 
conclusions go towards the general argument of the thesis that certain procedural 
obstacles can be overcome. The role of international organisations in environmental 
disputes has been underlined and is an effective tool that can improve the adequacy of 
international dispute settlement.  
113 
 
3. SCIENTIFIC FACTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
The central aim of this chapter is to assess the role of judicial institutions when complex 
environmental cases rely on contradictory and controversial scientific evidence. 
International environmental disputes highlight complex scientific data, often novel, and 
uncertain, on which judges have to take a stance. More broadly, the protection of the 
environment involves the management of scientific uncertainty, as a prerequisite. A key 
question to be answered is: when it comes to the interpretation and application of such 
rules of environmental protection, how should international judges deal with a changing 
scientific environment, or even with the unknown? This chapter will cover the extent to 
which international courts and tribunals can use their existing powers over fact-finding 
methods in order to respond effectively to the needs of environmental disputes. 
In international litigation, facts have never been a prominent source of disagreement 
between the parties to a certain dispute. Overall, states disagree on legal interpretations 
rather than factual determinations. Yet, problems concerning evidence have arisen in 
various cases, such as the ones involving the determination of territorial boundaries, 
where the parties would disagree on the factual situation as a result of different 
interpretations of maps and other cartographic evidence.
398
 Problems of proof also arose 
in very different cases, altogether setting the ground for further developments in 
environmental disputes. However, international dispute settlement bodies have been 
criticised for failing to offer procedural solutions to the specific challenges related to 
scientific facts in disputes on environmental matters. The fact the ICJ neglected all 
scientific facts from its reasoning in the Gabčíkovo/Nagymaros case, for example, was 
seen as a weakness, since the parties’ arguments relied heavily on certain controversial 
scientific facts.
399
 The fact the Court did not consider any of those facts can arguably 
delegitimise its ability to judge cases with a heavy scientific input. In the Pulp Mills case, 
the Court learnt from the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case and appreciated abundant 
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scientific evidence, but it created different problems concerning the process of 
assessment of this evidence by the Court.
400
 However, judicial practice keeps reacting 
rapidly between cases that involve uncertain scientific facts, showing its ability to adapt 
to current developments. Such rapid response shows that international courts and 
tribunals are aware of the specificities of environmental disputes and willing to make 
certain changes to better handle environmental disputes. 
Disputes over science are part and parcel of environmental conflicts, and represent more 
broadly the exercise of assessing the risks related to certain actions and decisions. 
Indeed, the WTO case-law shows great emphasis on scientific issues, especially when 
science is used to establish the existence of risk justifying certain trade measures (under 
the SPS Agreement for example).
401
 
This chapter will show the different procedural options available to judicial bodies, how 
they have been used and their potential for even further developments. It will consider 
these questions within the context of special environmental rules. Indeed, the role of 
international courts and tribunals also depends on which rules they are implementing. 
This chapter will focus on the different combinations between environmental rules 
dealing with scientific facts and certain procedural principles.  
3.1 Challenges for international adjudication 
The use and assessment of scientific facts in international judicial courts is part of a 
broader debate about the ability of a tribunal to determine the truth, or a truth. A critical 
question in judicial terms is whether or not it is possible to determine a true fact. A 
tribunal has to fix a certain factual setting from that given at a certain time before it. 
Indeed, it bears the responsibility to ascertain the facts at the basis of the dispute, which 
are considered distinct from the legal aspects of the dispute, as commonly understood 
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through the rationalist tradition.
402
 In order to establish the facts and convince the 
tribunal, sufficient proof must be given. In that sense, proof is only a means to persuade 




Is scientific fact-finding conceptually different from any other fact-finding process? 
D’Aspremont and Mbengue explained that a particularity of scientific fact-finding as 
opposed to other traditional fact-finding is that it is based on probabilities instead of 
veracities, creating tensions within a judicial procedure. This distinction between true 
and probable facts can be explained by the intrinsic lack of certainty of scientific facts. 
Science as a field is based on the verification of hypotheses, which evolve with the 
development of knowledge; new advanced knowledge replaces current knowledge, 
making current knowledge inherently unstable.
404
 Scientific knowledge is proven through 
the establishment of scientific evidence. The legal methods are completely detached 
from the process of affirming scientific facts. Therefore, a tribunal will have to 
encompass new techniques and rely on sources other than legal sources. Although there 
are certain facts so common they are considered as veracities and need not to be proved, 
such as the days of the week,
405
 all the other facts stay subject to examination and have 
different weights at the specific time the judicial decision is made. The increasing 
importance of scientific facts necessary to solve a legal dispute emphasises the limited 
ability of an international court or tribunal to decide adequately on the right application 
of the law in a particular case, therefore challenging the role of a legal court towards 
science. The uncertainty of scientific facts is demonstrated by the lack of clear evidence 
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in international litigation, and the complexity of the controversies affects how evidence 
is collected. 
In particular, environmental issues often derive from scientific controversies. The 
science at the basis of environmental concerns is often uncertain and debated among 
the scientific communities. Therefore, when it comes to proving environmental rules 
and principles have not been breached, the dispute over legal interpretation drifts 
towards a dispute over who has the most irrefutable scientific proof.  
The principles and tools used to guide international courts and tribunals are vague, with 
the aim of giving flexibility to the parties and respecting their sovereignty, as well as 
leaving open all means of ascertaining the facts.
406
 Indeed, international courts and 
tribunals can assess evidence freely, and there is no hierarchy among the different types 
of evidence.
407
 The importance of scientific facts challenges the structure of the current 
system in which rules on evidence are loose. In this regard, the highly scientific content 
of these disputes often implies a high recourse to expertise,
408
 creating a tension between 
judges and experts. Should he/she decide on scientific matters? How should scientific 
facts be used in court? Indeed, scientific facts are not just an empirical tool to prove a 
legal argument, but have a meaning on their own.
409
 These are best explained by scientists 
themselves, as highlighted in the Whaling case, where the Court had to analyse the 
meaning of the “scientific purposes” of Japan’s activities. Some are of the opinion that a 
court of law is not suited to determine what science is and that the question is: how far 
should the courts go in this venture? Nonetheless a court will have to determine facts, 
scientific and others. International judges might not always be best suited to 
accomplishing this task and might need to call for special external help. The risk in doing 
this is that judges may hand over some capacity to assess the facts to experts, therefore 
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compromising the judicial function of the court.
410
 Not only do judges have to receive 
facts, but they must also decide on their meaning. They need to appreciate and weigh 
the facts. The uncertainty and complexity of scientific facts in this sense challenges the 
interpretation of the burden and standard of proof. How to judge on science lies at the 
heart of the problem. 
However, one constraint exists for international tribunals: procedural fairness. This 
concept frames the role of international courts and tribunals. The rules governing 
procedural matters – including collecting and assessing evidence – have to protect the 
proper administration of justice and preserve the fair opportunity for each party to 
comment on the opponent’s legal and factual contentions. Indeed, establishing facts in 
a transparent and adequate manner is a defining feature of a court. Without it, a tribunal 
loses its legitimacy. 
The adaptation of the courts to this different type of scientific evidence has not taken 
place evenly. The ICJ, for instance, has been slow to adapt to the scientific content of 
environmental claims.
411
 However, arbitral tribunals have adapted more rapidly and 
innovated earlier with regard to procedural changes.
412
 The lack of clear rules on 
evidence has contributed to this slow adaptation, but at the same time offers possibilities 
for judges to innovate.  
Sands showed challenges are not only faced by tribunals but also by the legal teams 
pleading in a case, highlighting the importance of a scientist in the formation of the legal 
arguments and the impacts of scientific reports to determine the legal outcomes.
413
 But 
the role of the judicial body itself is pushed by the lack of certainty in science, as it makes 
the application of the law to those facts harder. The uncertainty has effects on the 
application of the law itself. This chapter, therefore, focuses first on the impacts of 
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science in international environmental law and subsequently the consequences of this 
for international dispute settlement. In particular, it will analyse how reliance on 
scientific knowledge has changed the rules themselves, consequently affecting the 
judicial procedures relating to these rules. Indeed, there is a correlation between the 
heavy dependence on science during the creation of adequate legal frameworks, and the 
reaction of an adjudicative body once a violation of some international environmental 
rules is alleged. 
3.2 International environmental law based on the development of science 
“Science makes the environment speak. Without science, trees have no standing”.
414
 
With this memorable phrase, von Moltke emphasised the crucial role of science in the 
development of environmental protection.  
i. Dependence on scientific progress 
The development of rules of environmental protection depends extensively on the 
progress of scientific knowledge.
415
 This reliance on science takes different shapes. It can 
be seen at every stage of the process, from the intent to legislate at the policy level to the 
determination of the content of the rules. Policy-makers, in determining the level of 
protection required to have an efficient impact, need to rely on scientific 
developments.
416
 But science is used not only to diagnosing the problems under scrutiny, 
but also to solving the problems. It is in the latter case that law-making is affected by 
scientific developments. Scientific bodies exist within some international organisations 
or are part of multilateral environmental regimes, researching specific environmental 
matters, and directly examining issues related to the organisations’ interests. Separate 
scientific organisations have also been created “to provide independent scientific advice 
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and research” on topics it judges relevant to law-makers.
417
 Moreover, the centrality of 
scientific issues to the structure of legal frameworks has resulted in the creation of so-
called “regulatory scientific institutions”, defined as hybrid institutions, “reliev[ing] rule-
making bodies from identifying the scientific position on controversial regulatory 
questions”, and filling the lack of “legal-political decision-making powers”.
418
 
As a result, many international environmental rules are dependent on scientific 
knowledge in two different fashions, either translating scientific data into law directly or 
referring generally to science. Rules that fix the maximum cap on the use of certain 
chemicals in order to preserve the ozone layer, for example, are using scientific data to 
directly determine the content of the rule.
419
  
On the other hand, rules can refer to scientific developments without defining what those 
developments are. The exception permitted by the ICRW for killing whales for scientific 
purposes, for example, does not identify what those purposes are.
420
 Moreover, rules 
relating to the prevention of transboundary harm and those preventing the threat of 
transboundary harm are another example of implicit reliance on science. Indeed, how 
these obligations will be fulfilled very much depends on how advanced the science is. 
Certain standards – inevitably evolving with time – are expected in the implementation 
of such obligations.  
ii. Impact of the uncertainty of scientific knowledge on environmental 
principles 
There are dangers attached to such a high reliance on science. One of these is the 
uncertain nature of most scientific knowledge related to the environment. Indeed, the 
main characteristic of today’s environmental protection is the lack of agreement from 
                                                 
417
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 21) 99–100. The International Council for Exploration of the Seas 
(ICES) is a scientific organisation that cooperated with many intergovernmental organisations in the 
formation of new rules. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is another example of 
a body composed of scientists advising the governing body of the UNFCCC. 
418
 Oren Perez, ‘The Hybrid Legal-Scientific Dynamic of Transnational Scientific Institutions’ (2015) 26 
The European Journal of International Law 391, 394–395. 
419
 See Article 2A of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, regulating the 
consumption of CFCs released in the atmosphere. 
420
 Article VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. 
120 
 
the scientific community on the evidence of certain natural phenomena, effects of certain 
activities or substances. This influences the behaviour of actors at all stages in both the 
law-making and decision-making processes. A central question that arises is: how should 
courts decide on a certain regulation when the evidence is limited, weak or inconsistent? 
A tension exists between scientists who do not have to give a final and definitive answer 
until they find all necessary evidence and law-makers who need to make decisions and 
cannot delay them indefinitely. Indeed, science uses the methods of confirming 
hypotheses by repeatedly scrutinising them until answers are strong enough. This 
process is a “cumulative effort, with answers generated through a long sequence of 
hypotheses, each moving closer towards full insight”.
421
 
Hence there is a need to resolve that tension and find a way to reconcile these two 
opposite stances. The need for preventive measures – even in unclear scientific cases – 
has been developed, as part of the obligation of due diligence by states.
422
 Legal responses 
have emerged, led by the development of the precautionary principle, which exists in 
order “to make greater allowance for uncertainty in the regulation of environmental risks 
and the sustainable use of natural resources”.
423
 Indeed, the precautionary principle is 
one of the pillars of international environmental law, formulated in the benchmark Rio 
Declaration at Principle 15, although the essence of the principle was already being used 
before 1992. The issue of not being able to ascertain causes or potential future effects 
of certain activities has then forced states to implement the precautionary principle in 
various international environmental conventions and regimes. When scientific certainty 
is lacking in order to define what the risks of certain activities or substances are for the 
environment, the precautionary principle guides states by asking them to be more 
cautious and take into account the uncertainties.
424
 The innovation of the precautionary 
principle is “that it changes the role of scientific data”.
425
 It furthermore “assumes that 
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Although the scope and exact content of the precautionary principle vary among the 
international community, three versions have been identified by Wiener.
427
 The 
principle entails the following: either it allows regulation in the absence of certain and 
complete evidence, demands regulation when the risks are uncertain, or affects how 
evidence is weighed in courts by either shifting the burden of proof from the complaining 
party to the defending party or lowering the standard of proof. The last version will be 
discussed later, but the developments regarding the two first versions show how the 
reliance on science is crucial and can shape the political debates to create certain rules.  
The essence of the precautionary principle is that it is a legal standard that affects the 
interpretation of the rules primarily, thus not having a direct impact on the conduct of 
the judicial procedures themselves. 
However, in the cases where the rules rely implicitly on science, it is important to 
underline that the legal standards to be applied to certain behaviours do influence the 
interpretative decisions of international courts and tribunals. Indeed, science helps to 
determine whether the standards have been met, but the standards themselves, being 
the application of the precautionary principle for example, will have the determining 
impact on the final decision from the judges. The nature of the applicable legal standard 
will require specific solutions from the court. There is a correlation between the 
substance of the rule and the role of the tribunal. Indeed, legal standards as applied by 
the judges must take into account such scientific uncertainty. The fact the rule itself sets 
a different threshold of intervention will influence how far a tribunal will intervene. In 
particular, the application of the precautionary principle will prefer restrictive measures 
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 It goes without saying that since science evolves, the application 
of the precautionary principle will vary over time. 
iii. Development of procedural obligations 
Another practical result of scientific uncertainty is the creation of procedural rules, as 
exemplified in the 2001 ILC Articles on Transboundary Harm
429
 in the form of 
obligations to conduct environmental impact assessments, and obligations to notify or 
monitor certain activities likely to cause harm. Procedural obligations relating to 
environmental protection can be seen as instruments to achieve certain environmental 
standards.
430
 The conduct of an environmental impact assessment, for instance, will be a 
yardstick used to decide whether the due diligence required for a state to pursue a certain 
project has been respected. The obligations to notify other states of certain activities or 
exchange data on certain substances force states to collect relevant data in order to reach 
the most correct decision. 
Procedural obligations shift the discourse at the law-making level: instead of reaching 
political consensus over more substantial concepts, lawmakers create procedural rules 
eliciting the need for greater consensus over the issue at stake.
431
 Notwithstanding that 
the proceduralisation of international environmental law is directly related to the lack of 
political consensus on substantial issues, it is connected with the high pace of 
developments in science, precisely because it leaves open the outcome of the particular 
project,
432
 including the scientific content related to the project. The procedural 
obligation will remain the same while the basis to comply with it will evolve with the 
development of scientific knowledge. The fact the outcome has not been decided by the 
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substantial rule leaves room for scientific developments and the adjustment of the 
procedural rules. Therefore, an environmental impact assessment will have to be carried 
out according to the knowledge at the time. Procedural obligations provide some 
flexibility in their application that can be positive regarding the incorporation of scientific 
developments.  
In delineating the role of international courts and tribunals, the question of whether the 
role of the court changes when it applies procedural or substantive obligations arises. 
Since procedural obligations in international environmental law have multiplied, 
international courts and tribunals must apply them regularly (as in the Trail Smelter case, 
the Pulp Mills case, or the Certain Activities case). Rules such as the obligation to enter 
into consultations, or to notify other states are easier to implement and verify, however 
they will not lead the court in its understanding of the purpose of the rules. Therefore, 
international adjudication will seem at first glance more apt to resolve a dispute over 
procedural obligations, because the verification of compliance seems easier. However, 
the interpretation of procedural obligations cannot be divorced from the broader 
scientific context within which environmental rules exist. The judicial exercise of 
determining the meaning of the rules is thus as complex for procedural rules as for any 
other rule. 
Moreover, does the level of scientific contents affect the role of the courts differently 
depending on what type of obligation is invoked? While the court does change the 
interpretative process it will apply to different types of rules, it does not affect the 
approach of a tribunal in establishing scientific facts. It could be imagined that the 
application of procedural obligations sidesteps the need to assess the scientific content 
of the substantive obligations, in the sense that the scope of procedural obligations is 
limited to narrower legal issues, excluding the scientific debates around the substantive 
obligations. In practice, however, this is not the case. Instead, international judges will 
have a broader mandate to determine the facts, as the exact scientific measures are left 
purposely open. It shifts the burden from the law-making body to the judicial body, 
which must pin down the exact scientific facts at the time of the dispute. 
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3.3 Procedural issues faced by courts and tribunals in environmental disputes 
involving complex science 
In order to encompass the specificities relating to the nature of international 
environmental rules, international courts and tribunals must use their fact-finding tools 
extensively. These tools are often part of the tribunal’s founding text, but are very 
rudimentary, leaving some interpretative space for the tribunals to adapt to the particular 
circumstances. This chapter therefore focuses on how international courts and tribunals 
can use this interpretative space in an adequate manner for environmental disputes. 
Changes in the case law have already been taken, as it will be demonstrated further, and 
the interpretative space is big enough for international courts and tribunals to adapt their 
methods for environmental disputes. 
 There are two major stances on the role of a court in the fact-finding process. On the 
one hand, procedures can be adversarial, leaving the collection of evidence to the parties 
only without intervention. On the other hand, tribunals can be given a more investigative 
role in the fact-finding process, where they have their own methods to gather facts.
433
 
The international system oscillates between the two since it gives international tribunals 
some independent fact-finding capacities, yet contains adversarial elements. In addition, 
parties are free to agree on the procedure at the beginning of a dispute. This is 
particularly important in the context of arbitration,
434
 however, parties retain some 
control over procedural issues as well in permanent courts, where “in every case 
submitted to the [International Court of Justice], the President shall ascertain the views 
of the parties with regard to questions of procedure”.
435
 Nonetheless, there are some 
limits to this freedom. 
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i. From procedural freedom to procedural fairness 
The parties and the tribunal are not free to decide on procedural rules as they want, but 
must respect certain rules as part of the respect of procedural fairness and procedural 
justice at large. Despite the fact the general concept of due process is not often 
mentioned in the context of interstate adjudication (in contrast with international 
criminal law or human rights law), it is present in interstate proceedings. Indeed, 
interstate litigation is based on the principle that the parties are equal; they are not 
automatically in a situation of unequal resources or means to collect evidence, as it would 
be the case in a criminal context.
436
 Therefore, rules of protection with the aim of 
balancing the parties do not appear as crucial as in other types of litigation precisely 
because the sovereignty of states is translated directly into the procedure as procedural 
equality. Nonetheless the principles associated with due process are present in interstate 
litigation.  
In particular, two fundamental principles are attached to the concept of international 
procedural justice, namely the impartiality of international courts and tribunals and the 
equality between the two parties to the dispute.
437
 They are sometimes translated in the 
procedures of the various international courts and tribunals through their own rules of 
procedures,
438
 but also form general principles of international law, and are arguably part 
of the inherent powers of international courts and tribunals.
439
 A sound (or proper) 
administration of justice commands the actions of international judicial bodies, as shown 
in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, where the 
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Court’s assessment of the impacts of an absent party on the proceedings was led by the 
application of such sound administration of justice.
440
 The South China Sea award also 
illustrates the awareness of the judges to ensure procedural fairness for both parties. 
Measures taken by the arbitral tribunal to ensure the procedural rights of each party to 
the dispute became especially important during the proceedings in this case since the 
People’s Republic of China did not participate at all. Imbalance in the procedure 




For the purposes of this chapter, the most relevant guarantee a tribunal has to offer to 
the litigants is the guarantee it will find the most exact facts at the basis of the dispute. 
The fact-finding function of a tribunal is one of the core features of the due process 
requirement of judicial procedures and a core issue for interstate adjudication. Indeed, 
the link between accurate facts and fairness exists because tribunals are expected to apply 
the law consistently and in uniformity, task that can be done only when the facts have 
been accurately ascertained.
442
 This function becomes harder to fulfil when the main 
facts are scientific, let alone when the science is uncertain. Because “scientific facts are 
rooted in methods of science […] and not in methods of law”,
443
 the application of 
procedural fairness needs to be adjusted. Indeed, scientific facts, in particular, affect fact-
finding methods, i.e. how the facts are gathered is critical, as the accessibility of the 
information required can be obstructed by territorial boundaries, high costs and/or the 
use of advanced techniques. Uncertain facts influence the way international tribunals 
weigh and evaluate the value of those facts. 
ii. Types of evidence 
The different ways of ascertaining scientific facts have a clear impact on the quality of 
the understanding necessary to judge in a fair and transparent way. How best represent 
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the factual situation in case of complex and uncertain scientific facts? In order to answer 
this question, a distinction between what kinds of evidence are used and who is in charge 
of bringing it to the proceedings must be drawn. In other words, the first issue is about 
the delegation of powers from the legal field to the scientific field, whereby the gathering 
of the facts is “outsourced”
444
 to scientific experts. The second issue is about the balance 
between the concept of monopolistic control of the fact-finding mission by the parties 
and the need for intervention by the tribunal and/or by other actors such as NGOs. 
In assessing the first issue, it is important to point out that “factual investigation and legal 
reasoning will need to proceed in tandem”
445
 in international adjudication. Therefore, 
the facts must be put forward alongside the legal arguments. Facts do not stand on their 
own. As a consequence of the nature of scientific facts, experts offer crucial proof, as 
Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma explained:  
“[t]he adjudication of disputes in which the assessment of scientific questions by 
experts is indispensable, as is the case here, requires an interweaving of legal 
process with knowledge and expertise that can only be drawn from experts 




Experts play a large role in identifying the relevant facts and their meaning in the context 
of the case under dispute.
447
 Arbitral tribunals are also familiar with the use of experts, 
as demonstrated in cases such as the Trail Smelter case, or the Iron Rhine Railway case, 
where experts’ opinions were relied upon by the tribunal. They are one of the most 
important ways to explain and support evidence of certain scientific facts. However, the 
limits of their role are not clear, and the relationship between them and judges need to 
be clarified.  
In the case of complex scientific disputes, the reliance on experts legitimises the decision 
of the court, only if procedural fairness and transparency are respected. The difference 
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between identifying the facts, understanding their meaning and deciding the case poses 
several problems for international courts and tribunals. The balance between the 
experts’ scientific input and their impact on legal questions must be measured. Knowing 
that, the ICJ has been careful in its reference to experts’ opinions by wording their input 
as “information” rather than “evidence”.
448
 The WTO Appellate Body also reaffirms 
that experts help panellists to “understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the 
arguments made”. Although “the purpose of the expert opinion must be to assist the 
Court in giving judgment upon the issues submitted to it for decision”,
449
 several authors 
have highlighted the dangers of relying too heavily on scientific experts, enabling them 
to almost judge on legal issues as well as clarify facts, because of the nature of legal 
obligations being dependent on science (as seen above at 3.2.i). The risk is that the line 
between experts and judges becomes thinner.
450
 Indeed, the role of the experts to present 
facts and data to the bench in an understandable manner – and to offer their own 
interpretation of these facts and data in the form of an opinion – can encroach on the 
role of the judges. In this sense, experts have a role beyond the fact-finding process 
because they influence the standards of proof and review the Court chooses to adopt 
regarding certain state actions. Indeed, the weight international courts and tribunals grant 
to certain facts depends on the level of persuasion and judges must assess experts in 
contrast to one another in order to test their credibility.  
As highlighted at the beginning of this section, different actors can contribute to the fact-
finding mission in different ways. Indeed, different mechanisms are in place to 
determine the facts as accurately as possible; in addition to the use of experts by the 
parties, NGOs can provide factual information, and the court itself has several ways to 
intervene in the fact-finding process, through the appointment of experts or assessors 
and site visits. The creation of enquiries by the tribunal is a special case, as it separates 
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the process of fact-finding from the legal claims. These different mechanisms will now 
be analysed. 
a. Evidence collected by the parties 
As Article 24 (1) of the PCA Optional Rules confirms, each party to the dispute has to 
prove the facts it relies on in support of its claim or defence. During the first phase of 
the proceedings, the parties will submit evidence with their written pleadings. Each will 
substantiate its claims based on factual information that can come from various sources, 
such as studies conducted by specific national institutes or by specialists commissioned 
by EU institutions or individual experts in a certain field.
451
 Parties are free to present 
any type of evidence, but will choose the most probing ones. 
During the oral hearings, the parties have different ways to convey the relevant facts: 
strategically, they can choose either to bring the factual and legal issues together, as in 
the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case, where scientists acted as counsels. Alternatively, they 
can separate factual issues and call independent experts as witnesses. In the latter case, 
experts will be subject to cross-examination and questioning by the judges while in the 
former they will be part of the overall legal argumentation.
452
 The practice of the tribunals 
shows a clear preference for separating experts from legal counsels after the Pulp Mills 
case especially, where the Court asked expressly for the separation in the future.
453
 
Indeed, in all future cases experts were brought to the dispute in their individual capacity, 
and were subject to cross-examination and questions from the judges themselves.
454
 
Cross-examination however can also be heavily influenced by the skills of the counsel, 
which may be seen as a displacement of the same problem.  
In order to mitigate the negative impacts of cross-examination and to promote 
procedural efficiency, Gros suggested using the mechanisms of prehearing conferences 
or conferencing experts, as developed by the International Bar Association Rules of 
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Evidence (article 8 (3) (f)). The purpose of this is to bring the experts together and let 
them establish where they agree and disagree.
455
 It means the legal part is disjointed from 
the scientific part. Only the experts discuss together, with the intervention of the tribunal 
for questions and clarifications, but the purpose is to trigger a debate among the 
experts.
456
 The process serves to narrow down the points of contention before the legal 
proceedings start interfering with the science. 
One risk of party-appointed experts relates to the question of the experts’ integrity. 
Indeed, the neutrality and independence of the experts towards the funder (i.e. the party) 
must be preserved in order for the evidence to be taken into consideration. When the 
reports are part of a research group led by a separate entity, such as the IFC, the World 
Bank, or the IPCC, the problem of direct bias towards the party submitting is avoided, 
but this risks the use of incomplete information, as it has not been prepared for the same 
purpose. 
Another risk with leaving the fact-finding process entirely in the hands of the parties 
without potential intervention by the judicial body is an asymmetry between the parties’ 
capacity to gather the necessary information. This asymmetry can come from different 
factors, such as territorial boundaries or the availability of financial resources. Although 
parties must act in good faith and disclose information inaccessible to the other party (if 
requested), one party can be disadvantaged in trying to prove certain facts sufficiently by 
not having access to the other party’s territory. Indeed, there can be material obstacles 
preventing one party from accessing the information or data its experts need to give full 
account of their position. That is one reason why even with the parties retaining the 
control over evidence, the Court can to some extent still supervise the production of the 
evidence by the parties through Article 49 of the ICJ Statute, Article 24 (3) of the PCA 
Optional Rules, or through inherent powers in general for any international tribunal.
457
 
The judges can request the parties to submit certain information they consider necessary 
for a better understanding of the case, a power that some argue stems from the fact there 
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is no possibility of appealing the decision of an international tribunal. In this case, the 
parties retain control over the evidence itself despite the fact the tribunal asked for 
particular points to be raised. 
b. Evidence collected by the Court 
Despite the fact international courts and tribunals are all granted fact-finding powers,
458
 
the debate over whether a specific tribunal should use its powers to determine certain 
facts is to be answered in every particular case. As the WTO Appellate Body underlined, 
the fact-finding powers of a panel should not be used as a means to replace the duty of 
the claimant to make a case for itself. The burden of proof remains on the claimant.
459
 
Therefore, in what circumstances can international courts and tribunals use their fact-
finding powers?  
i. Appointment of experts and enquiries 
All international tribunals have the possibility of appointing experts at their own 
discretion either through express provision or through their inherent powers.
460
 Although 
the ICJ has shown some reluctance in doing so, it used article 50 of its Statute in some 
cases, namely the Corfu Channel case, the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in 
the Gulf of Main Area case, and the Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and 
the Pacific Ocean case. Its predecessor appointed experts only once in the Chorzow 
Factory case. In all these cases, experts were asked a series of precise questions they 
should tackle, therefore giving a delimited scope to their contribution. The experts in 
the Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean case, for 
example, have to “advise the Court regarding the state of the coast between the point 
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Through the practice of other tribunals as well as the ICJ, it will be shown what the risks 
and advantages are of using court-appointed experts. The WTO in particular has 
fostered an extensive body of cases where experts were appointed, contributing to the 
development of the regime applied to court-appointed experts. In this regard, the EC – 
Hormones case, besides confirming the ability of the panels to seek technical advice at 
their discretion,
462
 highlighted inconsistencies that can arise with the appointment of such 
independent experts and parties’ experts. Indeed, even when appointed by the Panel, 
the capacity in which they give their expert opinions may be biased in favour of one 
party. In this case, the Panel used experts from a specific institution, which could be 
considered as unfavourable for the defending party.
463
 Subsequently, the WTO 
Appellate Body tried to homogenise the practice of the dispute settlement bodies 
concerning the appointment of scientific experts in the Japanese Measures Affecting 
Agricultural Products case where the Panel established a code of conduct for the 
selection of experts and their relationship with the panels. The Panel wrote to the parties 
with a detailed outline of how it would nominate the experts and what they will be asked 
to do: 
“Nature of advice 
(a) On the basis of the first submissions from both parties, the Panel will 
determine the areas in which it intends to seek expert advice. 
Selection of experts and questions to experts 
(a) The Panel will seek expert advice from individual experts. 
(b) The number of experts the Panel will select will be determined in light of the 
number of issues on which advice will be sought, as well as by how many of the 
different issues each expert can provide expertise on. 
(c) The Panel will solicit suggestions of possible experts from the Secretariat of 
the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), and, subsequently, from 
the parties. The parties should not contact the individuals suggested. 
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(d) The Panel does not intend to appoint experts who are nationals of any of the 
parties involved in the dispute unless the parties agree with such appointment or 
in the event the Panel considers that otherwise the need for specialized scientific 
expertise cannot be fulfilled. Parties are, however, free to include in their 
delegations scientific experts of their own nationality and may, of course, submit 
scientific evidence produced by their own nationals. 
(e) The Secretariat will seek brief CVs from the individuals suggested. To the 
extent possible, these will be provided to the parties. 
(f) The Panel will prepare specific questions for the experts. These will be 
provided to the parties. 
(g) The parties will have the opportunity to comment on and to make known 
any compelling objections to any particular expert under consideration. At the 
same time, the parties will have the opportunity to comment on the proposed 
questions, or suggest additional ones, before the questions are sent to the experts. 
(h) The Panel will inform the parties of the experts it has selected, and submit 
the questions to the experts. 
(i) The experts will be provided with all relevant parts of the parties' submissions 
on a confidential basis. 
(j) The experts will be requested to provide responses in writing; copies of these 
responses will be provided to the parties. The parties will have the opportunity 
to comment in writing on the responses from the experts. 
Meeting with Experts 
(a) Should the Panel decide it opportune, or should a party so request, a meeting 
with experts, immediately prior to the second substantive meeting, may be held. 
Prior to such a meeting, the Panel would ensure that: (i) the parties' comments 
on the experts' responses would be provided to the experts; (ii) the experts would 




This outline is interesting in the way it lays out how experts will be chosen. It gives 
transparency to the appointment of experts by the tribunal and examination of their 
reports. This practice has not been clearly set out in the ICJ proceedings, although the 
appointment of experts seems to follow the same principles. Article 67 (1) of the Rules 
of the ICJ requests the Court to issue an order stating among others the “mode of 
appointment” of the experts, which has varied from case to case. In both the Corfu 
Channel case and the Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean 
case, the Court simply disclosed the names of the experts, without any further 
justification or explanation.
465
 In both the Gulf of Maine case and the Chorzow Factory 
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case, the parties themselves agreed on the experts the Court should appoint in the first 
case, and were allowed to appoint one each, together with one appointed by the Court 
itself.
466
 In comparison with the ICJ practice, the outline made by the WTO reflects a 
greater transparency in the mode of appointment of experts; a practice that should be 
encouraged. 
The Panel also offered the possibility for the parties to meet with the court-appointed 
experts. This is an important guarantee a judicial body should offer, as it is necessary to 
enhance procedural fairness throughout the proceedings, in particular, the parties’ right 
to be heard. The PCA Optional Rules provide for the parties to comment on the court-
appointed experts with both written and oral material (Article 27 (3) and (4)), as well as 
article 67 (2) of the Rules of the ICJ. This practice is indeed common among 
international courts, and important for the respect of the parties’ rights. 
An additional challenge for court-appointed experts is their field work. When it is 
necessary for them to go on the disputed sites, located within the territory of one party, 
it must grant them access. The tribunal might not always be able to guarantee such 
access. Indeed, such restriction can prevent court-appointed experts from delivering 
their opinions. 
Court-appointed experts, however, offer certain advantages. Indeed, the possibility for 
tribunals to appoint scientific experts is another way to ensure the scientific facts are 
accurate and understood. The fact this possibility exists can counterbalance the fact the 
burden of proof cannot shift (see below 3.3.iii.b). In particular, it can re-establish some 
fairness in the process by externalising the process of fact-finding from the parties to an 
independent group of experts, especially when costs are disproportionate between the 
parties. If the scientific procedure needed to ascertain facts is complex and very 
technological, some equality between the parties could be rebalanced if experts are 
appointed by the tribunal. Similarly, court-appointed experts would not be faced with 
territorial issues and could access both territories equally, enhancing due process in 
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certain circumstances. As in the South China Sea arbitration, the tribunal appointed 
experts in order to compensate from the lack of China’s participation. The experts were 
specifically asked by the tribunal to  
“examin[e] and analys[e] the record submitted by the Philippines on the issue of 
environmental harm to coral reefs as a result of island building activities […]; 
assess the accuracy and certainty of the scientific conclusions drawn by the 
Philippines and its experts.”
467
 
The tasks of these independent experts were clearly set by the tribunal in a way to offer 
a second perspective on the evidence, in addition to the Philippines’ submissions. 
Moreover, the ICJ Statute mentions a special mechanism: enquiries. Article 50, read 
with article 67 of the Rules of the ICJ, allow judges to ask for an enquiry to be conducted. 
Enquiries are different from expert opinions in the sense that they do not have to be 
conducted by qualified experts with a special knowledge. Their purpose is to establish 
certain facts the Court is not satisfied with, task that does not have to be conducted by 
an expert, as opposed to the appointment of experts, who are expected to give advice to 
the Court because of their special knowledge. Enquiries are a fact-finding mechanism. 
In practice, the differences between expert opinions and enquiries are hard to pin down; 
both mechanisms overlap. As a consequence, the Court may appoint experts who are 
in charge of the determination of certain factual uncertainties, when it should carry out 
an enquiry.
468
 The results are similar, however, since the court will give specific 
instructions to the experts; they will determine exactly the scope of their work. 
Arbitral tribunals also showed their willingness to use fact-finding methods. For instance, 
in the Trail Smelter case the tribunal created a special scientific committee to gather and 
determine some scientific data on a particular question about what regime to apply to 
the smelter in the case that it was found infringing environmental laws. The tribunal 
delayed the final decision in order to give time for the data to be collected 
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 Similarly, in the Iron Rhine Railway arbitration, the tribunal 
recommended the parties to create a committee of independent experts, without giving 
instructions on who and how they would be chosen. Nevertheless, it did offer a precise 
definition of the committee’s tasks, and the outcome of their findings.
470
 
This mechanism would correspond to some scientific committees existing under some 
MEAs where special groups have the task of gathering evidence. This is exemplified by 
the Scientific Assessment Panel under the Montreal Protocol (Article 6), which is 
composed of many recognised scientists and who prepares a report on the status of the 
ozone layer depletion.
471
 Indeed, enquiries in a judicial context would have the same 
purpose as a scientific committee since it would have a mandate to gather evidence on a 
certain point. In the event such a committee has already gathered evidence relating to a 
case submitted to an international court, it could play the role of an enquiry. Indeed, 
existing reports from scientific committees could be used as such in judicial proceedings. 
They have been carried out at the request of treaty bodies of MEAs and are composed 
of a varied group of scientists, suggesting they could replace a court-appointed enquiry. 
There is room for cooperation between judicial bodies and scientific bodies created by 
MEAs. 
ii. Site visits 
Most international courts and tribunals have the ability to visit certain locations in the 
course of the proceedings. The ICJ Statute expressly offers the possibility in article 44 
(2). Arbitral tribunals have also used site visits, as exemplified during the Kishenganga 
Arbitration, where the judges went to visit areas where the hydroelectric projects were 
planned to be built.
 472
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In this case, it may be argued the site visit was one factor that allowed the court to decide 
on what specific activities should or should not be stopped at the provisional measures 
stage. The fact the tribunal was able to distinguish between particular aspects of the 
construction can be explained by the site visit: 
“As seen during the Court’s site visit, the construction and completion of these 
elements of the KHEP occur at some distance from the Kishenganga/Neelum 
riverbed, and would thus not in and of themselves affect the flow of the river.”
473
 
The site visit directly contributed to the way the tribunal would award certain provisional 
measures. It made it possible for the judges to see for themselves what the consequences 
of their measures would be. Although most environmental damage cannot be seen 
blatantly (as in the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case), site visits give context to the judges and 
enhance their understanding of the problem.
474
 They can be considered as a supportive 
tool for the judges to better determine the factual situation. The contributions of site 
visits to the legal reasoning of the judges, however, can be questioned.
475
 
Moreover, site visits cannot be conducted without respecting certain due process 
requirements, which must be created by the tribunal on a case-by-case basis.
476
 For 
instance, during the site visit in the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case as well as in the 
Kishenganga Arbitration and the Bay of Bengal Arbitration, representatives of the 
parties were not allowed to make any legal arguments,
477
 therefore guaranteeing a certain 
equality of the parties. Moreover, the fact experts involved in the case on the side of one 
party offered technical advice during the site visit should not be considered as infringing 
any due process requirements a priori, on the condition that the expert’s opinion is 
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independent from the party’s opinion. If the experts are proven to be acting in their own 
name, their presence and contribution to site visits cannot infringe the impartiality of the 
tribunal nor the equality between the parties. However, in this respect, it could be 
suggested to ask for all experts involved to be present, in order to further guarantee 
equality and impartiality. This has been achieved in the Bay of Bengal site visit, where 
each party was allowed eight members on their delegation, including experts.
478
 
c. Evidence submitted by third states, intergovernmental 
organisations, and NGOs 
Although not clearly stated in the procedural texts instituting the ICJ, third states may 
submit evidence, either at the request of the Court or at their own initiative. The former 
case is possible, although such a request would not be binding on the third state.
479
 The 
latter happened in the Corfu Channel case, when Yugoslavia submitted evidence. The 
Court did not reject the evidence on the basis it was submitted by a third state, instead 
affirming that “Yugoslavia’s absence from the proceedings meant that these documents 
could only be admitted as evidence subject to reserves”.
480
 In the US – Shrimp case, the 
Appellate Body notoriously said that “a panel has the discretionary authority either to 
accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to it, whether 
requested by a panel or not.”
481
 The WTO Appellate Body also confirmed member-
states not party to the disputes can submit relevant information.
482
 
Moreover, intergovernmental organisations can also provide information relevant to the 
case (article 34 (2) of the ICJ Statute read together with article 69 (1) of the ICJ Rules). 
Such information coming from international organisations can also be submitted either 
at the request of the Court or may be initiated by the organisation itself.  
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Additionally, through the submission of amicus briefs, NGOs can both participate by 
giving different legal arguments and representing interests at stake other than those 
belonging to the parties’ (as discussed in Chapter 2). They can also submit scientific data. 
Amicus curiae are especially useful in this regard as they are not limited to legal issues. 
The WTO Appellate Body, for instance, confirmed the view that panels have a 
discretionary power to procure any factual information relevant to the case based on 
article 13.1 of the DSU, including information coming from amicus curiae.
483
 
The possibilities explored above show that judicial procedures allow for a plurality of 
sources when it comes to fact-finding and the gathering of evidence in general. Although 
the submissions by these other actors are not necessarily useful to uncover unknown 
evidence, they can contribute to the elaboration of the most accurate factual 
representation. Indeed, the multiplicity of actors enhances not only the legitimacy of the 
legal decision made by the judges, but may also provide for a more rigorous 
determination of the facts.  
Judges have to be careful about all the potential biases brought by the external 
contributors, and can dismiss their evidentiary value on that basis. Notably, this occurred 
in the Armed Activities case, where they dismissed reports made by the UN Secretary 
General.
484
 However, the existence of many types of evidence contributes to a better 
system where the fact-finding process is not left to one actor. Many different actors can 
indeed bring different factual aspects to the dispute, therefore allowing environmental 
disputes to be better tackled by the judges. 
iii. Weighing evidence 
After receiving and hearing all evidence needed for the dispute, the tribunal will have to 
choose which is more convincing for the final decision on the law. In doing so, the 
tribunal will assign certain evidence a higher value than that of others. This task becomes 
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harder when scientific knowledge is uncertain and the legal interpretation depends on 
it. Indeed, when presented with different scientific explanations, the tribunal will have 
to choose which ones better prove the case. The process of weighing evidence is 
therefore essential as it “becomes a question of determination as to which type of 
rationality is the most instrumental in persuasiveness of the decision and hence 
legitimacy and authority and efficacy of international dispute-settlement bodies”.
485
 
Indeed, judicial bodies must be as transparent as possible in order to avoid arbitrariness 
and consequent loss of their authoritative status. They must adapt their argumentative 
process as a result of the structural differences of scientific facts. Judges cannot gauge 
evidence without justifying what has led to the particular decision. In doing so, judges 
may rely on external sources other than themselves, which can cause problems of 
legitimacy. The tension is inherent to the situation where judges themselves cannot 
appreciate fully the meaning of the facts underlying the dispute. 
The structural differences of scientific facts focus on their nature and their different 
epistemology, as well as their intrinsic uncertainty. Practically speaking, one question is 
whether environmental cases can be argued on the basis of what could have happened 
or could happen in the future rather than on tangible events.
486
 In other words, what is 
the effect of scientific uncertainty on the standard of proof? What standard could the 
courts and tribunals apply then? In the case that a state has already taken a policy 
decision based on a certain scientific understanding, can judicial bodies review the 
scientific justifications themselves or only the decision-making process? 
a. Appreciation of the evidence 
i. Expert-fantômes 
One practice that has been identified is the use of expert-fantômes in certain complex 
cases.
487
 In certain occasions, the ICJ nominated expert-fantômes, whose role was 
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arguably to define the standard of review the judges should apply to various scientific 
data. Since they were used by the court to help, by giving their specific opinions on the 
scientific facts of the case, they would therefore set the standard for the judges. 
This practice, however, has been criticised as infringing due process requirements. 
Indeed, because the use of such experts has occurred behind closed doors, and the 
choice of experts by the court does not follow any known process, this practice is not 
desirable.
488
 Notwithstanding the fact expert-fantômes have scientific credibility, they set 
the standard according to their personal views, which is problematic and goes against a 
number of procedural fairness requirements, the most urgent of which is transparency. 
ii. Experts 
The use of expert-fantômes was the method that sparked the need for more 
understanding from judges. The means to acquire this knowledge, however, was 
promoting a degree of arbitrariness. Therefore, a more transparent way to appreciate 
and assess the evidence had to be developed: the use of court-appointed experts. As 
explained above, a tribunal can nominate external individuals to both carry out the fact-
finding process and help to determine the quality and meaning of the evidence presented 
before the court. Indeed, experts are expressly asked to give their opinions, on the basis 
of their special knowledge. They are not limited to assert evidence, but can also tell how 
they interpret such evidence and its broader meaning for the proceedings. 
In cases where the court has not appointed experts, cross-examination and questions by 
the judges to the experts themselves can enhance their understanding of the scientific 
issues at stake. Article 65 of the ICJ Rules allows such intervention by the judges. Indeed, 
judges started asking directly the experts to clarify certain points. In the Whaling case 
for example, experts were questioned not only by the other party but by the judges. 
During the hearings in 2013, the expert brought by Japan – Mr Walløe – was cross-
examined and then interrogated by five different judges.
489
 A similar procedure was 
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undertaken for the expert brought by Australia. The fact judges have the possibility to 
intervene directly can only improve the quality of their understanding of the scientific 
issues under review. 
iii. Assessors 
The ICJ has the power to appoint assessors, who differ from experts in the sense they 
can sit with the court during the deliberations, albeit without a right to vote.
490
 The 
UNCLOS does not use the term “assessor” but offers the same possibility for the 
ITLOS to nominate “scientific or technical experts” who can sit with the tribunal but 
cannot vote.
491
 Assessors have been mentioned only in the Western Sahara Advisory 
Opinion by Judge Petrén, who suggested that the Court had used “experts in Islamic law 
or in the history of northern Africa to sit with it”.
492
 It could be a method of replicating 
the achievements of the Kishenganga Arbitration in a permanent court. In this landmark 
case, the tribunal adapted its composition to fit the scientific nature of the dispute. 
Indeed, Prof Howard Weather, specialised in hydrology, and a member of the 
department of civil and environmental engineering at Imperial College London was one 
of the seven judges.
493
 This unusual appointment of a non-legal specialist as an arbitrator 
is an example of a progressive shift towards an understanding of the need to integrate 
the epistemological divide between law and (environmental) science. Albeit limited to 
arbitral tribunals, this practice is encouraging, but depends solely on the will of the 
parties.  
b. Burden of proof 
Some rules on the allocation of the burden of proof are needed in order to guarantee 
the judicial proceedings always carry through.
494
 The rules of the burden of proof have 
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been used in international judicial procedures as if they have always existed.
495
 They have 
not been discussed per se but have been used indiscriminately. The allocation of the 
burden of proof on the party who asserts the facts (actori incumbit probatio) has also 
always been treated as an unquestioned assumption in international law and is based on 
the idea of procedural fairness. It is not always as easy to determine because of the 
difficulties to separate the burdens between claimant and defendant.
496
 
However, it is clear that the question of who bears the burden of proof can be crucial to 
the outcome of proceedings when the facts are scientifically complex and uncertain. The 
WTO even recognised the role it plays even in the decision to institute proceedings in 
the first place in many instances.
497
 Therefore, the allocation of the burden of proof 
becomes a central question in environmental disputes, and the question of who should 
bear the consequences of scientific uncertainty must be answered. 
The assignation of the burden of proof has been developed customarily through the 
practice of international courts and tribunals. Although subject to changes, the general 
rule is that the party asserting a fact has to prove it. Indeed, the allocation of the burden 
should be fair. The general rule relies on the presumption that states act in good faith,
498
 
which mean that when another state affirms there is a breach of international law, it will 
have to prove it.
499
 More precisely, Foster emphasises the role of the theory of 
compliance in the application of the rules on burden of proof, whereby states comply 
with their obligations unless proven otherwise.
500
 One case where this presumption can 
be lifted is when the respondent state bases its defence on a rule considered as an 
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exception to the substantive rules,
501
 as exemplified in the Whaling case.
502
 In this case, 
the Court placed the burden on Japan to prove the objective basis of its scientific 
programme and not on Australia.
503
 Although the Court did not explicitly explain why 
the burden was shouldered by Japan in this particular case, it is justified since the rule 
relied on by the defendant is an exception to the general rule. The fact it is an exception 
shows that the defendant did not want to comply with the general rule, thereby 
contradicting the theory of compliance. 
Consequently, the burden of proof generally follows the facts needed to prove the legal 
claims of the parties, and the international legal system does not recognise the 
“evidential” burden of proof. This occurs when the party with the claim reaches a certain 
threshold and the burden passes onto the other party – even though it is not its claim. 
Such process that allows a reversal of the burden of proof from one party to the other 
within the same claim does not exist in international judicial proceedings.  
There are other cases where the general rule might seem unfair and might need to be 
adapted. Does the burden change when a party has to prove a negative fact, i.e. when 
the other party failed to do something it should have? Should the rule on the burden of 
proof take into account the access to information available to each party? While these 
circumstances could be argued as justifying a reversal of the burden of proof, the 
jurisprudence appears not to differentiate between negative and positive facts, and 
instead seems to reject the allocation of the burden depending on the access to the 
information.
504
 Despite the emphasis of the Court on the flexibility of the rules on the 
burden of proof no later than in 2010 in the Diallo case,
505
 it did not shift the burden, 
                                                 
501
 ibid 209–223. 
502
 James Harrison, ‘Onus Probandi in the Whaling Case – a Comment’ 
<http://voelkerrechtsblog.com/2015/05/06/onus-probandi-in-the-whaling-case-a-comment/>. 
503
 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v Japan) (n 27), par. 68 in combination with par. 53-54. 
504
 See Foster (n 157) 198–209 for a complete analysis of the rules on burden of proof. 
505
 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Merits) [2010] ICJ 
Rep 2010 p 639, par. 54. 
145 
 




The ICJ, while reaffirming the general principle applicable to the allocation of the 
burden of proof, acknowledged that it can be subject to change: 
"As a general rule, it is for the party which alleges a fact in support of its claims 
to prove the existence of that fact (see, most recently, the Judgment delivered in 
the case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 
I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 71, para. 162). However, it would be wrong to regard 
this rule, based on the maxim onus probandi incumbit actori, as an absolute one, 
to be applied in all circumstances. The determination of the burden of proof is 
in reality dependent on the subject-matter and the nature of each dispute brought 
before the Court; it varies according to the type of facts which it is necessary to 
establish for the purposes of the decision of the case." 
However, the court itself in this judgment contradicted this principle, as Judge Cançado 
Trindade pointed out that: 
“[t]he fact remains that it has not been demonstrated that Article 10 (1) has been 
complied with either. The Court’s majority seems to have taken a somewhat 
hurried decision on this particular point, applying the presumption in favour of 
the Respondent State. In human rights cases of the kind, presumptions apply in 
favour of the ostensibly weaker party, the individual, the alleged victim. In the 
circumstances of the present case, the burden of proof cannot fall upon the 
Applicant State; it is the Respondent State that knows — or is supposed to know 
— the conditions of detention, and it is, accordingly, upon it that the burden of 
proof lies. 
After all, it is the receiving State (of residence), rather than the sending State (of 
nationality), that is supposed to know what is going on in its own prisons, how 
detainees under its custody are being treated.”
507
 
Although the general rule on the burden of proof is clearly not absolute, the Court has 
not embraced a more nuanced approach to the allocation of the burden of proof in the 
Diallo case. 
Are there other circumstances that could justify a shift of the burden of proof? It has 
been argued the precautionary principle should be used to reverse the burden of proof, 
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especially in cases of scientific uncertainty. Indeed, scientific uncertainty creates 
disequilibrium incompatible with the principle of a good administration of justice. In 
order to re-establish procedural fairness, a reversal of the burden of proof would be 
necessary and justified by the application of the precautionary principle.
508
 
The problem with the application of the precautionary principle in establishing who 
bears the burden of proof is that it does not give clear conditions in which a reversal is 
justified. Instead it gives general guidance. Consequently, there are some clear views on 
the incompatibility of the precautionary principle with other rules of international law 
on risk management: 
“The common but essentially incoherent belief that the principle always shifts 
the burden of proof and requires states to prove that development projects pose 
no risk of harm misunderstands both the nature of the precautionary principle 
and its relationship to other rules of international law on risk management”.
509
 
The ICJ has also declined to reverse the burden of proof by the application of the 
precautionary principle.
510
 In this context, the relationship between the legal obligations 
and the burden of proof must be emphasised. On the one hand, the principle of onus 
probandi incumbit actori has been established by the ICJ’s practice as regulating the 
determination of the burden of proof. On the other hand, the burden of proof depends 
on the primary legal obligation. Indeed, in the Pulp Mills case, the ICJ emphasised the 
importance of the applicable law as the determining element for applying a different rule 
on the burden of proof by saying that “there is nothing in the 1975 Statute itself to 
indicate that it places the burden of proof equally on both Parties.”
511
 
Would a shift of the burden of proof be useful in the context of scientific facts?  A shift 
of the burden will not alter the fact that their nature is precarious, resulting in general 
uncertainty of the issue at stake in the dispute. In the case of complex scientific facts, the 
question of heaviness and costs of the burden is not the most central question, especially 
                                                 
508
 Foster (n 157) 240–261. 
509
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 21) 164. 
510
 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (n 28): ‘The Court considers 
that while a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation and application of the provisions 





if other methods which do not rely on the parties only to gather evidence are used (see 
3.3.ii.b and c). In the case of uncertain scientific facts the problem is not about the 
difficulty of obtaining the information, but instead about the precariousness of the 
information. The question of who bears the burden of proof therefore may not be as 
crucial as it appears. Rather, the lowering of the standard of proof might be of more use 
in this context. 
c. Standard of proof 
In general, a certain standard of proof is applied to the facts parties bring forward in the 
dispute. Different standards exist, requiring more or less certainty in the evidence 
presented before the tribunal. In the Pulp Mills case, for instance, the ICJ rejected some 
facts on the ground they had not “been established to the satisfaction of the Court”.
512
 
The point of contention there was the cause of the unusual algal bloom that happened 
in February 2009; a fact that could not be proven sufficiently by the parties despite both 
submitting scientific facts explaining this particular event. In this case, the Court did not 
justify on what basis these facts were dismissed. It shows, however, that it made a decision 
on the scientific “value” of the parties’ arguments. 
It is argued here that the standard of proof should be entwined with the reality of 
scientific uncertainty. Therefore, the applicable threshold in environmental cases should 
be adapted to the scientific uncertainty. Boyle and Harrison precisely criticised the 
tribunal in the Trail Smelter case when it considered only “clear and convincing scientific 
proof of actual or threatened harm”. This approach taken by the tribunal is indeed no 
longer applicable. If it were, the “general duty to prevent transboundary harm as many 
longer-term or complex causes of environmental harm would escape regulation”.
513
 
Therefore, it is possible to sustain that when a risk of harm is argued as being the source 
of the violation by the other party, the standard of proof must consequently adapt. Since 
we cannot know whether harm will occur with certainty, the potentiality of it should be 
enough to confirm the violation of an obligation. Indeed, the rule itself sets a different 
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standard of proof, commanding the tribunal to apply it (see 3.2.i). In the case of a dispute 
about actual environmental harm and one about the risk of future environmental harm, 
a tribunal will not assess the evidence at the same standard of proof because the rules 
themselves contain a different standard, one which requires the proof of existing harm 
and the other only the possibility of negative impacts on the environment. 
It is not the precautionary principle that would affect the standard of proof but the 
uncertainty of the scientific knowledge that authorises the tribunal to accept evidence of 
potential harm. Indeed, if the precautionary principle would apply in determining the 
standard of proof, the court would be in a situation where a legal standard is misused as 
a standard of proof. The application of the precautionary principle would determine 
what to prove, but not to what extent the argument should be proved.
514
 However, 
because of the nature of scientific uncertainty which entails that none of the parties could 
prove a violation to a high enough standard, it seems unfair to make the complainant 
suffer the consequences of losing the case for lack of sufficient evidence.  
What standard of proof should then be used in cases of scientific uncertainty? There is 
no set rule on what applicable standard of proof is to be used by international courts and 
tribunals, but different thresholds exist, namely the proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the proof in a convincing manner, the preponderance of evidence, and the special case 
of the prima facie evidence (which is the lowest possible standard of proof). The choice 
of standard generally depends on the case and the gravity of the claim.
515
 In the same 
way as a tribunal traditionally imposes a higher standard of proof in criminal matters, or 
more generally when the gravity of the accusation is considered higher,
516
 it could apply 
a lower standard of proof in cases of scientific uncertainty.  
The prima facie standard as it has been used so far does not seem to offer the best 
solution as it contradicts the international procedural principles of the allocation of the 
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burden of proof and does not offer a useful solution.
517
 However, if a tribunal admits a 
lower standard of proof than the preponderance of evidence, meaning that: 
“although the evidence presented in support of a certain proposition is not 
sufficient to allow the tribunals to conclude that the proposition at issue is at least 
more probable than not, there are other facts and circumstances surrounding 
the dispute which when analysed together with the less than conclusive evidence 
allow the tribunals to arrive at such conclusion,”
518
 
it will not reject a claim at the outset. Uncertainty could be one of the facts or 
circumstances that permits the expectation of a lower standard of proof. The tribunal 
will hear uncertain facts from both parties, and will therefore judge on a more 
hypothetical basis. This will be more representative of the reality. The fact the lower 
standard applies to both parties allows the tribunal to decide more on the balance of 
probabilities. In this regard, the WTO confirmed the fact a scientific opinion represents 
a minority opinion does not a priori devalue the strength of the evidence.
519
 
It is different from a reversal of the burden of proof in the sense that the tribunal 
acknowledges the scientific knowledge at large is lacking in the particular issue it has to 
decide. Rather than reversing the burden of proof, the tribunal shows its understanding 
of scientific uncertainty and takes it into account when it determines what degree of 
evidence is sufficient to convince it. However, lowering the standard of proof does not 
affect the fact evidence has to be appreciated at its highest quality possible. 
d. Standard of Review  
The analysis of certain actions performed by states on the basis of certain scientific facts 
is a different exercise that an international court or tribunal must confront. How does a 
tribunal know if a certain programme is scientific or if an environmental impact 
assessment has been carried out according to certain standards? In other words, against 
what should tribunals review decision-making processes that are based on certain 
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scientific facts? The question is not only what facts meet the standard of proof required 
by an adjudicative body, but can the action taken by a certain state on the basis of certain 
scientific facts be considered persuasive enough by that same body. The object under 
scrutiny is not the scientific justification of certain acts per se, but whether the court can 
substitute itself for the decision-maker.  
There is an apparent tension as to the capacity of judicial bodies to assess the scientific 
grounds of a particular situation. International courts and tribunals are qualified to 
decide in the legal issues, but are prima facie not equipped to make decisions on 
scientific issues. Therefore, they need to decide how to tackle such issues. 
The WTO seems to provide an express answer, as Article 11 of the DSU mentions that 
“a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with 
the relevant covered agreements”. However, other tribunals’ constitutive texts do not 
refer specifically to any standard of review, which leaves the door open for judges to 
decide on various applications of standards of review. The WTO opted for a standard 
of objectivity, which was clarified in the Hormones II case as meaning that: 
“the review power of a panel is not to determine whether the risk assessment 
undertaken by a WTO Member is correct, but rather to determine whether that 
risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific 
evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable.”
520
 
The EC argued in this case that the tribunal could take two opposite directions: it can 
decide to either review the facts de novo or to use a deferential standard (as the WTO 
DSB). In the first case, it would mean the judges are able to review all information and 
facts of the case themselves, regardless of the decisions made by the states on the basis 
of previously selected information, whereas in the second case, the judges may review 
only the decision-making process of the state in question.
521
 However, the Appellate 
Body clearly made a decision that panels did not have the power to either review facts 
de novo or use total deference as a standard,
 
and should instead use the “objective 
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assessment” as the applicable standard of review.
522
 The justification for the rejection of 
a de novo review is clear, for an international judicial body should not replace the 
national body that has already made the decision. Total deference is also to be rejected 
as it would give judicial bodies too little to review, to the point where their role might be 
questioned. 
In the Whaling case, the ICJ had to decide how to assess the decision made by Japan to 
carry out a scientific programme. It established a test of “objective reasonableness” to 
review Japan’s decision. This test can be seen as astandard of review rather similar to the 
WTO practice mentioned above.  Gros showed how ambiguous this standard of review 
is, focusing especially on the fact that the Court interpreted this standard in both a de 
novo way and a deferential way.
523
 Is it for the court to decide whether a decision a state 
took on the basis of certain scientific evidence should have been taken differently 
because the scientific evidence was flawed? However, it is argued here that such test of 
“objective reasonableness” does not mean that the ICJ had to review Japan’s actions. 
Rather, it is a clever way to avoid precisely the question of standard of review. By limiting 
the scope of its review to whether the actions were objectively reasonable, the ICJ opts 
out from reviewing the actions themselves. It only assesses whether they seem reasonable 
enough.  
In the Kishenganga Arbitration, the tribunal went further and found that the facts put 
forward by Pakistan were more conclusive than those submitted by India because “in 
the Court’s view, the differences between the Parties must be viewed in light of the 
evolving science of predicting the environmental changes that would result from altered 
flow conditions”.
524
 Therefore, the tribunal was able to decide whether the actions by 
India were justified or not. The Kishenganga Arbitration offers a different perspective 
on the relationship between the role of a judicial body in reviewing states’ actions on the 
basis of scientific accuracy. The tribunal’s composition – formed by international law 
specialists and a scientist – provided the justification, allowing the court to judge on 
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scientific matters and to draw conclusions. Indeed, when the court had to answer the 
question whether it could deal with technical matters, as India argued that only a Neutral 
Expert was qualified to do so, excluding the capacity of a court of arbitration to do so,
525
 
it said the treaty did not exclude the competence of the court, and that the court’s 
competence was reinforced by its very composition.
526
 
The question of standard of review is still controversial and future cases will have to 
develop further its meaning and applicability. 
3.4 Conclusion 
As this chapter illustrates, the intermingling of factual and legal question in 
environmental matters proves a critical dilemma for international courts and tribunals, 
which consequently forces them to adapt to this different type of disputes. This chapter 
has shown the flexibility of the procedural rules regulating the fact-finding process. The 
question is then how far can those procedural rules be pushed to modify the role of 
international courts and tribunals? Several factors can lead to a different understanding 
of the function of international adjudication, among which the means to gather evidence 
and the determination of the standard of review of factual situations have direct 
consequences.  
Regarding the methods of gathering evidence, in cases where only the parties submit 
factual evidence, the tribunal is allowed to review the substance of the scientific findings 
of the parties. This means judges decide on both the most satisfactory interpretation of 
the law and on how scientific facts underpinning the dispute should be understood. The 
tribunal therefore becomes an arbitrator on scientific matters as well as on legal matters. 
A similar conclusion can be reached by the establishment of enquiries and the 
appointment of assessors or experts by the court. In this case, the fact-finders will give 
the authoritative interpretation of the scientific facts that the court will use directly as the 
basis for its decision. Although the tribunal defers the fact-finding process to particular 
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individuals, their conclusions will be followed by the tribunal. Therefore, the biggest 
challenge is to strike the balance between the different mechanisms in order to gather 
enough facts necessary to legitimise a judicial legal decision. 
In the case of fact-finding methods where international courts and tribunals are in 
charge, by using court-appointed experts or taking into account NGOs submissions for 
example, it makes evidence more objective, as long as the experts are chosen on an 
impartial and independent basis. The tribunal then bears the burden of choosing to rely 
on certain evidence – a process that is far from risk-free. 
Regarding the question of who performs the fact-finding function, scholars continue to 
propose ideas that combine evidence gathered both by the parties and by the tribunal. 
For example, in relation to international commercial arbitration, Sachs and Schmidt-
Ahrendts have argued for a hybrid system of fact-finding, whereby the parties and the 
judges cooperate in the appointment of experts.
527
 It is named “expert teaming”: an 
exercise combining the good elements of both party- and court-appointed experts. Both 
parties would submit a list of potential experts, comment on each other’s list, and let the 
tribunal pick two experts from each list. These four experts then form an expert team 
which mission is set out by the tribunal. This solution seems to prevent parties to use 
biased experts as well as prevent the risk of having only one expert and therefore one 
opinion on evidentiary matters. 
Moreover, despite the inflexibility of the rules on the burden of proof, judges have 
means at their disposal to rectify procedural imbalances where the claimant bears the 
burden of proof. In particular, international courts can apply a different standard of 
proof to uncertain, complex scientific facts. Indeed, the best option seems to shift 
towards a different understanding of the standard of proof. This suggestion joins the 
general argument of the thesis in the sense that it shows how international courts and 
tribunals have certain means to adapt to environmental disputes. In this case, the 
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scientific uncertainty of environmental protection can be integrated in the judicial 
procedure by lowering the standard of proof. 
Innovations have been taking place in various judicial institutions, without much 
coherence. As the sources of the rules on evidence are not limited to the separate 
constitutive texts of each tribunal, but can be linked to their inherent powers, it leaves 
room for cross-fertilisation of best practices and amelioration of legal processes across 
all judicial institutions. The WTO has developed a strong practice related to the 
handling of court-appointed experts; international arbitration shows great flexibility in 
appointing experts as member of the arbitral panel itself. The ICJ has also shown itself 
capable of making enquiries and appointing assessors. All these different variations will 
be vital in pursuing the creation of a law on evidence better suited to the shifting reality 





4. PREVENTION, LAW ON REMEDIES, AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION 
This chapter originates from the general criticism that courts are not a suitable forum 
for preventing environmental harm. Some regard judicial procedure as ill-suited to 
responding to international environmental legal violations, which can destroy 
permanently the environment. This section of the thesis will first review the current law 
on remedies and show its limitations in terms of preventive effects. Remedies provided 
by the ILC Articles on State Responsibility do not aim at preventing damage or harm. 
After a brief overview of the law on remedies, the main body of the chapter focuses on 
the development of provisional measures of protection as preventive remedies. 
Judicial remedies are not the object of this chapter – they are introduced to give context 
to the argument of the chapter, namely the use of provisional measures as remedies to 
untimely decisions. The criticism according to which international courts and tribunals 
cannot prevent environmental harm is based on the fact that remedies can only be given 
at the end of the lengthy procedure. This chapter therefore focuses on this time element, 
but first introduces the general framework of remedies, explaining what kind of actions 
can be required as a result of a judicial procedure, as a way of introducing what actions 
can international courts and tribunals order. 
4.1 The use of general remedies 
Different sorts of remedies are at the disposal of international courts and tribunals, 
stemming from different legal sources. Before 2001, the only source was from the 
jurisprudence of the various arbitral tribunals, followed by the decisions from different 
permanent courts.
528
 With the adoption of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, a list 
of remedies was established in article 34 which states that: 
“[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall 
take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in 
combination, in according with the provisions of this Chapter.” 
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These different forms of remedies may be overcome by the application of other more 
specialised rules of international law,
529
 and can be adapted depending on the primary 
obligations violated and the circumstances of each particular case.
530
 
The ILC Articles also provide for cessation and guarantees and assurances of non-
repetition (Article 30) as a consequence of an internationally wrongful act, which have 
been awarded in some cases by international courts and tribunals. 
 
 
A key general issue is the extent of the remedy: how far can – and should – the 
international tribunal go? The remedy ordered by the Court in the Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals case, for example, demanded the United States to “review and 
reconsider the convictions and sentences by means of its choice”. This did not appear 
precise enough to be effective, however, as underlined by Judge Sepulveda-Amor, who 
affirmed that: 
“an unsatisfactory rule on the remedial action that is to be assumed by a State 
found in a breach of a treaty obligation or of a customary rule may mean a chain 
of proceedings before the Court in the forthcoming future, as a result of an 




This shows how the choice of remedies before a tribunal is strongly linked to the parties’ 
demands. There are different factors contributing to the appropriate remedies, pointed 
out by Brown as being “the nature of the court, the type of the dispute, the identity of 
the parties and […] the particular relief sought by the claimant in the proceedings”.
532
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In particular, it must be noted that although parties themselves suggest remedies they 
would want to see implemented by the court,
533
 this does not impede on the court’s 
discretion over what remedies it allocates.
534
 The parties’ demands in the first stages of 
the procedure as to which remedy they are seeking give an indication of the aim of these 
particular judicial proceedings. In certain types of disputes, the applicant state only seeks 
satisfaction – such as in cases involving the determination of a border, showing they are 
not interested in possible reparation. In those cases, awarding further remedies might 
even harm the diplomatic relationship, but it does not automatically mean that harm has 
not occurred. It is a sign of the purpose of the particular dispute, and is closely related 
to the scope of the jurisdiction of the tribunal in the first place. In exercising its 
discretional power while awarding remedies, the Court shows its stance on its role within 
a particular dispute, having to balance the scope of the dispute framed by the parties, 
the right interpretation and application of international law and the consequences 
attached to it.  
The discretion of a tribunal also extends to the remedy itself. Once it has decided which 
remedy to award, it has to decide on its precise scope. In doing so, an international court 
is confronted by the complications of interfering with a state’s sovereignty.
535
 The 
question whether a tribunal can award specific remedies mandatorily has been treated 
differently across cases. Indeed, the intrusion of a court in determining the exact way to 
offer adequate remedy has not been consistent.
536
 The lack of development of the 
current state of the law on remedies has contributed to this discrepancy in practices.  
Moreover, if the primary obligation breached already asks for the occurrence of some 
damage in order to be breached, such as the obligation of states sponsoring persons and 
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entities with respect to activities in the seabed area,
537
 the question of reparation is limited 
to determining the monetary compensation. The rationale for awarding reparation in 
such a case is based on the primary rule itself, rather than on secondary rules or inherent 
judicial powers, which then has an impact on the way international courts and tribunals 
will award certain remedies.
538
 
Broadly, judicial remedies can be classified in two categories: retrospective and 
prospective remedies. The former focuses on how to annul the effects of the wrongful 
act, the latter centres on how to make sure it will not happen again. Sometimes, a single 
remedy can serve both purposes, such as in the Tehran Hostages case, where the release 
by the Iranian authorities of the American staff held in their embassy restored the status 
quo ante and stopped a current violation from having future effects.
539
 Combinations of 
different remedies are also possible. 
Prospective remedies do not aim at reparation as such but set the ground for future 
compliance. They focus on the implementation of the judicial decision, ensuring the 
breach does not continue in the future. This prospective element can be found in 
different types of remedies, such as the obligation of cessation and guarantees of non-
repetition, in certain consequential orders and is a pillar of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. Their existence shows that international adjudication is now also concerned with 
the compliance of judicial judgments, and this chapter will show how international 
adjudication has tackled this task as part of the judicial function. In some instances, 
courts and tribunals have been more innovative, embracing the idea of future 
compliance by the parties (see briefly chapter 5.1.iv). 
Retrospective remedies have been developed in the context of the law on state 
responsibility, codified by the ILC in 2001 under the umbrella of “reparation”. 
Reparation can take three forms according to the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, 
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either restitution, or compensation or satisfaction.
540
 These three forms of reparation do 
not allow for prevention of harm, as will now be shown. 
i. Restitution 
First, the obligation of restitution in kind (restitutio in integrum) is the established form 
of reparation for material injury and is considered to be the preferred remedy a tribunal 
should seek, awarding other remedies only when the restitution in kind is not available.
541
 
Restitution has been long defined as an obligation to “wipe out all consequences of the 
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if the 
act had not been committed”.
542
 Despite being the primary remedy, the obligation of 
restitution is limited, as often full reparation is not possible. In cases of environmental 
harm especially, a material impossibility can arise when the damage done is irreversible. 
This restricts considerably the application of the obligation of restitution. Indeed, 
restitution in kind makes sense only if the damage is reversible. 
Moreover, restoring the status quo ante in some cases might create more adverse effects. 
Where a state has already built a road or a dam, for instance, there may be no benefits 
to be gained from tearing down the construction. On the contrary, the restoration of the 
situation would not produce the right remedy, especially when the obligation breached 
is a procedural one. In the Certain Activities case, where the ICJ said that “restoring the 
original condition of the area where the road is located would not constitute an 
appropriate remedy for Costa Rica’s breach of its obligation to carry out an 
environmental impact assessment”, this was clearly the case.
543
 This is an example of a 
situation where it is impracticable to grant restitution. International courts and tribunals 
have some flexibility in striking the balance, using the concept of proportionality as a 
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means to achieve the right balance. Therefore, it is possible for an international tribunal 
to reject a restitution that is not impossible but disproportional.
544
 
In sum, restitution in kind seems to have a limited application in environmental cases, 
as it is often impossible or disproportional for the wrongdoer state to restore the 
situation. Despite the primary character of restitution, it is not the most suitable remedy 
in an environmental context. The nature of environmental harm is frequently 
disconnected with the possibility of restitution as the damage is irreversible. 
ii. Compensation 
Compensation is the alternative form of reparation for material injury in case restitution 
in kind is materially impossible. Its purpose is to compensate monetarily what is 
considered to be the value of the restitution in kind.
545
 Brown gives a full account on the 
state of the development of how compensation has been awarded and concludes the 
various international tribunals are not coordinated in that matter. The jurisprudence 
varies a lot, and it is difficult to draw a consistent practice.
546
 
Moreover, quantification of the damage and the follow-up on the use of the 
compensation is traditionally not handled by the judicial institutions, as the decision 
made by the ICJ in the Certain Activities case shows, whereby it ordered the state parties 
to the dispute to negotiate the amount of the compensation. Only if they do not reach 
an agreement within the next twelve months after the judicial decision would the Court 
intervene on their behalf. The Court left the decision regarding the precise amount of 
the compensation to the parties, and limited itself to state that Nicaragua must 
compensate Costa Rica for its violation of Costa Rica’s territorial integrity.
547
 
Regarding the allocation of compensation for damage that is not quantifiable in 
economic terms, the work of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) 
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in awarding compensation for environmental damages committed during the Gulf War 
must be emphasised. Although the UNCC is not a judicial institution per se, rather an 
administrative organ,
548
 its concrete role can be associated with a quasi-judicial function.
549
 
More particularly, the states being compensated had to prove the funds would be 
distributed to the claimants, and in case of failure the UNCC would be able to prevent 
further funds from being allocated to them.
550
 
Overall, compensation is another form of reparation, also based on the retrospective 
idea of remedies. 
iii. Satisfaction 
Satisfaction exists for moral damages. It constitutes an acknowledgment of the breach, 
or an expression of regret; a formal apology or another appropriate modality. This may 
include a court judgment declaring the breach. An example of a declaratory judgment 
which constitutes satisfaction can be found in the Certain Activities case, which states 
that: 
“The declaration by the Court that Nicaragua breached the territorial sovereignty 
of Costa Rica by excavating three caños and establishing a military presence in 
the disputed territory provides adequate satisfaction for the non-material injury 
suffered on this account. The same applies to the declaration of the breach of 
the obligations under the Court’s Order of 8 March 2011 on provisional 
measures. Finally, the declaration of the breach of Costa Rica’s rights of 
navigation in the terms determined above in Section D provides adequate 
satisfaction for that breach.”
551
 
This is a common outcome for environmental cases (see chapter 1.3.ii). International 
courts and tribunals often limit their role to a statement on the law or a clarification of 
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the parties’ obligations. The fact judgments do not often go beyond this declaratory effect 
limits their roles in terms of concrete future change in states’ behaviour. 
4.2 Importance of provisional measures in the application of international 
environmental law 
The limited availability of remedies is not the only reason for concluding that 
international courts are unable to prevent environmental harm; it has also been argued 
a judicial decision usually comes after other deliberations and therefore takes too long 
for the environment to be protected effectively.
552
 In response to this argument, this 
chapter tackles the time element in the process of judicial resolution. The core of the 
chapter lies in the idea that provisional measures rescue the relevance of judicial bodies 
precisely because they can be awarded very fast. The construction of a major site (for 
example a road, dam, factory) can affect dramatically the surrounding environment, or 
the conduct of an experimental programme can violate number of environmental rules. 
These might range from the conservation of biodiversity to the protection of endangered 
species. To address this issue, international courts and tribunals have at their disposal 
procedures that allow interim measures to be applied as a matter of urgency. Articles 74 
(1) and (2) of the Rules of the International Court of Justice, for example, emphasise the 
possibility of the provisional measures procedure to move swiftly as it has “priority over 
all cases”, and as “the Court … shall be convened forthwith for the purpose of proceeding 
to a decision on the request as a matter of urgency”. Similarly, the Rules of the ITLOS 
say that a “request… has priority over all other proceedings before the Tribunal”.
553
 
This illustrates the importance of understanding whether or not provisional measures 
offer a useful legal tool where a threat of the environment exists but a judicial settlement 
would not be considered because of its lengthy duration and its ex post facto effect. Also 
examined in this chapter is the scope of provisional measures, specifically: in what 
circumstances may courts and tribunals intervene, and on what basis? The first question 
to be tackled is to what extent they can use their power to grant provisional measures: is 
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a request for provisional measures a right to a party or a right of the international 
community? How far can the court represent other interests and act accordingly?  
Another relevant issue to be considered concerns the correct way to achieve the balance 
between taking measures for the effective protection of the environment and ensuring 
the rights of the respondent state are not unduly constrained pending the final outcome 
of the dispute. Courts and tribunals have developed a set of tests in order to help this 
balancing exercise. One question is about the implications of the choice of tests made 
by different judicial bodies, another is how they affect the creation of a regime of 
provisional measures. This chapter will argue that if international courts and tribunals 
take a less restrictive approach in the application of the set of tests than they have been 
taking recently, environmental protection will benefit from the procedure of provisional 
measures.  
The focus on provisional measures of protection is part and parcel of the overall 
argument that international courts and tribunals have tools available to them to adapt to 
environmental disputes. By using provisional measures in a meaningful way, they can 
overcome the procedural obstacle of untimely decisions. Indeed, it will be shown how 
provisional measures can contribute to ameliorate the adequacy of international courts 
and tribunals in environmental disputes. 
4.3 Nature of provisional measures 
A request for provisional measures must be filed after the case has been brought to the 
court or tribunal, but before the tribunal decides on the merits. In between the time the 
case has been filed and the time it is heard, both parties have the opportunity to request 
provisional measures. The procedure is meant to be incidental, meaning the jurisdiction 
to prescribe provisional measures stems from its jurisdiction over the merits of the 
dispute.
554
 Its matching concept in various national legal systems is known as the interim 
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 or interdict procedure.
556
 Provisional measures are expressly provided by 
the founding texts of both the ICJ and the ITLOS, respectively in Article 41 of the ICJ 
Statute and in Article 290 UNCLOS read in conjunction with Article 25 of the ITLOS 
Statute, whereby provisional measures can be requested by either party to a dispute 
previously filed. 
The precise status of provisional measures orders was unclear in the early practice of 
the Court. In the LaGrand case, the Court explained that such uncertainty stemmed 
from the modifications of the wording of the Statute while drafting it for the PCIJ, which 
has changed between the Court “ordering” provisional measures and “suggesting” or 
“indicating” them (the latter being the current version).
557
 This issue has been clarified in 
the LaGrand case when the Court held that the parties which are not respecting 
provisional measures orders are violating international law. Indeed, provisional 
measures orders are binding on the parties.
558
 This controversy was avoided in the case 
of the ITLOS where no doubt was left regarding the binding nature of provisional 
measures, as the Tribunal has “the power to prescribe provisional measures”.
559
 
Following this new jurisprudence, Brown asked whether the measures were inherent to 
a judicial institution or if they had to be agreed on by the parties on a case-to-case basis.
560
 
In other words, can a court or tribunal grant a provisional measures order even in the 
absence of explicit power in its constituent instrument? This issue is especially important 
in ad hoc arbitration when the tribunal is set up for the resolution of a specific dispute. 
Although the PCA’s founding texts (1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes) do not mention interim measures, all the recent 
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PCA Arbitration Rules include a section on interim measures.
561
 This change not only 
shows the adaptation of the PCA but also that it embraces the argument that it is part of 
the judicial function itself. Before such rules were created, specific arbitral tribunals 
included interim measures of protection in their own rules of procedure, such as the 
Iron Rhine arbitration in 2005 (Article 21). There has not yet been a case where a party 
requested provisional measures from a tribunal that did not have express powers to grant 
them.  
The key question is the extent to which the tribunal will dispose of its powers. Indeed, 
if the power to grant provisional measures is inherent to the judicial function, it is then 
crucial to analyse the extent to which it can be used, and for what purposes. Initially, the 
constitutive statutes of the various permanent courts set a framework defining the scope 
of the provisional measures procedure, but they also leave a generous margin of 
appreciation to the courts. It must be noted the scope of provisional measures orders 
may depend on the precise language of the applicable rules. The fact international courts 
and tribunals use their inherent powers does not automatically imply a uniformity of 
their practices. Indeed, despite the development of a certain harmonisation, the 
Kishenganga Arbitration underlined the importance of the different wording of the 
applicable rule. In this case, the disparities between the Indus Waters Treaty and the 




It is also crucial to underline that the proceedings are totally independent from the 
proceedings on the merits. As Rosenne said, “all findings of fact and of law and all 
decisions in connection with provisional measures are provisional and do not directly 
affect the merits of the case, or any related incidental question of jurisdiction or 
admissibility.”
563
 This is especially important both at the procedural level and in the 
analysis of the substantial conditions, because the tribunal will not be bound by its 
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decision on provisional measures. This has been the case in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
case, where the ITLOS ordered provisional measures because it found prima facie 
jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, then denied by the arbitral tribunal itself. 
Indeed, it affirmed that “the ITLOS holdings upheld no more than the jurisdiction 
prima facie of this Tribunal. It remains for it to decide if it has jurisdiction to pass upon 
the merits of the dispute”.
564
 It shows the provisional measures regime should be 
autonomous, especially since the urgency of the situation forces the tribunals to decide 
without full account of legal arguments and factual evidence. However, courts need a 
mechanism to prevent them from going too far in granting provisional measures. Indeed, 
a court or tribunal seeks to avoid granting measures that in fact prejudge the case. It 
needs therefore to create a regime that precludes a party from obtaining what it would 
during the main phase of the proceedings.
565
 This has always been a clear threshold the 
court would never want to overstep.
566
 That is exactly why provisional measures can be 
an appropriate remedy to the role of international courts and tribunals in environmental 
disputes. The fact there must be a clear separation between the measures adopted at the 
incidental level and at the merits level emphasises the role of provisional measures as 
measures of precaution. It reiterates the importance of framing the tribunal’s decision 
in terms of precaution versus sovereignty (see below 4.5). It is, however, possible that 
the relief sought at the provisional measures stage is identical to the one sought at the 
merits stage. For example, Argentina requested the provisional release of its warship 
from Ghana, which also constituted the measure it was seeking permanently in the 
merits. The ITLOS did not find the similarity of the measure requested with the relief 
sought at the merits problematic, as its decision could be reversed. Judge Paik even 
argued that certain circumstances can allow provisional measures to be similar to the 
relief sought in the merits. Despite acknowledging that “any request designed to obtain 
an interim judgment in favour of a part of the claim formulated in the application should 
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be dismissed”, he accepted that “this does not mean that a party cannot seek relief 
through a request for provisional measures which is in substance identical with the 
principal relief sought on the merits of the claim”.
567
 
Finally, it must be noted that requests of provisional measures are limited to contentious 
cases, and are not open to the advisory jurisdiction. This is because in advisory opinions 
the court is only giving an interpretation of a legal rule, without relying on the existence 
of a dispute. Although a request for an advisory opinion stems from a concrete problem 
the international community is facing, the request aims mostly at clarifying the law.  
4.4 Purposes of provisional measures 
Provisional measures do not exist solely to allow the courts and tribunals to exercise 
their judicial function fully. Different purposes have been enunciated by courts and 
tribunals,
568
 such as the preservation of the respective rights of the parties,
569
 the 
maintenance or restoration of the status quo,
570
 the avoidance of any aggravation or 
extension of the dispute,
571
 the prevention of serious harm to the marine environment.
572
  
The general PCA Arbitration Rules 2012 provide a non-exhaustive list of purposes 
which are concerned with the maintenance or restoration of the status quo and the 
prevention of current or imminent harm
573
 (both aiming at the protection of broader 
interests than the parties’ respective rights), and add another type of measures that aim 
at securing the arbitral process itself,
574
 such as the preservation of “assets out of which a 
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subsequent award may be satisfied”,
575
 or the preservation of “evidence that may be 
relevant and [of] material to the resolution of the dispute”.
576
 In addition, the specific 
Optional Rules for Inter-State Arbitration mention the preservation of the respective 
rights of the parties (article 26 (1)), but none of the other possibilities contained in the 
general Rules. In contrast, the Optional Rules on natural resources and environment 
mention the prevention of “serious harm to the environment falling within the subject-
matter of the dispute”.
577
 Taking the various Optional Rules together, all the existing 
purposes are articulated.  
These categories fall either within the idea of a bilateral judicial dispute only concerned 
with the parties’ interests or within the idea that the court or tribunal offer the possibility 
to defend other values or interests. In particular, protection of the environment can fall 
within the narrower scope of provisional measures as a way of preserving the parties’ 
rights. If not, however, it will be part of the broader purpose of non-aggravation of the 
dispute. In the second case, it is critical to establish that provisional measures can also 
ensure the maintenance of the status quo – or in other words the protection of the 
“object of the litigation”.
578
 Indeed, the institution of provisional measures can be viewed 
as a mere attribute to the parties’ rights once a judicial procedure has started, or as an 
opportunity for the tribunal to include other interests at stake. This dichotomy is 
reflected in the different purposes attached to provisional measures. The dependence 
of the measures solely on the rights of the parties restricts the use of provisional 
measures, in the sense that it prevents other measures to be taken in light of the parties’ 
rights but to preserve broader situations, unless the rights claimed by the applicant did 
not exist at the time of the order.
579
 When the Court in the Nuclear Tests case indicated 
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provisional measures to “ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate 
or extend the dispute” it did not limit its competence to the preservation of the parties’ 
rights only. Ensuring certain rights are safeguarded is not the same as ensuring the 
situation is not aggravated, i.e. to maintain the status quo. The latter entails a wider 
variety of measures than the former.
580
 Moreover, it means the court acts as a defender 
of values other than the parties’ rights. The same applies to the specific measure of the 
UNCLOS to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. It relies not just on the 
preservation of the parties’ rights, but goes beyond the rights of parties to protect the 
marine environment. Indeed, the UNCLOS mentions the possibility of granting 
provisional measures for the protection of the marine environment. Article 290 (1) 
UNCLOS does not only aim at protecting the rights of the parties, but contains this 
element of protection of the global commons.  
The ITLOS mentioned article 290 (1) in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, but did not 
focus its argumentation on it. The closest it came to this was when the tribunal found 
that “measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to preserve the rights of the parties 
and to avert further deterioration of the southern Bluefin tuna stock (emphasis 
added)”.
581
 The wording of the emphasised sentence recalls the ICJ’s position when it 
says that provisional measure can be granted to “avoid any aggravation or extension of 
the dispute”. The ITLOS does not seem to differ substantially from the ICJ’s 
jurisprudence in that respect. Indeed, the prevention of serious harm to the marine 
environment as seen by the ITLOS falls into the ICJ’s interpretation of the avoidance 
of any aggravation or extension of the dispute. However, in the Land Reclamation case, 
although the ITLOS establishes a “group of independent experts […] to deal with any 
adverse effects of such land reclamation”, it does not justify its decision on the 
prevention of serious harm to the marine environment. The same happens in the MOX 
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Plant case where the prevention of serious harm to the marine environment is 
mentioned several times, yet never invoked separately.
582
 
Notwithstanding the underuse of the possibility offered by the text of UNCLOS, the 
tribunal has not restricted its application of provisional measures. It does consider 
seriously irreparable harm in the situation at stake, which can be affiliated with a broader 
conception of the protection of global commons. This can be compared with the way 
the ICJ can protect the non-aggravation of the dispute. 
In the ICJ jurisprudence, an example where provisional measures can seek to protect 
more than just the parties’ rights can be found in the Certain Activities case. Indeed, 
Costa Rica, by requesting the suspension of the activities carried out by Nicaragua in the 
disputed area, not only preserves its right of sovereignty over its territory, but also 
contributes to the protection of the environment, separately from its sovereignty claim.
583
 
Indeed, the maintenance of the state of the environment in the area is necessary both as 
an attribute of the sovereignty claim and as a requirement for the settlement of the 
dispute. Therefore, by protecting the wetlands and forests where the activities are taking 
place, the Court prevents further violations to Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty and 
also protects further potential deterioration of the environment. This represents an 
example of when the Court takes the liberty to defend the protection of the environment 
not as a direct right of Costa Rica. It does so in order to preserve the situation until the 
court decides on the merits. 
What if a party invokes erga omnes obligations to be protected at the provisional 
measures level? If the party requested provisional measures for the defence of an erga 
omnes obligation being violated, it would not only benefit its own right to the respect of 
this erga omnes obligation, but also all the others’. The consequences of the provisional 
measures would be broader, but the purpose of provisional measures would remain the 
same: the tribunal will still act to preserve the party’s rights. The difference would be in 
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the type of measures the tribunal chooses to order, as it would have to take into account 
the multilateralism of the right invoked (see 4.7.iii). 
Provisional measures are not dependent on a party’s request. Indeed, if a party does not 
ask for provisional measures, the tribunal would have to act itself. The ICJ is given the 
opportunity to grant provisional measures proprio motu, which would be the basis for 
its intervention.
584
 It is recognised that the Court can intervene on its own initiative when 
circumstances so require; a further expression of its inherent powers to order provisional 
measures.  
International courts have two ways of using their power proprio motu. Firstly, if 
provisional measures have been requested by either party, they will be able to modify 
the request as it wishes. This possibility is found in Article 75 (2) of the Rules of the ICJ 
and Article 89 (5) of the Rules of ITLOS. They can adapt and change the measures 
proposed in the request to better fit the circumstances. Secondly, the ICJ can order 
provisional measures “irrespective of whether or not it has been seized by the parties of 
a request for the indication of provisional measures”
585
 (Article 75 (1) Rules of the ICJ). 
It has been used in the LaGrand case to justify that the Court indicates provisional 
measures without any proceedings
586
 and does not have the equivalent in the ITLOS. It 
gives full powers to the court to decide on provisional measures even without the consent 
of any party. 
International courts and tribunals can then protect an interest that neither party deemed 
worth protecting. In that case, judicial bodies may have interests in integrating evolutions 
that take place in international environmental law, especially the developments relating 
to legal protection beyond territorial boundaries, i.e. global commons. They would 
therefore need to justify their intervention on the interests of the court to preserve or 
prevent further aggravation of the factual situation. Their role would be in this case to 
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protect common interests of the international community. In other words, they could 
be a third party defending interests that might go beyond the parties’ interests.  
Kolb has mentioned rightly that the tribunals are “the guardians of the objective interest, 
as a matter of judicial integrity”. He meant that they have to preserve the “value of their 
judicial functions”.
587
 It can go even further than that and may be argued this power to 
protect the objective interest also entails any interests beyond the parties to the dispute 
– still strongly related to the ongoing dispute – and should be taken into account by the 
courts and tribunals.  
4.5 Balance between sovereignty and precaution 
Not only is the question of the role of the court or tribunal in granting provisional 
measures relevant in determining the importance of the latter in international 
environmental law. It also represents the balance the tribunal must strike in analysing 
the range of possible provisional measures applicable in the individual case. The two 
stances on the purposes of provisional measures developed above may be explained 
with the balancing exercise the tribunal or court has to pursue. If the tribunal decides 
that the preservation of the parties’ rights weighs more than the preservation of the 
factual situation, it is generally to safeguard the sovereignty of the respondent. There is 
a connection between which principle the Court decides to put forward and the 
conceptual approach to provisional measures. 
On the one hand, most judgments refer to possible infringements to the sovereignty of 
the respondent as opposed to the precaution required by provisional measures 
requested by the applicant. The refusal of the Court to grant provisional measures in the 
Passage through the Great Belt case for example was based on the exercise of Denmark’s 
sovereignty over its own affairs. Finland was asking the ICJ to grant provisional measures 
to protect its right of passage through the Great Belt, as Denmark was building the East 
Channel Bridge. The Court sustained that 
“it is for Denmark, which is informed of the nature of Finland’s claim, to 
consider the impact which a judgment upholding it could have upon the 
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implementation of the Great Belt Project, and to decide whether or to what 
extent it should accordingly delay or modify that project.” 
At this stage of the procedure, it can be difficult for a court to  
“restrain a State from doing what it claims it has a legal right to do without having 
heard it in defence of that right, or without having required the requesting State 
to show that there is at least a possibility of the existence of the right for the 
preservation of which the measures are sought.”
588
 
These extracts show the emphasis on protecting the sovereignty of the parties, to the 
detriment of the need for precaution. In this particular case, the Court judged that the 
urgency required for granting provisional measures was not proven in a satisfactory way 
to overcome Denmark’s sovereignty and dismissed the case.  
Also, a “proceed at your own risks” principle has been used to protect the sovereignty 
of the party allegedly violating the other party’s rights. The idea centres on the 
importance of leaving the parties to determine their activities within their territories, as 
long as they are responsible for their own actions. It has been mentioned as such in the 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, allowing India to keep working on a diversion 
of the river Kishenganga/Neelum, as part of a bigger hydroelectric project.  
On the other hand, the idea of precaution has been underlined by Judge Cançado 
Trindade who described the anticipatory effect of provisional measures several times, 
and declared among others that “[provisional measures of protection] are endowed with 
a preventive character, being anticipatory in nature, looking forward in time”.
589
 Pakistan 
also stressed the importance of precaution in the provisional measures procedure in the 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, saying that “interim measures are necessary to 
prevent the creation of a fait accompli and harm the likelihood of any remedy that the 
Court may order”.
590
 In this sense, the tribunal might impose measures restricting the 
sovereignty of either state party.  
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As an example of the balancing exercise, the arbitral tribunal in the latter case explicitly 
made a choice as to what parts of the construction should be suspended.  Indeed, on 
the one hand, it said that  
“consistent with the nature of interim measures, the Court, on a provisional basis, 
cannot exclude that the by-pass tunnel […] is a “temporary by-pass” within the 
meaning of [the Indus Waters Treaty], … which has been intended to be 
essentially of temporary use and would thus not by itself be capable of rendering 
more or less likely the implementation of any remedies that the Court may 
decide upon in its Award”.
591
  
However, the tribunal treated the construction of some elements of the actual dam 
differently. As these elements were part of the final permanent project, precaution 
required their suspension.  
“A temporary halt to the construction of the dam would … go a long way toward 
avoiding any situation of potential inconsistency with the Treaty while these 
proceedings are ongoing … Moreover, even if the Court were ultimately to reject 
Pakistan’s arguments regarding the alleged illegality of the KHEP in all its 
elements, … the Court at this stage cannot rule out that adjustments to the design 
of the KHEP dam or related works … may be required. The entirely 
unconstrained construction of the KHEP pendente lite thus presents a risk of 




The element of precaution took over the concurrent sovereign right of India to build a 
tunnel, because the operation had a direct impact on the waters, which were at the heart 
of the dispute. Conversely, when the construction of some parts of the installations did 
not interfere directly with the waters themselves, the Court applied the “proceed at own 
risks” principle, which excluded Pakistan’s responsibility but did not prevent the 
construction from happening.
593
 The tribunal for each of the actions of India balanced 
precaution with sovereignty. This case shows that even within one procedure, some 
measures justify the infringement of a state’s sovereignty, but not all. Despite the fact the 
arbitral tribunal’s powers to award provisional measures in the Kishenganga Arbitration 
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were based on the Indus Water Treaty specifically,
594
 the award shows how a tribunal 
can balance interests which broadly either belong to the protection of the sovereignty of 
either party or to the guarantee of precaution inherent to provisional measures.  
It is important to emphasise the precautionary nature of the procedure, therefore it is 
important to think of the balancing exercise in terms of sovereignty against precaution, 
even though there are variations in what is in the balance. The reason why it is important 
to think in those terms is to not depart from the very nature of the procedure. The 
consequences are not procedural, but conceptual. Opposing sovereignty and precaution 
creates a tool to delimit the frame within which the tribunal exercises its powers. Indeed, 
the balance could be described in different terms, for instance the protection of the 
environment versus the right to development, as in the Pulp Mills case. However, this 
reasoning would allow the court to make political decisions outside the scope of the 
procedure.
595
 If the balancing exercise is constrained to sovereignty versus precaution, 
the essence of provisional measures is preserved. In other words, if the role of the court 
is defined in the balance between two sovereign rights without the precaution element, 
the court loses the most important reason for the existence of provisional measures. 
Furthermore, it is beneficial to think in those terms since the protection of the 
environment requires an urgent response – almost pre-emptive in certain cases. 
This balancing exercise is present in the analysis of every condition the tribunal has to 
consider. Each time the question asked is: how far can the tribunal go to protect the 
parties’ rights or the non-aggravation of the dispute without infringing on the depleted 
party’s rights either? The development of international environmental law has had an 
impact on the examination of those conditions, especially when the court must 
determine when the risk of irreparable harm is worth protection. 
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4.6 Conditions for provisional measures to be granted 
The impact of the choice between the two stances on granting provisional measures 
discussed above is reflected in the determination of certain conditions by the various 
tribunals. Also, it is through the analysis of the specific conditions in each individual case 
that the tribunal or court makes its balancing exercise. Whether the court or tribunal 
will favour a greater protection over the sovereign rights of the parties depends on how 
it considers the following conditions are fulfilled. The ICJ is the leading court in the 
provisional measures cases and it is the jurisprudence of this Court that will provide the 
main focus of the analysis. However, the ITLOS or arbitral tribunals have interesting 
inputs and sometimes divergent approaches.  
First, some criteria must be established. The grounds for setting these criteria are Article 
41 of the ICJ Statute and 73 to 78 of the Rules of Court. The Court must at first establish 
its prima facie jurisdiction, which does not require such an in-depth analysis as on the 
merits. Then, at least two common elements have to be present: the measures must 
prevent an irreparable prejudice and must be required as a matter of urgency, which I 
will call here the risk of irreparable harm.
596
 The provisional measures requested must 
also be in connection with the case on the merits. And in the latest jurisprudence a new 
criterion seems to have appeared repetitively, which will be called the “plausibility test”.  
Each of these conditions will be analysed with the ICJ jurisprudence, and with judgments 
from other interstate courts. The analysis will demonstrate how they relate to the 
different purposes enunciated above and to environmental protection.  
i. Prima facie jurisdiction 
As the request for provisional measures is an incidental procedure, the tribunal needs 
only to establish that its jurisdiction is not obviously excluded. Although it does not have 
the time to affirm its jurisdiction in a comprehensive way, the tribunal must still found 
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One of the key questions is which test an international tribunal should apply to 
determine the threshold when its jurisdiction is granted. The prima facie test responds 
to the justified need of the court to not grant something it would never be able to judge 
on the merits. It also adapts to the fact that the court needs to decide quickly on the 
request. Practically, the tribunal will accept its jurisdiction unless the contrary is obvious 
and clear. Yet it is not sufficient for a party to invoke provisions of a treaty in abstract. 
The provisions at the basis of the request must be applicable and sustained by relevant 
facts put forward at the time of the request. The court has to establish its jurisdiction 
rationae personae, rationae materiae, rationae temporis and rationae loci.
598
 The 
competence rationae materiae is the most controversial, as the tribunal needs to analyse 
to some extent the content of the norms invoked in order to determine whether the 
dispute falls under their scope. Often the responding party will claim the norms forming 
the basis of the request are not applicable to the facts in question. The court is then 
faced with the possibility of overruling the merits. But the case-law has been consistent 
in its application of the prima facie test as a low threshold,
599
 as opposed to the phase of 
preliminary objections to the jurisdiction, taking place before the phase on the merits 
(as it suspends the proceedings) but not in urgency, where the question of jurisdiction is 
examined definitively yet the Court cannot prejudge the merits either.
600
 They do not 
share the same analysis of their jurisdiction over the merits. 
The advantage of this accelerated and superficial analysis is that even in the doubt of an 
overlap between different allegedly applicable treaties and their dispute settlement 
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mechanisms, the tribunal will accept its jurisdiction.
601
 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
cases, for example, the ITLOS accepted its prima facie jurisdiction, which was ultimately 
revoked by the arbitral tribunal, as it based its jurisdiction on a regional treaty excluding 
its jurisdiction according to UNCLOS. By accepting its prima facie jurisdiction, however, 
the tribunal could freeze the ongoing situation, temporarily prevent Japan from 




ii. Urgent risk of irreparable harm 
The fact provisional measures are granted when there is a risk of irreparable harm (or 
prejudice) is the main reason they are relevant in an environmental context. Provisional 
measures must be taken only when an urgent reaction is needed and when – if the 
tribunal does not intervene – it will cause an irreparable damage. In other words, the 
notions of urgency and irreparable prejudice are at the very heart of the institution of 
provisional measures.  
Irreparable harm is a “concept [which] does not relate to the rights as legal positions […] 
but to the substance of the right”.
603
 It is concerned with the impact on the concrete 
situation protected by the right. This makes it very important for environmental 
protection. It has long been established that the damage can be legal or factual.
604
 
The criterion of urgency was first developed by the courts but it has since been codified 
in some instruments, such as Article 290 (5) UNCLOS. It requires that measures are 
immediately necessary at the time they are requested. As Rosenne said, “the substantive 
implication of urgency is to ensure that […] no action taken pendente lite by a State 
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engaged with another State in dispute before the Court can have any effect whatsoever 
as regards the legal situation which the Court is called upon to decide”.
605
 
From an environmental law perspective, the development of the “precautionary 
approach” has had a significant impact in the court’s approach to the notions of 
irreparable harm and urgency. The balancing exercise tribunals must pursue has been 
influenced by the precautionary approach, although not consistently and 
homogeneously. In some other cases, such as the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the lack 
of an explicit link between urgency and the precautionary approach has been criticised. 
In his separate opinion, Judge Treves said expressly that provisional measures under 
article 290 UNCLOS have a natural affinity with the precautionary approach and that 
“a precautionary approach seems to me inherent in the very notions of provisional 




An important aspect courts have to determine is the threshold when risks become worth 
protection. And the determination of such threshold should be influenced by the 
precautionary approach. Indeed, the meaning of what a risk of irreparable harm is can 
have different consequences on the perspective the court takes on provisional measures. 
The key problem in assessing whether harm is irreparable and the situation urgent is the 
uncertainty of the situation created by the alleged violation of one party to the dispute. 
With the application of the precautionary approach, the party that requests the measures 
will have to comply with a lower threshold. Because states have an obligation to prevent 
or reduce future harm, within or outside their territorial boundaries, the tribunal will be 
more inclined to order provisional measures for the same purpose. However, judges 
have not been unanimous. 
Moreover, the ITLOS is specifically able to grant provisional measures when there is a 
risk of serious harm to the marine environment. Despite this it has failed to allocate such 
measures for the prevention of serious harm to the marine environment under Article 
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290(1) UNCLOS in the both the Land Reclamation and MOX Plant cases.
607
 In 
particular, in the MOX Plant case, Judge Treves explained the reason why the tribunal 
was not able to recognise the urgency of the situation: 
“Scientific evidence linking risks to the marine environment specifically to the 
commissioning of the MOX plant within the relevant time-frame was not 
substantial and focused enough to permit discussion of whether or not such 
evidence was conclusive as to the causal relationship between the activity 
envisaged and the risk to the marine environment.”
608
 
The question of the weighing of evidence by international tribunals has been examined 
in the previous chapter and is applicable to provisional measures as well. Overall, 
because the harm to the marine environment can only be factual (as opposed to a legal 
harm), the proof of such harm requires stronger evidence, which can explain why 
tribunals have not granted many provisional measures under this heading. The Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case stands out precisely because it was acknowledged that the stock was 
endangered, so such fact needed not to be proven.
609
 
If the requesting party fails to sufficiently prove the existence of a risk of irreparable 
harm, the procedure ends there and the tribunal will not grant such provisional 
measures. Establishing a risk of irreparable harm is not yet enough to grant provisional 
measures on its own, however, because this risk must be related to the alleged rights of 
the parties.  
iii. Link between the rights and the measures 
One of the requirements developed by the courts is the proof of a connection between 
the measures granted by the court and the dispute over the merits needing to be 
established. Since provisional measures are incidental (they take place within a 
procedure), they must relate either directly or indirectly to the subject of the dispute on 
the merits otherwise another dispute is created. 
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As Kolb said, this condition is “functional and causal”, because it is necessary to the 
proceedings and because provisional measures cannot exist without an existing dispute. 
However, this condition can “also limit the scope of the provisional measures that the 
Court may indicate proprio motu”. He further sustained that “‘[n]ot to aggravate the 
dispute’ and to protect the procedure against external challenges are two elements that 
are sufficiently connected to the very subject matter of the dispute”.
610
 For environmental 
protection, the stance on the necessity and scope of this condition is crucial, focusing in 
particular on the question of whether the link has to be direct or may be indirect. The 
protection of the environment is a very factual protection, which depends on a legal 
right, but which needs a very concrete approach. So the relation between the legal right 
and its counterpart in the “real world” must be the drive to order provisional measures. 
Therefore, the more the order is embedded in the factual situation, the more efficient 
it is for the environment. It means the tribunal needs a slightly broader margin of action, 
which is precisely given by the purposes of non-aggravation or extension of the dispute 
or the maintenance of the status quo. As stated above, these objects are related to the 
subject of the main dispute, albeit in an indirect way. In the jurisprudence, the tribunals 
recognised their power to grant provisional measures indirectly, based on the prevention 
of the aggravation of the dispute. This approach is not consistent, however, and in the 
more recent jurisprudence, the ICJ especially seems to have limited its margin of 
appreciation with the “plausibility test” (below section 4.6.iv). 
The links between the measures and the rights invoked can be direct or indirect, 
meaning the tribunal will justify taking provisional measures on the grounds of either the 
protection of the parties’ rights or the protection of the situation. Exemplifying the first 
possibility, in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case, the 
Court mentioned that “the Court must be concerned to preserve by [provisional] 
measures the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either 
to the Applicant or to the Respondent”.
611
 Similarly, in the Convention on Racial 
Discrimination case, the Court said that “the rights which Georgia invokes in, and seeks 
to protect by, its Request for the indication of provisional measures have a sufficient 
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connection with the merits of the case”.
612
 Exemplifying the second possibility, in the 
Frontier Dispute case, where the Court said that “armed actions within the territory in 
dispute could result in the destruction of evidence material to the Chamber’s eventual 
decision”.
613
 In the  Indus Waters Kishenganga case, the arbitral tribunal said that 
“discretion from the Court in the form of interim measures […] is necessary to “avoid 
prejudice to the final solution” of the present dispute as it may be prescribed in the 
Court’s eventual Award”.
614
 In the Land Reclamation case, the ITLOS said that “given 
the possible implications of land reclamation on the marine environment, prudence and 
caution require that Malaysia and Singapore establish mechanisms for exchanging 
information and assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation […]”.
615
 These cases 
represent the scenario where tribunals protect the situation where states exercise their 
rights, instead of their rights directly. 
It is important to mention that when provisional measures are granted on the basis of 
the protection of rights, it does not mean the measures themselves will be narrower. In 
the Certain Activities case, for example, the measures awarded are based on the 
protection of Costa Rica’s rights. Nevertheless, they are generous.
616
 It is not because it 
is based on the narrower and direct link between the measures and the rights that the 
provisional measures ordered will be narrower as well. Broader grounds for granting 
provisional measures are necessary because they give more possibilities for states to 
request provisional measures successfully. 
iv. Plausibility of the alleged right 
This condition is connected to the previous one which required a link between the 
measures and the rights invoked. The “plausibility test” goes further in the sense that 
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not only a link must exist, but the alleged right itself must be plausible. This condition 
has not always been required by the ICJ. Indeed, there has been a shift in the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ from the affirmation in the Frontier Dispute case in 1986 
(followed in the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria in 1996 
case and in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case in 2000)
617
  stating 
that: 
“Independently of the requests submitted by the Parties for the indication of 
provisional measures, the Court or accordingly, the chamber possesses by virtue 
of Article 41 of the Statute the power to indicate provisional measures with a 
view to preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it 
considers that circumstances so require”.
618
 
As seen above, by emphasising the possibility that the Court can indicate provisional 
measures to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute, it means the regime of 
provisional measures is not restricted to the alleged rights of the parties. Provisional 
measures are an attribute of the judicial function as such, and are therefore not strictly 
dependent on the parties’ rights. Despite this, in the later decisions of the ICJ, the 
conditions upon which the Court would grant provisional measures include 
automatically the analysis of the “plausibility test”. The jurisprudence in that sense 
shifted because it seems the Court forgot the other ground for provisional measures to 
be granted, and only analysed the criterion based on the rights of the parties on the 
merits. This is also mentioned by Judge Sepulveda-Amor as the Court “appear[s] to 
make the “plausibility” of rights a definite requirement for interim protection under 
Article 41 of the Statute”.
619
  
In the Certain Activities case, the “plausibility test” was examined as a necessary 
condition to grant provisional measures, based on the affirmation that provisional 
measures are concerned with the “preservation of the respective rights of the parties 
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pending [the Court’s] decision”.
620
 Similarly, the Court said both in the Questions 
Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data case and the 
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment in the Case Concerning the Temple of Preah 
Vihear case that it “may exercise the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by it to 
belong to either party. Therefore, the Court may exercise this power only if it is satisfied 
that the rights asserted by the requesting party are at least plausible”.
621
 
Following this trend, the ITLOS used the plausibility test for the first time in its order 
on the “Enrica Lexie” Incident case.
622
 Previously, it has not mentioned the plausibility 
test as such, but it can be argued it includes it in the examination of the prima facie 
jurisdiction. The reason why the plausibility test may have been included in the analysis 
on prima facie jurisdiction is that it is a specialised tribunal with a particular scope, which 
makes its jurisdiction depend on the alleged rights of the parties. But it seems much 
sounder to make the jurisdiction depend on the rights of the parties rather than the 
decision on the types of measures. Indeed, in the ARA Libertad case for example, the 
tribunal said that  
“the Tribunal does not need to establish definitively the existence of the rights 
claimed by Argentina and yet, before prescribing provisional measures, the 
Tribunal must satisfy itself that the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear 
prima facie to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal might be founded.”
623
  
This connection between the existence of rights and the basis for jurisdiction seems 
much sounder than the extraction of a plausibility test as a separate test in a tribunal with 
restricted jurisdiction. 
In the ICJ, a first debate has emerged about the scope of the “plausibility test”. On the 
one hand, some judges strongly disagree on the use of the “plausibility test”, qualifying 
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it as “inconsistent with the settled jurisprudence of the Court, according to which the 
applicant has to demonstrate that an existing right is threatened and needs to be 
protected”.
624
 In this sense, the plausibility test is lowering the threshold as a consequence 
of its vague phrasing. On the other hand, some are in favour, because it specifies the 
threshold which ought to be “something more than assertion but less than proof”.
625
 
Secondly, it has been argued that the use of the plausibility test is justified to avoid 
prejudgement on the merits. This argument proves to be unreliable, especially since the 
Court was criticised precisely because its analysis of the plausibility of the rights led to a 
deeper analysis of the rights.
626
 
In the Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, Pakistan raised an interesting point about 
the difference in the Indus Waters Treaty between the existence of “interests” rather 
than “rights” upon which the granting of interim measures depends. It further contended 
that “it is enough that Pakistan has an interest in not having these claimed rights 
prejudiced pending the decision of this Court”.
627
 
Since provisional measures can be granted for many non-exclusive and alternative 
reasons, their dependence on the alleged rights of the parties should not be automatic. 
Having a link between the right and the measures is necessary, however. This condition 
means that if the right exists, a connection must be established between the right and the 
measures. It is more a practical condition, to make the procedure efficient. However, 
the “plausibility test” means the tribunal must know whether the right exists or not.  
Although any tribunal has to consider how the incidental procedure relates to the case 
on the merits and therefore establish some connection, the “plausibility test” does not 
answer that question. So what are the legal principles used to constrain the competence 
of the court at the incidental level? Thus far, the Court has been relying on two 
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safeguards to prevent the incidental procedure to be unrelated to the merits, namely the 
prima facie jurisdiction and the irreparable harm requirement.  
The basic requirement of prima facie jurisdiction is relevant in the discussion around 
the need for the “plausibility test”, precisely because the court has to examine at the first 
place whether it has jurisdiction over the dispute. In order to answer the question over 
its jurisdiction, the court or tribunal will need to look at what rights are invoked by the 
parties. It is especially clear in specialised courts with a limited scope, such as the ITLOS 
(when it is not based on its compulsory jurisdiction) or an arbitral tribunal, since their 
competence depends on the type of rights or obligations relied on the parties. It is more 
complex in the case of the ICJ, which has a general jurisdiction as the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations, but the same can be sustained. 
It could be therefore argued that when the court looks at its prima facie jurisdiction, it 
already satisfies the “plausibility test”. As Judge Abraham said, the tension is about how 
restricted the review over the substance of the case should be,
628
 and if we take the view 
of Judge Cançado Trindade that there should be an autonomous legal regime of 
provisional measures,
629
 the review of the court over the substance cannot be strong. 
Therefore, the analysis of the prima facie jurisdiction coupled with the need for a link 
between the measures and the dispute should be enough.  
A second safeguard exists: the risk of irreparable harm. Indeed, the court needs to know 
what is harmed by a conduct or omission of a party. In analysing this, it also satisfies the 
requirement of the incidental nature of provisional measures.  
The consequence for the protection of the environment of the automatic use of the 
“plausibility test” is that it sets another threshold for indicating provisional measures, 
which does not take into account the developments of environmental protection as the 
conditions of urgency and irreparable harm do.  
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The idea of creating an autonomous regime of provisional measures can be achieved if 
unanimity is found in the notion that the test of the prima facie jurisdiction added with 
a thorough analysis of the risks of irreparable harm could potentially offer enough of a 
justification to create the link with the dispute on the merits. However, the jurisprudence 
has asked for more. Not only must the tribunal appear to have jurisdiction, but a link 
between the rights and the measures must exist and the rights alleged must be plausible. 
It is a question of threshold where the tribunal considers it has enough power to grant 
specific provisional measures. The same can be said for the existence of an irreparable 
harm. Through the analysis of the harm caused by the actions or omissions of the 
defendant, the tribunal must consider what is harmed.  
4.7 Types of measures 
The measures themselves ordered by the different international courts and tribunals are 
interesting to analyse, especially in relation to environmental disputes. This is because 
judges have shown creativity in the specification of the measures. Depending on the type 
of measures, they may concretely achieve different purposes within the dispute.  The 
courts and tribunals have shown a great variety of measures, but there are three main 
relevant types, namely measures imposing obligations on the respondent only, measures 
focused on the cooperation between the parties and also common obligations, and 
measures that create a regime with their complexity and adaptability. 
i. Unilateral acts of the defendant 
Different tribunals ordered the respondents to cease the alleged violation and prevented 
them from taking further action. It happened in relation to the protection of the 
environment in the Nuclear Tests case, the Land Reclamation case, and the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case, among others. The measures taken are good examples of the 
preventive effect of provisional measures and the courts clearly imposed the allegedly 
violating states to stop their actions. In the Nuclear Tests case, the ICJ indicated that 
“the French Government should avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radio-active 
fall-out on Australian territory”.
630
 Similarly, in the Land Reclamation case, Singapore 
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was directed “not to conduct its land reclamation in ways that might cause irreparable 
prejudice to the rights of Malaysia or serious harm to the marine environment”.
631
 
Finally, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the ITLOS also prevented Japan to catch 
more Bluefin tunas than what was agreed by the parties, including the catches in the 
name of the experimental fishing programme in the total number of catches.
632
 These 
measures are similar as the “wrongdoer state” is obliged to stop its activities until the case 
is decided on the merits or by the arbitral tribunal appointed for the merits. The 
measures are directly influencing the environmental protection of the object of the 
dispute.  
Although it has not been used many times in practice, the enforcement of such measures 
is clearly enunciated in Articles 95 (1) and (2) of the Rules of the ITLOS, and less 
obviously mentioned in the Rules of the ICJ. The latter only mentions in Article 78 that 
“the Court may request information from the parties on any matter concerned with the 
implementation of any provisional measures it has indicated”. The former creates a 
formal obligation for the parties and requires them to “submit an initial report upon the 
steps it has taken or proposes to take in order to ensure prompt compliance with the 
measures prescribed” (Article 95 (1) of the Rules of ITLOS). Such actions have been 
required by the ITLOS in the Land Reclamation case,
633
 as well as by the ICJ in the 
Certain Activities case, where  
“the Court also directed each Party to inform it, at three-month intervals, as to 
compliance with the provisional measures. By various communications, each of 
the Parties notified the Court of the measures they had taken with reference to 
the aforementioned Order and made observations on the compliance by the 
other Party with the said Order.”
634
 
The existence of such a mechanism strengthens the position of the court in the following 
up of its orders. It emphasises the fact provisional measures are meant to have concrete 
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impacts on the behaviour of the parties. Provisional measures do not merely have a 
declaratory effect; they exist in order to have a tangible impact on countries’ conduct.  
Furthermore, it is not just international courts and tribunals that have imposed unilateral 
measures on one of the parties, but the parties themselves have also taken active steps 
before the procedure reaches its endpoint. Indeed, the mere fact of asking for 
provisional measures can sometimes trigger anticipated reactions by the alleged “guilty” 
party, which will then take initiatives unilaterally to avoid that provisional measures are 
granted against it. In the Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain 
Documents and Data case, for instance, between the moments Timor-Leste filed a 
request to file a dispute before the ICJ and the public hearings for provisional measures, 
Australia provided the Court with various undertakings the Attorney-General gave to 
satisfy Australia’s compliance before the Court ruled.
635
 Similarly, during the Indus 
Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, India decided to unilaterally comply with one of the 
requested measures, which was to notify Pakistan of any “actual or imminent 
development or steps […] that would have significant adverse effect on Pakistan’s rights 
or interests”.
636
 During the hearings – before the Court decided anything – India 
voluntarily committed to respect one of Pakistan’s requests. Although these voluntary 
actions are evidence of the party’s good faith, they do not replace a formal order granted 
by an international court. The ICJ still ordered some provisional measures for Australia 
to respect despite its efforts to show its compliance. The Court did not reject Australia’s 
efforts but it formally issued its opinion nonetheless. These voluntary acts do not replace 
the binding power of a provisional measure order.  
ii. Strengthening of the cooperation between the parties 
One of the recurrent types of measures is the obligation to cooperate. A famous example 
of this obligation is given in the MOX Plant case by the ITLOS as it stated that  
“the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution 
of the marine environment under Part XII of the Convention and general 
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international law and that rights arise therefrom which the Tribunal may 
consider appropriate to preserve under article 290 of the Convention”.
637
  
This statement is important not only for the meaning of the prevention of pollution, but 
also for provisional measures orders. It shows that international courts and tribunals can 
develop orders more complex than simply unilateral orders. 
Interestingly, the ITLOS indicated measures to cooperate between the two parties, not 
only between themselves, but also by establishing a group of independent experts. The 
appointment of an external body to assess the situation had the effect of devolving the 
power to decide on more specific measures that are dependent on the scientific findings. 
In the Land Reclamation case, the tribunal prescribed a general obligation for the two 
parties to cooperate, but left it to the experts’ panel to investigate whether the operations 
conducted by Singapore have adverse effects, in which case it would propose new 
measures. Indeed, the experts’ mandate was clearly set out by the tribunal and the 
experts were given one year to fulfil it. Parties were also ordered to exchange information 
regularly. Moreover, when the tribunal appointed independent experts, they were 
specially monitoring that the states’ actions are well implemented. They added a layer 




The tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case did not create itself an independent 
expert team, but it helped the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna to do so. Although this last case was rejected on the merits, the order on 
provisional measures helped the parties to collaborate and create an independent 
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This new mechanism will lead to the creation of more complex regimes, as analysed 
below, with different purposes and responsibilities.  
iii. Regime creation 
While international courts and tribunals (especially the ICJ) might have been restrictive 
in their approach towards the regime of provisional measures, it is interesting to look at 
the measures themselves, and see whether a pattern can be drawn that can be particularly 
interesting when applied in an environmental context. In some cases, the court went 
further than just imposing independent advisors on the parties to help them collaborate 
better, and created systems of guarantors. In this system, the third party is involved in a 
sort of monitoring process created by the measure.  
This practice can be grounded in a broader conceptual approach towards the amplitude 
of choice of measures by the tribunals. In the context of the prohibition of the use or 
threat of force, the ICJ has had an expansive approach in the measures it chose to grant. 
As Judge Cançado Trindade underlined: 
“[i]n those previous three cases [Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of 
Mali), Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Armed Activities 
on the territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda)], the 
Court, in indicating provisional measures of protection, most significantly went 
beyond the inter-state dimension, in expressing its concern also for the human 
persons in situations of risk, or vulnerability and adversity”.
640
 
In other words, the Court created a regime that goes beyond the interests of the parties. 
It is not one single state who benefits from the provisional measures, rather the 
irreparable environmental harm caused is of concern of all. In these cases, serious 
human rights violations were at stake, which appeared to justify such measures. Whether 
they could be granted for environmental violations as well is a significant question. The 
threshold seems to relate to the gravity of the situation. 
There are two main examples to support this idea of creating a new regime within the 
realm of a bilateral dispute through the use of a separate established body: the Certain 
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Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area case
641
 and the Temple of Preah 
Vihear case.
642
 In the former, the ICJ ordered the parties to cooperate through a 
specialised organisation, the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention
643
 and in the latter 
case through ASEAN. The Court delegated the responsibility to multilateral regimes to 
ensure better cooperation between the parties and to respect the provisional measures 
order.  
In particular, the Court directly empowered the Ramsar Secretariat to supervise and 
guarantee the actions taken by Costa Rica in the area under dispute are consistent with 
the Court’s order. The Court refers to this specific Secretariat because the disputed area 
is composed of wetlands, which are protected under the Ramsar Convention and the 
two parties of the dispute are member-states of the Ramsar Convention. Indeed, the 
Court indicated that “Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar 
Convention in regard to the actions [of dispatching civilian personnel charged with the 
protection of the environment]”.
644
 The Ramsar Secretariat is given an active role, since 
Costa Rica cannot take action without previous consultation to it. In other words, its role 
is to guarantee the good execution of the provisional measure granted by the Court. In 
that sense, they make sure the order is enforced by the parties.  
Moreover, in the second request for provisional measures Costa Rica filed two years 
later regarding the same area of wetlands, the Court reiterated that “pending delivery of 
the Judgment on the merits, Costa Rica shall consult with the Secretariat of the Ramsar 
Convention for an evaluation of the environmental situation created by the construction 
of the two new caños”.
645
 A continuous thread may be drawn between the measures. 
Allotting responsibility to a multilateral treaty body also allows a number of measures to 
be taken under the umbrella of the broad measure ordered by the court. It also allows 
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for the creation of interrelations between both the different bodies and the various 
actions to be taken. The series of measures are not isolated, but become part of a bigger 
picture, part of a regime. By confirming its first order, the ICJ endorses this approach. 
Another characteristic of these measures involving a third party is the potential 
incremental development of the measures. Indeed, as mentioned above, the fact they 
create an umbrella under which a series of other measures can be taken also allows the 
organisations in charge of the implementation of the measure to reflect the passing of 
the time. They are more flexible and capable of adjusting, in order to respond to the 
evolving circumstances. This is especially important because the parties can request 
other provisional measures if the circumstances evolve. In the Pulp Mills case, Argentina 
tried to obtain provisional measures two times, on the basis the situation had changed. 
In that sense, by creating such a regime with a third party would allow us to take into 
account such changes.  
In sum, the inclusion of another institution in the judgments shows the permeability of 
different regimes, and a positive outcome of their interactions. The tribunal 
acknowledged that the applicable legal framework was multilateral, and therefore the 
dispute was of concern of all the parties to that framework. Judge Sepulveda-Amor 
emphasised that “the fact that wetlands are interconnected means that their 
environmental protection requires a wider bilateral collaboration and the full assistance 
of the Ramsar Secretariat”.
646
 It introduces a third actor in the procedure, which, 
although not active within the judicial procedure, plays a direct role in the management 
of the dispute. The court embraces the existence of obligations erga omnes partes and 
acts upon it. It takes into account the multilateral nature of the rights invoked. The 
measure taken in the Request for Interpretation of the Temple of Preah Vihear decision 
case is a great example since it obliges the parties not only to cooperate with the help of 
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Since the Court can decide provisional measures proprio motu, it opens to a variety of 
measures, and this case is an example of adaptation of the ICJ towards the developments 
of international environmental law. In a way, the tribunal exercises the role of an external 
party, with the defence of other interests (or values) than the interests of the parties. The 
tribunal not only guarantees the good administration of justice, but it is argued the 
provisional measures granted in those two cases may be interpreted further as the 
recognition of interests (or values) common to the international community.  
4.8 Conclusion 
This analysis of provisional measures in an environmental context shows they contain 
some permeability, since they are designed to adapt fast to harmful situations. This 
chapter highlighted good practices in awarding provisional measures. They are an 
important tool for solving environmental disputes: both their incidental nature and the 
variety of different measures on offer provide a great springboard from which the court 
or tribunal can leap to pursue decisions that will assist the protection of the environment.  
Moreover, the nature of the right invoked by the party plays a role when it comes to 
choosing the right measures to order. If, however, the tribunal decides to use provisional 
measures in the purpose of non-aggravation of the dispute, a broader set of measures 
are available. In the MOX Plant case, for example, Judge Anderson argued the measures 
granted were outside the scope of the preservation of the rights of the parties.
648
 It can, 
however, be argued that they were within the scope of the non-aggravation of the dispute. 
Indeed, the existence of provisional measures for the purpose of preventing the 
aggravation of the dispute is a window of opportunities for environmental disputes. 
Although international tribunals are trying to reduce their margin of appreciation and 
lose the important factor of autonomy given to them by the relevant statutes (especially 
through the indication of measures proprio motu), the relevance of provisional measures 
remains as the choice of measures is wide. The Certain Activities case is a great example 
of judicial creativity and interaction between regimes, which is a positive development 
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for the future. It also shows that a tribunal can integrate a third actor in the resolution of 
the case indirectly and therefore represent other interests than the primary interests of 
the parties. Such practice also enhances collaboration between the parties, key to better 
prevention of environmental harm. 
Moreover, when the object of protection is common to the international community, 
the fact international courts and tribunals can grant provisional measures proprio motu 
becomes crucial. Such judicial freedom – exercised through international courts and 







5. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JUDICIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND NON-COMPLIANCE 
PROCEDURES 
This chapter focuses on the enforcement of multilateral environmental treaties (MEAs) 
and the role of international adjudication in this context. Indeed, most of the MEAs 
include provisions both about traditional enforcement mechanisms and non-compliance 
procedures. Non-compliance procedures are separate treaty-based procedures which 
have been created only in the context of environmental protection, as a response to 
dissatisfaction with the inappropriate use of traditional enforcement mechanisms. In 
other words, non-compliance procedures were created to respond to the specificities of 
international environmental obligations, as an alternative to international courts and 
tribunals.
649
 They are endogenous to a specific treaty, in opposition to international 
adjudication, which is an exogenous mechanism independent from any treaty institution.  
The rationale for this chapter to focus on non-compliance procedures is based on the 
raison d’être of non-compliance procedures: they exist to offer a different and separate 
way of enforcing environmental obligations. In case of potential violations, states could 
bring claims to non-compliance mechanisms. Therefore, the purpose of such 
mechanisms is not far from the purpose of formal international courts and tribunals; it 
therefore questions the use of international courts and tribunals per se. Hence the need 
to identify the ways in which both procedures can collaborate – if at all.  
Non-compliance procedures are embracing the ideas of another type of compliance 
theory.
650
 Indeed, compliance can be viewed as a process of interactions between 
regulators and those who they regulate (theories of regulatory process).
651
 They consider 
compliance to be a flexible concept, with the idea of self-regulation as the backbone.
652
 
This conception is based on concepts other than judicial enforcement, which believes 
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in binding legal decisions by an independent body as the authority to decide on the 
violation of an international rule. Judicial settlement leaves no room for hybrid situations 
where one state is not complying yet is not condemned. Despite opposite theoretical 
backgrounds, both systems have similar aims: they want states to comply again with the 
rules by which they abide. The means to achieve those aims are, however, different. 
Since the purpose of the thesis is to clarify the role of international courts, and if we 
acknowledge international adjudication has potential for developments in hearing 
environmental cases, the question of its relationships with non-compliance procedures 
has to be answered. A core question must be whether or not both mechanisms are 
“competitors” excluding each other or “guarantors” working together, and which of 
these cases is better for environmental protection. In other words: how do they interact 
and could potential coordination enhance environmental protection? To this end, 
technical differences between non-compliance procedures and international 
adjudication will be emphasised, leading to the analysis of the different models on which 
their relationship can be based. At a practical level, the different legal principles that can 
be used to fill the gaps will be analysed, as well as certain elements of collaboration 
between the two systems. 
The main feature of non-compliance procedures is that they are based on dispute 
avoidance rather than on dispute settlement, and therefore have a facilitative nature. 
However, these can become corrective if non-compliance persists.
653
 The difficulty with 
this lies in diversity: each non-compliance procedure can vary considerably from one 
another. Moreover, not all multilateral environmental agreements have developed such 
non-compliance procedures to the same degree. The first successful example of a more 
complex procedure was established under the Montreal Protocol
654
 in 1992, which 
created its own permanent “Implementation Committee”.
655
 On the contrary, CITES 
distributes the compliance review between the Secretariat and the Standing Committee, 
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where the two bodies share competence.
656
 However, the UNEP Guidelines on 
Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
657
 were 
precisely about gathering the common practices among the MEAs and putting them 
together in a unique text. The task of information gathering, reporting control, data 
analysis, monitoring, financial support and capacity-building are all present in the tasks 
of a compliance committee.
658
  
Although non-compliance procedures are led by the principle of dispute avoidance, 
their nature is far from clear. It is generally agreed that they are not judicial in nature
659
 
but there seems to be little agreement beyond that on what non-compliance procedures 
are. 
One reason for such disagreement is that the technical differences between non-
compliance procedures and judicial procedures are numerous, and can be interpreted 
in different ways. Some specific characteristics weigh more than others in the 
determination of the nature of non-compliance procedures. And depending on the legal 
nature assigned to them, the relationships with international courts and tribunals will 
vary. Among others, non-compliance procedures have been described as diplomatic 
procedures sui generis (as opposed to judicial procedures) and particular procedures 
have been identified as quasi-judicial.
660
 But they also have been labelled as 
administrative procedures as part of a “wider category of non-confrontational avoidance 
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 In this same trend, they have been characterised as “supervisory 
mechanisms” that exert “continuous review and evaluation [of the] effective 
implementation” of the Convention (as exemplified in Article 15 of the Basel 
Convention).
662
 Thus, it has been suggested that what differentiates these procedures 
from judicial mechanisms is: 
“[t]he general lack of procedural safeguards for the Parties involved in the 
process; the minimal consideration of burden of proof issues; and the fact that 




Another way of differentiating the role of non-compliance procedures from judicial 
dispute settlement is to analyse their purposes. The general aim is to provide a non-
confrontational solution to potential problems with the implementation and 
enforcement of the treaty. Most of the procedures exist to “facilitate”, “promote” and 
“assist” Parties to comply with their obligations.
664
 Some mechanisms emphasise the 
“distinctive collaborative spirit of the Convention”, as well as the need for the 
compliance committee to always “secure a constructive solution”, or even in the 
Montreal Protocol regime to “secure an amicable solution”. The manner in which a 
compliance committee has to achieve this aim shall be “simple, non-confrontational, 
non-adversarial, transparent, supportive and cooperative”.
665
 Shibata deducted from the 
difference of purposes in non-compliance procedures and judicial bodies that both 
systems can “coexist without prejudicing each other.”
666
 Does that mean that they are not 
related at all? Is the functional difference a barrier for their interactions? A potential 
danger may arise in allowing the two procedures to interact, based on the recognition of 
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an overlap, because despite the fact the nature of non-compliance procedures is debated, 
they lack major features specific to judicial bodies. Admitting an overlap would mean 
elevating the non-compliance procedures to an equal institutional footing as the 
judiciary. However, the fact they are dependent on political instruments should prevent 
them from being related to judicial dispute settlement. They belong to the category of 
diplomatic instruments and should not be interpreted extensively. 
In contrast, some compliance mechanisms are closer to adjudication. Thus, Boisson de 
Chazournes and Mbengue have compared the Kyoto Protocol mechanism with 
international adjudication based on the identification of the core features of international 
adjudication. What makes the Kyoto Protocol mechanism quasi-judicial is the presence 
of some elements that are essential for a judicial body
667
, especially its clear distinction 
between the Facilitative Branch and the Enforcement Branch.
668
 The major difference 
in the case of the Kyoto Protocol regime is that the recommendations taken by the 
Branches are not dependent on a final approval by the COP, i.e. they do not need to be 
adopted by the COP to enter into force. The possibility to appeal to the COP against 
one of the branches’ decision is the only restriction to the branches’ power.
669
 
However, we classify them, in the context of international environmental law, 
compliance mechanisms have a specific role to represent the interests of the treaty, and 
therefore acquire a special status. Thus, it has been argued that trying to fit non-
compliance procedures into a known category is not possible, because “they are a genus 
on their own”.
670
 However, if they are to be completely separated from general dispute 
settlement mechanisms, fragmentation of the law is more likely to happen. Therefore, 
it will be argued in this chapter that clearer and well defined relationships between non-
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compliance bodies and judicial bodies will enhance the whole system of enforcement. 
Nonetheless, arguing in favour of a clearer relationship between non-compliance 
procedures and judicial bodies does not entail conflating their roles. It is not because 
the process of each procedure impacts on the other that they may be conflated. Their 
roles are different and separate, and the analysis will show the extent to which they 
overlap, bearing in mind they are meant to play the same role in the enforcement of 
international environmental rules. 
5.1 Differences and similarities between the compliance mechanisms 
In order to understand what kind of relationships the two systems have, it is necessary 
to analyse the differences between traditional adjudication and non-compliance 
procedures. Both systems are centred on contrasting concepts, so it is critical to know 
where they overlap. Indeed, it is necessary to compare exactly where they differ and 
therefore what consequences may be drawn. The two systems diverge on a number of 
issues: when and how can be triggered, by whom, who they concern, when they operate, 
who are they composed of, and their decision-making processes and outcomes.  
This exercise tests the permeability of non-compliance procedures to a certain 
“judicialisation”. Although the aim of this section is not to decide whether a non-
compliance procedure equates to an international court or tribunal
671
, it demonstrates 
the blurred lines between an institution created as judicial and the different mechanisms 
created within MEAs. 
i. Triggers 
All non-compliance procedures contain the Party-to-Party trigger – the closest to an 
adversarial mechanism. Although the existence of a legal dispute is not a requirement
672
 
to initiate the procedure, the party-to-party trigger shows the more adversarial nature of 
the procedure.  
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In this case, some procedural rules mirroring litigation exist creating a higher threshold 
for states. Indeed, in numerous regimes, only an “affected state” can make a submission 
to the compliance committee about another Party’s non-compliance
673
, which creates a 
threshold when a case can be submitted by a Party. It restrains the inclusiveness of the 
process to only affected Parties of the agreement, criticism often made regarding 
international courts and tribunals. The bilaterality of the judicial process (as examined 
in a previous chapter) and its restrictive rules on standing are reflected to some extent in 
non-compliance procedures.  
Other rules limiting the trigger mechanisms for states exist. Some regimes, for example, 
prevent Parties from making a submission against another Party without having informed 
the concerned Party
674
 or having undertaken consultations to try to resolve the matter
675
. 
The former requirement resembles the rule stating judicial procedures should be 
triggered only after other diplomatic means have been exhausted. Although non-
compliance procedures do not ask for the existence of a dispute as such, a state cannot 
trigger such procedures without at least informing the other party. The latter 
requirement creates some procedural safeguards, establishing a threshold under which 
submissions are not admissible, when they do not emanate from the secretariat. They 
concern the form of the submissions and the quality of the information contained. For 
instance, under the LRTAP regime, a “submission [by another Party] shall be addressed 
in writing to the secretariat and supported by corroborating information” (emphasis 
added)
676
. Another common safeguard giving some discretion to the compliance 
committee is the “de minimis or ill-founded” clause. It exists under the Cartagena 
Protocol regime for instance, where the compliance committee has to reject submissions 
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that are “de minimis or ill-founded”
677
. The Rotterdam Convention COP has not yet 
adopted a non-compliance mechanism but the latest draft articles also provide for the 
exclusion of cases de minimis or manifestly ill-founded.
678
 Although the exact meaning 
of a de minimis case is still open, the LRTAP Committee, as an attempt to define this 




However, beside the Party-to-Party trigger, four major differences
680
 – or innovations – 
from international adjudication can be found in the different non-compliance 
procedures, namely: the self-trigger when a state, accepting it is itself in non-compliance, 
wants help to comply again; the trigger by the administrative organ of the treaty; the 
trigger by the compliance committee itself; and the peculiar trigger by members of the 
public, which is the most innovative mechanism. First, the different triggers will be 
analysed and then it will be argued they should be treated differently from a Party-to-
Party trigger. 
The self-trigger is used by a state when it knows it will not be able to respect its obligations 
and seeks assistance before “getting caught”. The Montreal Protocol Non-Compliance 
Procedure explains that the reason why a Party would announce its lack of compliance 
is to show that despite its best and bona fide efforts, special circumstances prevented it 
from complying.
681
 For instance, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea foresaw its 
non-compliance in 2013 for the next three years, due to “delays in the disbursement of 
funds for the institutional strengthening renewal project … and the lack of approval for 
its HCFC phase-out management plan”.
682
 By admitting its non-compliance, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea requests assistance and puts its case in the 
                                                 
677
 Par. IV (1)(b). 
678
 Par. 17 of Annex to Decision RC-6/9. 
679
 Document ECE/EB.AIR/2014/3, par. 48. 
680
 For a complete survey of the different triggers, see Francesca Romanin Jacur, ‘Triggering Non-
Compliance Procedures’ in Tullio Treves and others (eds), Non-Compliance Procedures and 
Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (TMC Asser 2009). 
681
 MOP Decision X/10 (1998), Annex II, par. 3 (UNEP/OzL.Pro.10/9). 
682
 Report of the Implementation Committee under the Non-Compliance Procedure for the Protocol on 
the work of its fifty-third meeting (UNEP/OxL.Pro/ImpCom/53/4), par. 42. 
205 
 
forefront. Indeed, the Implementation Committee considers its case “as a matter of 
urgency”.
683
 The self-trigger is the direct expression of the non-confrontational nature of 
the non-compliance procedure. 
The second difference is the possibility for an organ of the treaty to trigger the 
procedure. Widely adopted as well, this trigger allows the administrative organ – the 
secretariat – which receives the reports and data to point out where there might be a case 
of non-compliance and then refer it to the compliance committee.
684
 It is important to 
note the Secretariat’s power is not discretionary as it may not refer the case to the 
compliance committee without the obligation to do so, but its power is rather mandatory 
so that the Secretariat shall bring the matter to the compliance committee after a certain 
period meant to be used to resolve the issue as exemplified in the LRTAP Convention 
regime
685
and in the Aarhus Convention regime
686
 for example. Moreover, once the 
Secretariat brought the issue to the compliance committee, the former has to proceed 
to the examination of the case, without specific mention of an applicable threshold for 
admissibility. It assumes that the Secretariat already excluded de minimis or ill-suited 
cases. 
The compliance committee itself can also be entitled to review compliance generally, 
particularly used for the review of the Parties’ reporting obligations. The 
Implementation Committee under the LRTAP Convention, for instance, reviews 
general matters relevant to compliance and especially reviews compliance with the 
Parties’ reporting obligations. It “evaluated compliance by Parties with their emission 
data reporting obligations under the seven Protocols in force on the basis of information 
provided by the secretariat. The evaluation covered the completeness and timeliness of 
reporting”.
687
 The compliance committee will not need a referral by the Secretariat, and 
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will assess systematically how many Parties have submitted the reports. In addition, it 
will then make a recommendation to these Parties to comply again. This general 
competence changes drastically from the role of an adjudicatory body. It therefore does 
not depend on the submission by an organ or Party, but can start a procedure on the 
basis of the information at its disposal.  
Lastly, a special mechanism exists under the Water and Health Protocol regime, where 
the Implementation Committee can take the initiative to request a Party to provide 
necessary information when it becomes aware of a possible non-compliance, on the basis 
of information received from the public.
688
 The Implementation Committee has the 
discretion to decide whether the information received from the public is valuable and 
worth pursuing, but it still gives the opportunity for an NGO or an individual to point at 
a possible non-compliance. This trigger is similar to the mechanism under the Aarhus 
Convention regime
689
, whereby members of the public (individuals or NGOs) can trigger 
a non-compliance procedure.
690
 The submission of communications from the public to 
the Compliance Committee shows a will to make the process more open to all parties. 
It allows members of the public to submit a claim that a state party is in non-compliance, 
subject to the fulfilment of some admissibility criteria.
691
 These criteria give the 
opportunity to the compliance committee to reject certain issues when they are brought 
anonymously, when they are abusive, manifestly unreasonable or incompatible with the 
object of the treaty. They spell out a certain definition of what other treaties call de 
minimis or ill-suited cases. These two examples show the flexibility of non-compliance 
procedures and their adaptability to the object of protection of the treaty they are 
implementing. Whereas international adjudication is strictly initiated only by states, 
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states have agreed to give voice in a procedure reviewing their behaviour to individuals, 
members of the public. 
Procedures initiated by these different triggers have to be analysed separately from the 
party-to-party situation. Despite having similarities with judicial bodies in general, the 
role of non-compliance procedures changes drastically from being a mere tool for a third 
party to assess and interpret the law and its potential breaches by the Parties.  
ii. Compositions and Procedures 
The composition of the compliance committees influences their independence from 
the Contracting Parties to the treaty. Indeed, the compliance committees are never 
composed of all parties to the treaty they are enforcing but by a smaller group of experts, 
from eight to fifteen members. States have – in early mechanisms – opted for the 
members to be representatives of the contracting parties, instead of being completely 
independent experts, with the view of representing the different geographic regions in 




In more recent cases, the members of the compliance committee are elected as 
representatives but have to be objective.  In other cases, the members of the committees 
are completely independent from the political body, as in the Aarhus Convention 
regime, where the members of the Compliance Committee “shall serve in their personal 
capacity”.
693
 Under the Water and Health Protocol regime, the members also “shall 
serve in their personal capacity and objectively, in the best interest of the Convention”.
694
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol regime, they “shall serve in [their] individual capacity …, act 
in an independent and impartial manner and avoid real or apparent conflicts of 
interests”.
695
 Most of the non-compliance procedures contain clauses on conflicts of 
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 prohibiting both direct and indirect conflicts. The experts themselves of a 
compliance committee should have a “recognised competence” in the field of the treaty 
“including legal or technical expertise”.
697
 The Aarhus Convention regime even adds that 
members should be “persons of high moral character”,
698
 a characteristic borrowed from 
the International Court of Justice.
699
  
Those rules show that members of compliance committees are not representing their 
national states’ interests, and therefore guarantee a certain degree of independence. 
Compliance Committees are not mere organs of the Convention they implement; they 
represent the interests of the Convention itself in the name of the community of states 
parties to it. In that sense, as they act as an autonomous entity from the states, they can 
be related to international courts and tribunals.  
Leaving aside the political dependence of members of some compliance committees, 
the internal procedure leading to the adoption of a recommendation also shows some 
crossovers with international adjudication. The rules of procedure are in general adapted 
to the specific treaty and vary in their level of detail. Moreover, although some elements 
can be found in multiple agreements, they do not follow a common system.
700
 The 
question of the existence of procedural guarantees and their development in non-
compliance procedures has been thoroughly analysed by Montini, who observes they 
are “of a different nature and degree than those normally available in judicial 
proceedings”.
701
 Yet they exist, such as the right to be heard, in the way that the Parties 
concerned can participate in the procedure, generally in writing and by submitting 
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comments and information. They will, however, generally be excluded from the 
elaboration and adoption of the recommendation. The under-development of such 
procedural rules is a reason why non-compliance procedures cannot be called judicial 
per se. But the more the non-compliance procedures are formalised, the more they 
resemble a judicial procedure. Indeed, such a trend has been noticed in the regimes of 
the Aarhus Convention,
702
 the Espoo Convention,
703
 and the Kyoto Protocol.
704
 
iii. Types of review 
A distinction must be made between the fact-finding side of a compliance committee’s 
tasks and its legal determination of non-compliance, which is based on the different 
functions expressed in the various non-compliance mechanisms and the material being 
reviewed. A compliance committee is always entitled to review the information about 
the relevant facts, such as the submission of specific reports and data on emissions of 
limited substances, but is also entitled to “make recommendations … on systemic 
compliance issues … or on individual situations of possible non-compliance” in the case 
of the of the London Convention regime for example.
705
 Indeed, a compliance 
mechanism is empowered with the review of general issues of compliance, always 
directed by the COP/MOP. It also pursues reviews on a case-by-case basis. 
The first function of the review process has merely a fact-finding purpose.
706
 It does not 
aim at stating and interpreting the law in any sense, but rather focuses on the facts, the 
circumstances and causes of non-compliance.
707
 Compliance committees review the 
information states have given them on national implementing laws, they also review that 
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specific bodies or administrative roles are created to enforce those laws. In the case of 
the Montreal Protocol regime, this included data showing that the levels of forbidden 
products or pollution have not effectively increased. This function is related to a certain 
type of obligations contained in the MEAs. These obligations can be labelled as 
obligations of surveillance, because they intend to make sure states regulate and control 
activities – often made by non-state actors, such as industrial companies, etc. – 
susceptible to lead to violations by the states of the substantial obligations.
708
 What is 
therefore needed from the states is that they make sure the obligations are transcribed 
and respected under their jurisdiction. It explains that obligations are either about 
collecting, analysing and sharing information on scientific data about the amount of 
emissions created in a period of time, or the state of a species under protection. It also 
explains about obligations that force states to submit information about its legal 
implementation of the treaty.
709
 An advanced example of a mechanism facilitating 
information exchange is the Biosafety Clearing-House operating under the Cartagena 
Protocol.
710
 It is a database available online for the exchange of information from state 
parties about their decisions on the release of Living Modified Organisms, on risk 
assessments or on their national laws. State parties have an obligation to submit their 
information to this Clearing House. Because of the nature of these obligations reviewed, 
a part of the work of a compliance committee is continuous. Indeed, it reviews parties’ 
compliance on a regular basis, every time they have to submit a report. 
In conjunction with this type of review, compliance mechanisms can interpret the 
information and assess their legality. Indeed, the second function resembles much more 
the function of a judicial body, as it gives scope to the compliance committee to analyse 
the facts in light of the applicable legal framework. For example, in relation to the 
Clearing House created under the Cartagena Protocol, the Compliance Committee is 
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empowered to “consider information submitted to it”
711
 and will therefore be able to 
decide on a state’s non-compliance of its information sharing obligation. 
The same Compliance Committee will be also able to use the information submitted to 
the Clearing House to “review general issues of compliance”
712
 with its own will. This 
separate function translates the instrumental nature and dependence of the compliance 
committee on the COP/MOP since it is commanded by the latter.
713
 Indeed, despite the 
fact it is given the opportunity to flag up what could be improved by a group of states or 
by all the state parties, it can only do that within the mandate given by the COP/MOP. 
When the compliance committees are limited to a fact-finding function, it is easier to 
see how they could be considered as evidence by international courts and tribunals in 
their own procedure. However, the capacity of compliance committees to deliver 
reporting review of general scope goes beyond what an international court or tribunal 
can do because it considers compliance issues in a multilateral way. So it is difficult to 
argue for a hierarchical relationship with judicial institutions in this case. And in specific 
cases over a particular state’s compliance, they make a legal decision on the compliance 
of that state. When they do so, they almost adjudicate the situation. Therefore, a 
separation can be made between the scientific and administrative role and the legal role 
of non-compliance mechanisms. 
iv. Outcomes 
Kingsbury explains that the purpose of the compliance committee under the Montreal 
Protocol regime is to “build cooperative relations by refraining from challenging data 
submitted by particular countries where possible non-conformity with Protocol rules was 
outweighed by the more fundamental interest in keeping the country moving in the 
direction required by the Protocol”. It seeks to “build trust and authority among state 
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 The Secretariat “induces states to invoke the non-compliance procedure 
rather than simply to seek a blanket five-year waiver from the Meeting of the Parties”. 
Therefore, dialogue with the Committee is crucial.
715
 This type of measures can be 
categorised as “political adjustments and compromise”.
716
 By contrast, international 
courts and tribunals are asked to remedy the violations committed which will have a final 
and definitive status, and which will be legally binding.  
On the other hand, compliance mechanisms can be used in a more corrective way, such 
as in the case of the recommendations from the Implementation Committee of the 
LRTAP Convention regime: 
“Szell, Keizer and Kuokkanen have identified three main elements in the 
recommendations of the [Implementation Committee]: first, there must be a 
conclusion of non-compliance. Second, the Party concerned is urged to fulfil its 
obligations as soon as possible. Third, the Party concerned is requested to 
provide a periodic progress report to the IC.”
717
 
The “de facto determination of a party’s compliance or non-compliance”
718
 is necessary 
for the exercise of the corrective sanctions. It is a pre-condition allowing the compliance 
committees to then decide on further specific sanctions. There are different ways to 
pressurise a party; if the party does not respond to the first signal from the compliance 
committee, urging it to come back to compliance, it will have to provide a periodic 
progress report, which means a Party is required to provide a timetable framing the time 
needed to return to compliance, and to explain the measures it will undertake to do so. 
Milano emphasises that “the purpose of these requirements is to put pressure on the 
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Parties in question to bring about full compliance as soon as possible”
719
, sign of a 
disciplinary decision.  
In sum, the effects of the recommendations made by non-compliance committees can 
be either facilitative or more corrective. In the former case, the compliance committee 
will provide assistance to the Party and help it bring itself back into compliance. In the 
latter case, the compliance committee can impose sanctions such as the suspension of 
rights in the Montreal Protocol regime.
720
 Some stronger regimes have even established 
non-exhaustive lists of possible measures that may be taken by the compliance 
committee.
721
 Some weaker regimes give less room for manoeuvre to their compliance 
committees in the elaboration of corrective sanctions, such as the Basel Convention and 
the Aarhus Convention, which require some form of consent by the party in violation 
on the choice of sanction. Indeed, the compliance committees have to decide the 
outcome “after coordination” with the party concerned, or should decide “in agreement” 
with the Party, or in “consultation with the party”.
722
 
This contrasts with judicial remedies, as international courts and tribunals will decide on 
the individual responsibility of states for breaches of international law, which gives rise 
to the award of remedies for the injured party to the proceedings. Remedies can only be 
awarded to the party requesting them. Whereas non-compliance procedures look for a 
collective approach to sanctions using peer-pressure mechanisms, international courts 
and tribunals are bound to award remedies to the plaintiff.  One innovation provided by 
the creation of non-compliance procedures is the possibility of finding different solutions 
to non-compliance. In particular, the fact it can work with a community of states to 
improve compliance
723
 is something an international court is not yet able to do as such.  
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However, there could be some developments in the future. Indeed, since remedies 
depend significantly on the type of obligation violated (see chapter 4.1), they could be 
adapted to multilateral obligations, or even erga omnes obligations. The type of 
substantive obligation breached would determine the recipients of the obligation of 
reparation. The tribunal would analyse which states are entitled to reparation and what 
kind of reparation. If the wrongful act in question is of a non-bilateral type of obligation, 
it means the remedy sought by the court would adapt accordingly. In other words, if the 
obligation is of erga omnes character, the entire community of states could be asked to 
do something. Interestingly, in the Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ 
expressly declared that in cases where erga omnes obligations are violated – in this case 
by Israel’s construction of a wall in Palestinian territory – “all States are under an 
obligation not to recognise the illegal situation” and “not to render aid or assistance in 
maintaining the situation created by such construction”.
724
 However, such a statement 
was part of an advisory opinion, as opposed to a contentious case, and therefore non-
binding. Although the Court gave instructions to states, they did not qualify per se as 
remedies. Moreover, the issue with judicial remedies remains: a judicial body is limited 
to the responsibility of the wrongdoer brought before it. 
Furthermore, judicial remedies are more focused on retrospective aspects of reparation 
and therefore do not contribute as much to the future compliance of wrongdoers. 
However, there is a possibility for judicial bodies to award prospective remedies. These 
remedies are specifically provided for in Article 30 of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility, and oblige states to cease the wrongful act and to guarantee the non-
repetition of the wrongful act. Cessation is the “negative aspect of future performance” 
and assurances and guaranties are the “positive reinforcement of future performance”, 
with a preventive character.
725
 These remedies are relevant only in the case where the 
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obligations breached are continuing.
726
 It has emphasised the adequacy of these remedies 
for breaches of ongoing obligations.
727
  
However, the ICJ has refused to order specific guarantees of non-repetition in numerous 
cases, explaining that there were no circumstances to justify such an order, as the good 
faith of the violating state in implementing the judgment should be presumed.
728
 
Guarantees of non-repetition are awarded only in certain cases under “special 
circumstances” – a criterion that has not been defined more precisely so far. For 
instance, in the Certain Activities in the Border Area case, special circumstances did not 
exist despite the fact the Respondent Nicaragua had previously failed to comply with the 
first provisional measures order already. The non-compliance with the first provisional 
measures order did not justify granting guarantees of future non-repetition in the eyes of 
the Court. This was because Nicaragua complied with the second provisional measures 
order issued two years after the first one.
729
 
Circumstances justifying the award of such prospective remedies have been found in the 
LaGrand case. In this case, the violation was not isolated to a certain set of facts, but 
could reoccur if there was no change in the domestic legal practice of the United States. 
Moreover, the consequences of a future violation of the same rule were likely to be 
irreversible. On the contrary, in the Certain Activities case for example, there was no 
further legal reason to believe that Nicaragua would repeat its violation in another factual 
context. The state was legally equipped to prevent future violations of the same rule, and 
there was no sufficient evidence demonstrating its bad faith in applying international 
obligations. In the Construction of a Road case, the ICJ reaffirmed this perspective when 
it refused to grant the remedy sought by Nicaragua because the obligation breached by 
Costa Rica i.e. the “failure to conduct an environmental impact assessment does not at 
present adversely affect the rights of Nicaragua nor is it likely to affect them.” (emphasis 
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added). It shows the illegal conduct is terminated and therefore there is no reason why 
the Court should specifically ask Costa Rica to cease the illegal act. 
Generally, judicial remedies are not originally intended to promote compliance, 
although certain developments have been noticed. On the other hand, a 
recommendation from a non-compliance committee is based on the concept of future 
compliance. Its structure itself links to the concept of what compliance means, which 
can vary from one mechanism to the other, and even within one mechanism, depending 
on the type, degree or frequency of the non-compliance. It reflects the broader 
distinction between countermeasures and amicable solutions.
730
 Moreover, 
recommendations from non-compliance committees aim primarily at changing the 
future behaviour of the state, whereas judicial remedies – although some prospective 
remedies exist – are not so strong on this issue. 
v. Status of Compliance Decisions 
There are different issues with the outcomes of a recommendation made by a 
compliance committee. First, how are they adopted? Consequently, are they binding?  
The outcomes of a compliance committee’s conclusions have been viewed as political 
rather than legal because of their adoption process.  
First, the decisions are only named “recommendations” or “draft decisions” to 
emphasise their non-binding nature. And the expressions used by compliance 
committees are not authoritative, such as when they “urge”, “request” or “call on” the 
party to comply again.
731
  
Second, the process of adoption does not end when the recommendations by the 
compliance committees are taken, but those recommendations have to be endorsed by 
the COP/MOP. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, the LRTAP Convention and the 
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Aarhus Convention among others,
732
 it is true the procedure can be described as a two-
stage procedure.
733
 The role of the COP/MOP must be emphasised, as they will in most 
cases be the body conferring a legal effect on the compliance committee’s decisions. 
This is a consequence of the relationship between a compliance committee and the 
COP/MOP of the treaty. Indeed, a compliance committee is in most cases a subsidiary 
body of the COP/MOP. Therefore, the outcome that should be taken in consideration 
is the one taken by the COP/MOP, “on behalf of the compliance committee”, if it is a 
clear subsidiary body, or according to the compliance committee’s recommendations if 
it is not a subsidiary body, but just another treaty body. This has been considered not to 
affect the independence of the compliance committee vis-à-vis the COP/MOP
734
, 
although it questions the legal nature of the recommendations themselves. The 
Montreal Protocol Implementation Committee, for instance, “shall report to the 
Meeting of the Parties, including any recommendations it considers appropriate” and at 
the same time, “after receiving a report by the Committee the Parties may decide upon 
and call for steps to bring about full compliance with the Protocol”. Thus, the final 
decision rests with the COP/MOP. This is a political decision and the COP/MOP may 
ultimately reject or modify the recommendations by simple vote. A different process 
takes place with judgments made by DSU panels and the Appellate Body, which are 




As a result, the compliance committee being rarely entitled to decide on a party’s non-
compliance without the adoption of a decision by the COP/MOP, the effects produced 
by the recommendations themselves are unlikely to be considered as binding. They 
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need to be endorsed by the COP/MOP to produce binding effects on the states parties 
to the multilateral environmental agreement. 
In practice the COP/MOP does not challenge the findings of the compliance committee 
but reinforces its statement. The COP/MOP indeed transcribes the draft decisions of 
the Implementation Committee as they were, without any intention to review or question 
them; a practice that derives from the status of a subsidiary body. Indeed, practice 
demonstrates that recommendations of compliance bodies can have an effect even 
before they have been adopted by the COP/MOP. For instance, the report of the 53
rd
 
meeting of the Implementation Committee (14-15 November 2014) found 
Liechtenstein in non-compliance with Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol and therefore 
drafted a decision “urg[ing] Liechtenstein … to report the required data”,
736
 and by the 
time the MOP met a week later (17-21 November 2014), Liechtenstein had already 




From the example of Liechtenstein and the LRTAP Convention regime, it can be 
concluded that the recommendations have the same weight as the decisions taken by the 
COP/MOP de facto. Nonetheless, the possibility of the COP/MOP changing or even 
not adopting the recommendations made by the compliance committee remains. This 
is the biggest hurdle that prevents non-compliance procedures from being apolitical, 
unlike an independent judicial tribunal, where decisions are directly binding.  
One exception must be mentioned: the Kyoto Protocol mechanism is independent from 
the political body. The only possibility for the COP/MOP to have a say in the procedure 
is in the case of an appeal, but decisions taken by the branches do not need to be adopted 
by the COP/MOP. This is one of the reasons why the Kyoto Protocol mechanism has 
been qualified as quasi-judicial.  
The importance for the parties to a multilateral environmental agreement that the effects 
of a compliance committee remain non-binding has been considered as a key element 
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for the successful functioning of the non-compliance procedures.
738
 Indeed, the reasons 
why states agreed on such “invasive” non-compliance procedures are so they can choose 
to prioritise other interests if needed.  
However, the fact the recommendations are never binding does not mean they do not 
produce effects on the determination of the law, as this chapter examines. Kingsbury 
argued that the recommendation about “Russia’s non-conforming conduct might 
exclude some remedies for breach of treaty”.
739
 In this view, despite their non-
bindingness, they have consequences on general international law, especially the law on 
state responsibility.
740
 Indeed, they do not trigger state responsibility as such, and cannot 
determine the wrongfulness of an act,
741
 but some recommendations can influence such 
concepts. 
vi. Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, the debate around the nature of non-compliance mechanisms has not 
been resolved since it has proven difficult to justify which characteristics should be 
prioritised over others. Apart from their non-confrontational, supportive, cooperative, 
facilitative nature, to name a few characteristics enumerated in some foundational texts 
of non-compliance procedures, it is not clear in which category they belong or if they 
are a category on their own.  
Although the purposes for which they have been created are clearer, some of the work 
of a compliance committee can be seen as contradictory to its purposes. Indeed, what is 
similar to an adjudicative process and a non-compliance procedure is the Party-to-Party 
trigger, which takes places in a straight-forward manner. It resembles a traditional dispute 
in the sense it is more adversarial: a state will complain about another state’s violation of 
a treaty-rule. It will generally have to complain either to the specific compliance 
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committee or to the secretariat. The party triggering the mechanism can be required to 
be directly affected by the potential non-compliance. In the cases of the London 
Convention, the Basel Convention, the Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions (which 
have not yet adopted formally a non-compliance procedure), the texts require the 
affected Party to “undertake consultations with the Party whose compliance is in 
question” before triggering the compliance mechanism.
742
 These two conditions show 
that non-compliance procedures contain some elements common with international 
adjudication, associated with the creation of a dispute in a judicial sense. But some other 
regimes do not attach any requirement to a Party’s submission, such as the Montreal 
Protocol, the Aarhus Convention and the LRTAP Convention regimes where any state 




Compliance committees are also able to review states’ compliance in different ways. The 
review can be either of the relevant information required or of the legal obligations 
themselves, let alone the competence to review general compliance issues only at the 
request of the COP/MOP. The type of review they are using will affect the way in which 
they collaborate with judicial courts. The type of measures – facilitative or corrective – 
at the disposal of compliance committees also affects their role, but the question whether 
it affects the collaboration with judicial courts is unclear.  
Non-compliance procedures do not completely live up to the expectation of a purely 
multilateral and collective process. Indeed, Koskenniemi pointed at the contradiction 
between the concept of multilateral process in view of protecting collective rights to 
facilitate compliance and the need to find an “amicable solution” between the parties in 
conflict.
744
  Further contradictions can be found in the bilateral triggers, some of the 
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thresholds established for the admissibility of such claims, and the certain steps in the 
decision-making process of certain compliance committees.  
However, the current lack of judicial remedies for multilateral obligations and for areas 
beyond national jurisdictions may be a reason for a greater collaboration between non-
compliance procedures and international courts and tribunals. Indeed, it may be an 
efficient solution to defer compliance issues to non-compliance mechanisms when 
obligations breached are of multilateral or erga omnes nature. Moreover, the existing 
judicial remedies are mostly retrospective. Despite the existence of prospective judicial 
remedies, international courts and tribunals have awarded them scarcely. This is another 
reason for collaboration between non-compliance procedures and judicial bodies (see 
below 5.2.iv). 
5.2 Models of relationships 
Having discussed the nature of non-compliance procedures and how they differ from 
international adjudication, the chapter will now turn to the relationship between 
compliance procedures and traditional dispute settlement procedures involving courts 
and tribunals.  To begin with, it must be noted that no case has been brought before 
both a compliance committee and a judicial body; no such an overlap has happened 
until now. Although there has never been a situation in which the same alleged violations 
are submitted to a compliance committee and an international tribunal at the same time, 
it could happen in the future and determining more precisely how the two procedures 
can interact will help shaping each regime’s role. Indeed, the purpose of this chapter lies 
in the argument that potential collaboration between the two mechanisms can enhance 
the overall protection of the environment. 
Reviewing the case law of international courts and tribunals, the recent disputes with a 
multilateral environmental agreement for object are rare. The Whaling case between 
Japan and Australia/New Zealand is one of them, the Certain Activities Carried Out by 
Nicaragua in the Border Area case between Costa Rica and Nicaragua being the second. 
The two treaties involved are the Whaling Convention (ICRW) and the RAMSAR 
Convention and, interestingly, none contain a compliance control mechanism 
endogenous to the treaty. A central question must be, therefore: is there an inverse 
correlation between the fact a non-compliance procedure does not exist and the use of 
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international adjudication by State Parties to those treaties? Fisheries disputes are 
another illustration of multilateral treaties without an institutional mechanism of 
compliance and clear advice where disputes get settled in court. 
However, since the two mechanisms in some ways overlap
745
, the question of how they 
should interact with each other needs to be answered, that is, the jurisdictional rules 
applicable must be determined. To this end, it is necessary to find an organisational 
model to know which procedure should be used in the event of potential non-
compliance.  
Alongside the normative claims in support of either model of relationship, different legal 
tools are available, from both specific treaty rules and general principles of law, which 
can be used to define how the relationship between non-compliance procedures and 
judicial dispute settlement can be shaped practically. First, the express provision in most 
of the multilateral environmental agreements will be analysed as the basis for the 
relationship between non-compliance procedures and international courts and tribunals 
and then the analysis will focus on the relevant general principles of law potentially 
applicable in this case. Indeed, the only existing clause is the common “without 
prejudice” clause contained in most of the multilateral environmental agreements. But 
other principles may be applicable to the relationship between non-compliance 
procedures and judicial procedures, in order to try to clarify the system of enforcement 
in multilateral environmental treaties. 
i. The automatic use of non-compliance procedures before a judicial dispute 
settlement 
The first question to be answered is whether a non-compliance procedure should always 
be used before a formal dispute settlement mechanism. In that regard, two solutions 
have been advanced, with various justifications, either based on a hierarchical system or 
on parallel systems. If a hierarchical model is favoured, a state will have to use non-
compliance procedures before going to a judicial court. Moreover, the commencement 
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of a procedure before a compliance committee will prevent the commencement of a 
judicial procedure. If a parallel model is favoured, a state will be able to trigger any of 
the procedures, and rules to organise competing jurisdictions must be applied.  
Some scholars have taken the approach that non-compliance procedures should prevail 
over judicial procedures,
746
 because they consider that non-compliance procedures have 
a different purpose of dispute avoidance. As Klabbers argued, “the non-compliance 
procedure finds its raison d’être precisely in the attempts to defuse the adversarial or 
confrontational nature of dispute settlement, so why should it not be allowed to 
prevail?”
747
 Another argument has been advanced confirming the application of the 
hierarchical model, which is the application of the lex specialis principle. Indeed, in the 
context of the Kyoto Protocol, Boisson de Chazournes and Mbengue suggest 
considering the non-compliance procedure set up in the decision 27/CMP.1 and the 
subsequent relevant decisions as lex specialis, which would have as a consequence that 
the non-compliance procedure would take precedence over Art. 14 of the UNFCCC.
748
 
On the whole, the application of the hierarchical model means that a Sstate cannot 
initiate a formal adjudicative procedure before having submitted the conflict to the 
relevant compliance committee. Yet, the question of the impact of a decision by a 
compliance committee on a judicial procedure remains. 
However, it is also possible to sustain that the two procedures should evolve in parallel, 
as Treves affirmed that “non-compliance procedures and judicial procedures are 
independent, neither of which excludes the other. But some impacts are unavoidable 
and explainable in the light of international law.”
749
 One justification is that they are 
inherently different, as non-compliance procedures are non-confrontational. They do 
not affect any judicial procedure, especially since they can be triggered without the 
existence of a legal dispute as required in formal judicial procedures and because the 
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decisions are non-binding. Furthermore, Romanin Jacur
750
 argues that, in the case of the 
Montreal Protocol, the two procedures run in parallel, based on the negotiation of the 
non-compliance procedure and its “without prejudice” clause.  
Most non-compliance procedures contain a clause stating they should be without 
prejudice to the dispute settlement clause.
751
 For example, the Basel Convention NCP 
says that  
“the present mechanism shall be without prejudice to the provisions of article 20 
on settlement of disputes. In performing its functions under paragraphs 19, 20 
and 21, the Committee shall take into account any specific procedures provided 
for under the Convention concerning failures to meet Convention obligations”.
752
  
The meaning of this clause is not entirely clear. It explains broadly what happens when 
a procedure before an international tribunal is initiated while there is a pending non-
compliance procedure, but it does not give an answer for when there is a decision by a 
compliance committee and yet parties go to court. Koskenniemi is of the opinion that  
“It follows from the express reservation regarding Article 11 of the Vienna 
Convention in the preamble of the NCP … that the fact that an alleged breach is 
or has been under consideration in the Implementation Committee cannot 
function as a bar for invoking the jurisdictional clauses. Consequently, any party 
– including the allegedly defaulting state – may initiate the procedures in Article 
11 of the Vienna Convention either immediately upon the emergence of a 
dispute regarding the latter’s performance of its obligations or at any stage later, 
regardless of whether the matter has come up in the Implementation Committee 
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A similar analysis has been found for the Basel Convention, as the “without prejudice” 
clause permits dispute settlement procedures in spite of a pending non-compliance 
procedure.
754
 As a result, Scott came to the conclusion it meant that dispute settlement 
procedures are given a formal primacy over non-compliance procedures.
755
 To 
emphasise this view, the Montreal Protocol states that “the Meeting of the Parties may, 
pending completion of proceedings initiated under Article 11 of the Convention, issue 
an interim call and/or recommendation”
756
, which could interrupt the non-compliance 
procedure until the end of the judicial procedure. 
The main shortcoming of the “without prejudice” clause is that it does not provide with 
more specific rules on the consequences of the initiation of a procedure on the other.
757
 
It only states that the trigger of a non-compliance procedure should not prejudice a 
formal judicial procedure. At an operational level, the “without prejudice” clause as 
interpreted above supports the opposite view on hierarchical relationships between the 
two mechanisms. It would give priority to formal dispute settlement at the expenses of 
the non-compliance procedures. However, this sweeping interpretation may be 
considered too extensive,
758
 and therefore the “without prejudice” clause should be 
interpreted as supporting the model of parallel relationships, where the two mechanisms 
coexist, using the “without prejudice” clause only as an “interpretative tool”.
759
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The “without prejudice” clause would prevent a situation where the court has to dismiss 
the case because it is not admissible, such as in the Georgia v. Russian Federation case. 
In this case, the CERD treaty said diplomatic means must be exhausted before a judicial 
procedure can be started. If the precondition is not fulfilled, the judicial procedure is 
not admissible.
760
 But MEAs do not contain such a rule; just the opposite, the “without 
prejudice” clause does not prevent state parties from initiating a judicial procedure. 
Indeed, the clause can be qualified as “non-exclusive jurisdiction clause”, and does not 
“waive the right” of State Parties to pursue formal dispute settlement.
761
 
In addition, the “without prejudice” clause says nothing about the situation where a 
formal dispute settlement could prejudice a non-compliance procedure. Indeed, Sands 
noted that it “does not purport to apply in reverse”.
762
 Accordingly, the “without 
prejudice” clause, alongside the fact it does not define precisely the consequences of the 
initiation of a formal dispute settlement procedure on a (pending or future) non-
compliance procedure, it can be interpreted narrowly or extensively. In any case it does 
not make the initiation of a judicial procedure dependent upon the exhaustion of a non-
compliance procedure. Therefore, the hierarchical model of relationship cannot be 
sustained with respect to the “without prejudice” clause. Indeed, it favours a parallel 
model, where the two procedures do not obstruct each other. The State Parties have 
free choice between the two procedures. 
Knowing that, the parallel relationship still needs to be regulated. Three different 
situations can arise: the first occurs when one procedure is initiated while the other is 
already pending; the second is when a non-compliance procedure has decided on a 
matter then brought to a court or tribunal; the third one is when a judicial decision 
already exists and a non-compliance procedure is triggered afterwards. Each of these 
scenarios will be analysed below. 
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ii. The effects of the initiation of one procedure on the other 
The problem of having two procedures running concurrently must be resolved, to avoid 
contrary decisions, and to avert some unnecessary problems. Indeed, since there is no 
clear solution to the extent of the impact of one procedure on the other, one institution 
should wait until the other has decided. The following section will examine the extent to 
which the principle of lis pendens applicable is to the present case, as well as the doctrine 
of comity. These two general principles give a solution to the consequences of pending 
competing jurisdictions, but prove difficult to apply fully to the situation between non-
compliance procedures and judicial procedures. 
a. Lis pendens principle 
The lis pendens principle is a general concept normally only associated with effects that 
judicial procedures create between each other and helps solving the problem of 
competing jurisdiction. Competition between them occurs only when two features are 
present: the parties are the same in both procedures, and the same issues are raised.
763
 
Moreover, lis pendens is closely related to res judicata, as the lis pendens principle 
“anticipates the result which will ultimately obtain from application of the rule of res 
judicata” (analysed further).
764
 Therefore, the application of the lis pendens principle 
would suspend the second procedure. It would mean stricto sensu that the triggering of 
a non-compliance procedure prevents a judicial procedure from being initiated or vice-
versa. 
However, to what extent is lis pendens applicable to the relationship between non-
compliance procedures and judicial procedures? In other words: could non-compliance 
procedures also create lis pendens without being fully considered as judicial bodies? 
Some authors have been of the opinion that none of the general principles of 
litispendence and res judicata are applicable to non-compliance procedures. 
“The determination by the COP/MOP is not binding upon the Parties, if by 
“binding” we refer to the fact that the determination involves a finding of 
international responsibility, entailing a number of consequences under general 
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international law. It does not entail the application of the principles of res 
judicata or lis pendens.”
765
 
In this view, the non-binding character of a recommendation issued by a compliance 
committee prevents the application of lis pendens and res judicata.
766
 However, the 
contrary has been argued, suggesting the non-binding character does not affect the 
jurisdictions to be competing. Instead, the practical significance of non-compliance 
procedures to dispute settlement, together with their minimal practical differences with 
judicial bodies, has outweighed their non-bindingness.
767
 Indeed, in the case of the 
application of the lis pendens principle only, the binding character is not the decisive 
element, but the potential substantial overlaps are. The fact the non-compliance 
procedures can ultimately give a recommendation on the application of the same law as 
judicial procedures is enough to justify the application of lis pendens. 
Thus, in the case that lis pendens is applicable to non-compliance procedures, three 
criteria must be fulfilled: identity of parties, identity of object, and identity of ground.
768
 
The application of those principles on the relationship between non-compliance 
procedures and international courts and tribunals will depend upon the interpretation 
of these criteria. Although non-compliance procedures have broader rules on standing 
than judicial bodies (as seen in the aforementioned section on triggers), they can also 
overlap because of similarities of objects or grounds. But in that regard, different 
arguments have been advanced to justify that in particular, the identities of object and 
ground do not exist.  
First, concerning the application of the condition of identical parties, the fact the triggers 
are broader in non-compliance procedures than in judicial ones means that a lot of 
situations are excluded from the application of the lis pendens principle. The criterion 
of identical object between the two procedures poses a problem for non-compliance 
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procedures, because of their political nature.
769
 This criterion requires not only that what 
is decided must be identical, but also that the relief granted in the action (remedies) is 
identical. In this case, the difference is that the general outcome of a compliance 
committee decision is not to hold a party responsible for its non-compliance, but instead 
to help this party comply again by changing its behaviour. As mentioned before, the 
outcomes of a non-compliance procedure can vary between decisions that are 
cooperative in nature and those that contain sanctions. In the latter case, the principle 
of lis pendens might preclude the judicial proceedings coming after such a decision. In 
this case, the issue is again about the nature of the sanctions. Treves is of the opinion 
that even the sanctions taken by compliance committees go beyond what a judge or 
arbitrator can do, therefore having no impact on judicial proceedings.
770
 Indeed, if a 
judge finds a state in violation with international law, it will trigger this state’s 
responsibility and the judge will be able to order reparations. This is not a task that any 
compliance committee has been entitled to do. This criterion would exclude the 
application of lis pendens to all cases of overlap between non-compliance procedures 
and judicial bodies. Lastly, an identity of ground must be found between the two 
procedures, meaning the parties must have argued the same rights in both procedures. 
Another reason to dismiss the application of lis pendens is that it can be triggered without 
the existence of a dispute in the judicial sense, which means that there is no identity of 
object.
771
 However, the identity of reliefs and of grounds should not be interpreted 
restrictively, because if 
“only an exactly identical relief sought (object) based on exactly the same legal 
arguments (grounds) in a second case would be precluded as a result of res 
judicata, then litigants could easily evade this by slightly modifying”.
772
 
As a result, the application of the specific principle of lis pendens proves limiting since 
it excludes potentially all overlaps, by the fact that not only the parties can be different 
in numerous cases, and the identity of ground is difficult to be met, but also because the 
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fulfilment of the criterion of identity of objet might be impossible to ever fulfil if a 
restrictive interpretation is chosen. 
Since the lis pendens principle is not an appropriate tool to regulate a relationship 
between non-compliance procedures and judicial procedures, another principle must 
be relied upon to organise their relationship. Indeed, if no principle is applicable at all, 
triggering the second instance will result in having to ignore the existence of the first 
procedure, and there are chances that the decisions will be incompatible. This situation 
is avoidable if the second instance chooses to invoke the principle of comity. 
b. Doctrine of comity 
The doctrine of comity offers an alternative to the lis pendens principle, as it gives the 
opportunity to a court or tribunal to interrupt the proceedings until the other tribunal 
decides in respect of the other procedure. Shany explains that the doctrine of comity 
found in domestic legal systems “was invoked in situations of multiple proceedings to 
justify restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction and in the issuance of extraterritorial 
remedies, in order to minimise jurisdictional conflicts”.
773
 In this context, it was originally 
used as a “discretionary doctrine that empowered courts to decide when to defer to 
foreign law out of respect for foreign sovereigns” and was transformed into a “rule that 
obligates courts to apply foreign law in certain circumstances”.
774
 However, this general 
principle has not been applied consistently at the international level by courts and 
tribunals. Yet, when it has been used, it was considered as part of the inherent powers 
of a tribunal, as exemplified in the Pyramids case.
775
 Although this case was concerned 
with proceedings pending in a French domestic court and an ICSID arbitral tribunal, it 
has been considered as representative of the good use of the doctrine of comity by an 
international tribunal, especially because the ICSID tribunal decided to suspend the 
proceedings rather than decline jurisdiction, therefore preventing a situation where the 
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parties are left with no remedies at all.
776
 It is also important to mention the Separate 
Opinion of Judge Treves in the MOX Plant case, where the doctrine of comity is 
mentioned as a solution to parallel procedures.
777
 More importantly, the Annex VII 
tribunal set up for the MOX Plant case used the doctrine of comity as a justification to 
suspend the proceedings. It said that 
“bearing in mind considerations of mutual respect and comity which should 
prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called upon to 
determine rights and obligations as between two States, the Tribunal considers 
that it would be inappropriate for it to proceed further with hearing the Parties 
on the merits of the dispute”.
778
 
The doctrine of comity has been used in this case because the lis pendens principle was 
not applicable as such. Indeed, the parties to the MOX Plant dispute at the European 
level were not the same as the ones before the international arbitral tribunal. 
The practice of comity by international courts among themselves being already scarce, 
it might be considered inconceivable to broaden even more its application to concurrent 
proceedings with non-compliance procedures. The doctrine of comity, however is better 
suited to answering the question of the implications of the initiation of one procedure 
(either judicial or non-compliance) on the other pending one precisely because it does 
not require strict conditions to be fulfilled, and can be used at the discretion of the 
tribunal. Indeed, comity being a rule that can be considered “inherent to the proper 
function of judicial bodies”, it does not require specific rules to be used by tribunals.
779
 
It could be beneficial to use the doctrine of comity when the lis pendens principle is not 
applicable.  
This would apply consequently to non-compliance procedures since their work entails 
legal determination of one party’s non-compliance, but in the case that they only exercise 
their facilitative and advisory function, they should not be restricted at all. Indeed, when 
their purpose is to offer a political forum for the parties, nothing seems to prevent them 
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from doing so. As Koskenniemi said with the support of the Case Concerning Passage 
through the Great Belt, “the saisin of an arbitral or judicial organ prevents a definite 
determination of non-compliance by the Implementation Committee, but does not 
bring the attempts to reach an amicable solution to an end.
780
 Indeed, their political role 
would not be affected by a potential suspension through the application of comity. The 
diplomatic role of non-compliance procedures is not related to judicial procedures. 
Non-compliance bodies would still be able to perform their role as a negotiator and try 
to reach an amicable solution to the disagreement despite the existence of judicial 
proceedings. 
iii. The effects of a recommendation adopted at the end of a non-compliance 
procedure on a judicial procedure 
In the event that a non-compliance procedure has resulted in the adoption of a formal 
recommendation adopted by the COP/MOP, how should a tribunal react to this 
recommendation? Is the outcome of a non-compliance procedure final and does it 
therefore prevent the tribunal from making a decision on the same matter? Or can the 
tribunal reverse the decision taken by the non-compliance procedure? These questions 
of successive jurisdictions can be partially answered by the application of the res judicata 
principle. However, this principle does not cover all the cases of successive jurisdictions 
between non-compliance procedures and international courts and tribunals. Therefore, 
it will be analysed what are the options available to international courts and tribunals 
when they have to hear a case already decided by a compliance committee. 
a. Res judicata principle 
The doctrine of res judicata entails that the decision of an international court or tribunal 
is final and immutable. It prevents the same dispute to be adjudicated twice (ne bis in 
idem).
781
 Unlike the lis pendens principle, the res judicata principle is more broadly 
recognised in international law.
782
 Not only is the final character of the awards mentioned 
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 but it is also reaffirmed for arbitral 
decisions, such as in the Trail Smelter case, reaffirming that “the sanctity of res judicata 
attaches to a final decision of an international tribunal is an essential and settled rule of 
international law”.
785
 Concretely, the application of the principle of res judicata would 
prevent a judicial court from ruling on a situation that arose previously before a 
compliance committee and is dependent on the fulfilment of the same three criteria as 
for the lis pendens principle, namely the identity of parties, objects and grounds. 
The non-binding and political nature of non-compliance procedures is crucial to the 
application of the res judicata principle. It has been underlined by Judge Torres 
Bernárdez in his dissenting opinion in the Qatar v. Bahrain case:  
“[I]f it was not an international arbitration, how could the 1939 British “decision” 
(independently of its validity) be res judicata or have become so in international 
law? In fact, the 1939 British “decision is not the product of a jurisdictional organ 
or a political organ acting in casu in a jurisdictional capacity. Thus the “decision” 
cannot have the finality of res judicata; it does not express the legal truth (vérité 




Applied to the present relationship, it means international adjudication can give a legal 
answer to conflicts where non-compliance procedures – as a political means – are unable 
to give a suitable answer.
787 
Moreover, the principle of res judicata does not apply to 
recommendations issued by compliance committees because they are not binding. 
Therefore, the tribunal is allowed to review the same facts and the same dispute, because 
the nature of the procedure cannot be affiliated to a judicial legal process. However, 
Judge Torres Bernárdez mentions that “political organs acting … in a jurisdictional 
capacity may be able to create res judicata effects”. A difference could then be made 
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between the decisions by compliance committees producing corrective – or 
jurisdictional-like – and facilitative – or diplomatic-like – effects. Only in the former case 
would the res judicata principle apply to recommendations made by compliance 
committees, if the two other criteria of identical parties and grounds are met as well. 
Only in this narrow scenario would the non-compliance procedure produce res judicata 
effects. In the other cases, the international tribunal seized would be able to decide 
regardless of the existence of a non-compliance procedure, and the question of how it 
would use the non-compliance procedure arises.  
b. ‘Review’ by international courts and tribunals 
The question of a potential judicial review of a non-compliance procedure as a quasi-
judicial entity is linked to the idea of a judicial court functioning as a “supervisory” organ, 
or an “appeal” court in a sense. However, a problem is created by the fact procedural 
safeguards that exist in the non-compliance procedures are weaker than in a formal 
judicial procedure. Indeed, the principles of due process and fairness in proceedings are 
not guaranteed as formally and fully as in a judicial procedure, as well as the possibilities 
for the allegedly non-complying Party to defend itself.
788
 In other words, since the 
procedural safeguards are not as developed as in a judicial procedure, an international 
tribunal would be the first instance where those procedural safeguards are applied 
properly and therefore could not play the role of an “appeal” court.  
The question of judicial review of a non-compliance procedure as a political entity is 
linked to the idea of justiciability of political acts. The issue attached to a potential 
judicial review by international courts and tribunals is that it relates legally the two 
mechanisms. If the optimal situation is where they are clearly separated in principle as 
non-compliance procedures are considered political and judicial courts are considered 
legal, linking the two through a judicial review process can be dangerous.
789
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iv. The effects of a judicial decision on a potential future non-compliance 
procedure 
In this case, the non-compliance has not been triggered before a decision has been taken 
by a judicial body. What is the impact of this decision on a future non-compliance 
procedure? The first question is whether a judicial decision prevents a non-compliance 
procedure from being triggered, and the second question is whether there are 
possibilities of cooperation between the two institutions. 
The first effect of a judicial decision is its bindingness upon the parties to the dispute. 
According to the res judicata principle a non-compliance procedure cannot take the 
case. Indeed, the decision is binding and final and therefore not only binds the states 
part of the dispute and then involved in a non-compliance procedure, but also the 
compliance committee and the COP/MOP of the particular treaty.  
A non-compliance procedure can nonetheless play a complementary role. It would have 
to follow-up on the judicial decision. There are different ways for the non-compliance 
procedure to take action, even though a judicial decision exists, without compromising 
or re-judging the case. In addition, there are ways for the court or tribunal to include the 
non-compliance procedure as part of the execution of the decision. The cooperation 
between the two institutions is worth considering in an effort to bridge gaps and potential 
tensions between them. 
Denying the importance of the findings of a compliance committee in an international 
court or tribunal would encourage the idea that environmental regimes created by 
multilateral environmental agreements are self-sustaining in the sense that they have 
exclusivity over the application of their rules.
790
 This consequence is to be avoided 
precisely because multilateral environmental agreements and the following creation of 
non-compliance procedures should not work on their own. Hence, cooperation 
between non-compliance procedures and judicial tribunals should be promoted, which 
can take various shapes. The aforesaid analysis of the specificities of non-compliance 
procedures helps defining how cooperation can take place. The different types of review 
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by compliance committees, for instance, can be used differently by judicial courts. But 
how will the tribunal use it? 
a. Cooperation with fact-finding 
The first possibility is for the court to treat it as evidence. It is important to say that by 
analysing it as evidence, the court is not making a “judicial review”. But it is a review 
nonetheless, with the difference that it cannot affect the outcome of the non-compliance 
procedure. Indeed, the court cannot overrule the sanctions taken by the compliance 
committee but it can take them into account. The scope of the review is different from 
a review of the legality of the previous recommendation or decision since the parties to 
the judicial dispute would argue about the right interpretation on the basis of the result 
of the non-compliance procedure, but would not argue about the legality of the 
procedure. 
The use of the fact-finding reports by international courts and tribunal could strengthen 
their approach to scientific evidence. In the Certain Activities Carried Out in the Border 
Area (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), for example, the Court analyses the RAMSAR 
Convention and the work undertaken by its committees. Although the RAMSAR 
Convention does not create a non-compliance procedure, its scientific body issued 
reports on the status of specific wetlands located in the area under dispute before the 
ICJ. This use of fact-finding reports could also be developed by international courts and 
tribunals with regards to non-compliance procedures. 
b. Cooperation with the legal assessment 
The second type of review – the legal assessment that compliance committees make in 
order to decide on non-compliance – triggers more complex issues, especially if we 
consider the quasi-judicial nature of non-compliance procedures. Although their 
decisions do not create the status of res judicata, it does not mean that the analysis by 
compliance committees should be dismissed as such. If they are considered as a merely 
political process from which states receive only assistance (material and financial), 
international courts and tribunals could use them as a piece of evidence, as much as fact-
finding reports. The problem is that they are more than mere diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the non-compliance and less than judicial procedures, especially when they take 
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more corrective measures. Should we make a difference between those two types of 
outcomes? 
c. Cooperation with implementation of judgments 
Since both purposes of non-compliance procedures and international adjudication aim 
at rectifying illegal behaviours, collaboration between them regarding the 
implementation of judgments does not seem impossible. Indeed, non-compliance 
mechanisms have special tools to bring states back into compliance, which international 
courts and tribunals do not have. It is then possible to imagine some collaboration, 
especially through the way international courts award remedies. They could contain 
some deference to non-compliance procedures in implementing judicial decisions, 
especially when multilateral obligations are breached. Collaboration between the two 
different institutions could compensate for the lack of multilateral judicial remedies. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The whole system of enforcement benefits from a clearer understanding of the 
interrelations between non-compliance procedures and formal judicial dispute 
settlement. More precisely, although the raison d’être of the non-compliance procedures 
is to provide a flexible and non-confrontational mechanism, where non-compliance can 
be corrected and not punished, it can become less clear through the development of 
judicial-like procedural requirements and the application of sanctions. Therefore, the 
most distinctive aspect of the two procedures is eroded by the extension of the powers 
of non-compliance procedures. It is for this key reason that a closer analysis of their 
relationship with formal adjudicatory mechanisms is critical. 
Non-compliance procedures and judicial procedures do not compete against each other. 
They can be triggered independently from each other, but when one is triggered, it 
creates consequences that the other procedure cannot circumvent. Indeed, both can be 
triggered for the same legal issues, creating a situation in which an overlap between the 
two jurisdictions occurs and needs to be organised. This potential overlap can be 
exploited in the advantage of environmental disputes, especially in the case where a 
judicial procedure is triggered before a non-compliance procedure is. 
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In the spirit of clarifying the role of adjudication towards non-compliance procedures 
and vice-versa, there are situations when non-compliance procedures seem more 
appropriate. Indeed, it is important to remember some environmental obligations are 
more difficult to enforce in a bilateral setting. Therefore, the fact the obligation of 
reducing emissions of certain substances harming the ozone layer is not “bilateralisable”, 
for example, in the sense that another state will not be directly harmed by a violation. It 
is a case where non-compliance procedures may be better suited than international 
courts. Indeed, in the event a state violates such an obligation, it will be easier to argue 
the community of states that are complying will be taken in default and the object and 
purpose of the treaty will be violated – an argument that seems successful in a 
compliance committee. Compliance Committees exist precisely to represent the 
interests of the community of states of the treaty, rather than to apply the stricter rules 
on state responsibility before an international court or tribunal. When such an obstacle 
arises, the option of a non-compliance procedure can become a solution. However, it 
does not mean a judicial tribunal is not able to hear such community interests, as proven 
in the Whaling case where Australia did not justify its own harm to be the basis of the 
claim. With a greater use of the rules on participation in international adjudication, more 
cases will arise, blurring the lines between each procedure’s specific roles. Moreover, in 
the case that a dispute arises over a matter encompassing more than one multilateral 
environmental agreement, or other rules outside multilateral environmental agreements, 
an international court or tribunal might save some complexities that would emerge from 
the trigger of separate non-compliance procedures. 
Why is cooperation emphasised in this chapter? On the one hand, a key question is 
whether the collaboration between the two mechanisms could undermine the 
independent character of the judicial process by the use of a political decision 
objectively. Courts always use political decisions as evidence of certain practices or 
beliefs, but if they rely on such decisions as impartial and independent, it might impact 
on the impartiality and independency of the judicial process itself. As mentioned in the 
chapter, the arguments in favour of keeping the two procedures apart are strong, but a 
careful collaboration should not be prevented. On the other hand, cooperation is set 
within a broader concept of harmonisation of judicial decisions. Indeed, it is part of the 
idea to “encourage increased jurisprudential consistency and strive to contribute towards 
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the development of a more coherent ‘community of law’”.
791
 Moreover, cooperation is 
especially beneficial for international courts and tribunals as it defines more clearly their 
role and also strengthens their legitimacy. Indeed, one major consequence of their 
collaboration with non-compliance procedures is the inclusion of a multilateral process 
within the judicial process. The COP/MOP of the treaty adopts the recommendations 
made by the compliance committee by consensus and therefore represents all the parties 
to the treaty, so if an international tribunal uses this decision in its procedure, it means 
that it includes all the parties to the treaty’s views, rather than a decision coming from a 
limited number of judges, even in the case that other actors participate to the judicial 
procedure.  
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The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate that international courts and tribunals can 
adequately overcome certain procedural obstacles prominent in environmental 
disputes. The aim of the thesis itself was to rebut some of the easy assumptions about 
the role of international adjudication in the development of international environmental 
law. Mostly seen as inadequate, I wanted to see the extent to which the contrary was true. 
It can be now concluded that international courts and tribunals are equipped with 
procedural tools that can be adapted and interpreted in ways to accommodate 
environmental disputes. Indeed, judicial settlement of environmental disputes can be an 
effective mechanism to enhance environmental protection. Adaptation and 
interpretation of procedural tools are necessary, but in some instances, international 
courts and tribunals have already shown they are willing to adapt and interpret in a 
manner to respond adequately to environmental challenges. If they have not yet done 
so, practices identified in this thesis could be followed by international courts and 
tribunals without the need for radical change within the judicial institutions. 
The overall original contribution of this thesis consists of building a bridge between 
international adjudication and international environmental law. It has sought to establish 
a connection between the substantive rules forming international environmental law and 
procedural rules regulating international courts and tribunals. In presenting this research 
it has shone a light on the extent of the powers of international courts and tribunals, and 
analysed how these may be used profitably in an environmental context. By focusing on 
different procedural problems particularly prominent in environmental disputes, the 
thesis highlights the importance and intrinsic values of procedural rules.
792
 In doing so it 
offers a unified vision of how international environmental principles interact with 
procedural rules. 
The general framework within which international courts and tribunals develop is 
defined by the notions of independence, impartiality and judicial freedom. Indeed, 
seeds for greater applicability and broader judicial impact exist: they must now be used 
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appropriately. This thesis has pinned down where judicial bodies can make a difference 
for environmental protection. In other words, the contribution of this thesis in the wider 
context is to offer a unique, in-depth analysis of how judicial procedures can be 
strengthened. Indeed, specific procedures are highlighted throughout the thesis, showing 
how judicial institutions can use them more adequately and more authoritatively.  
Although international courts and tribunals always have to juggle with the sovereignty of 
states, which hinders their independence per se,
793
 emancipation of international courts 
and tribunals from states can happen through procedural choices and applications. 
Procedural developments indeed encourage more emancipation from the part of 
international courts and tribunals.
794
 
The arguments presented in this PhD may be located within a body of scholarship that 
tries to answer the question: what is the role of international courts in the international 
legal system at large, especially when other actors have potentially competing values or 
objectives? Helfer says that “an international court that is adroit at developing 
international legal norms … may, as a result, narrow the discretion of government 
policymakers or diminish state sovereignty”.
795
 In that sense, this thesis – by focusing on 
the weakest aspects of international adjudication in environmental disputes –emphasises 
the reality that international courts and tribunals cannot (and should not) be afraid to 
use their mechanisms as a counter-power to states and intergovernmental policymakers.  
Moreover, the thesis also contributes to the determination of the meaning of “judicial 
powers”. By analysing some of the structuring characteristics as defined by Hernandez,
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this thesis helps defining how far the judicial function has been taken by international 
courts and tribunals themselves. Indeed, each chapter has focused on particular 
procedural elements at every stage of the judicial proceedings, from their triggers to their 
remedies.  
The analysis included both the study of the powers international courts and tribunals 
have and how they have exercised their powers. In doing so, the analysis brought to light 
the best practices found throughout case law, and the potential role of international 
courts and tribunals in developing those powers based on these best practices. Overall, 
the thesis has identified where there is room for improvement, and how far international 
courts and tribunals have used the opportunities to develop practices favourable to a 
better adjudicative system responding to the specificities of environmental disputes. 
While the developments analysed in the thesis have not all come to fruition yet, the 
future looks promising. 
Throughout the different chapters, four main concerns have been tackled: the need for 
integration of the collective nature of certain environmental rules and the public element 
of adjudication, the judicial response to technical uncertainties, the need for more 
preventive actions, and the judicial response to environmental bodies (NCPs) competent 
in potential environmental disputes.  
The thesis first showed that the system of international adjudication is not closed to a 
bilateral setting, but can encompass multilateral elements of environmental disputes. 
The rise of legal protection of areas beyond national jurisdiction and the legal responses 
to global concerns have created a potential implementation gap. Judicial institutions, 
despite having been created in the restricted bilateral conception of international law, 
contain certain elements crucial for closing this implementation gap. In particular, the 
foundations for a broader consideration of standing exist, laid down in the articles on 
state responsibility, whereby states could initiate judicial proceedings without a direct 
personal injury. Indeed, articles 42 and 48 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
open up standing to “community obligations” and can be used as a legal basis for 
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a third party. 
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international courts and tribunals to allow proceedings in the public interest. Such 
behaviour has not been consistent but the Whaling case is the latest example of a 
potential acceptance of broader rules on standing. Moreover, other actors, such as 
international organisations or NGOs, have ways to participate in bilateral disputes 
through the mechanisms of intervention and amicus curiae, as well as through the 
advisory jurisdiction.  
The role of scientific experts and NGOs in the fact-finding process can also influence 
the judicial decision. The need for more multilaterality in international adjudication is 
closely related with the fact that most environmental disputes are also based on highly 
complex factual situations, often involving scientific disagreements and contrary 
opinions. This feature is problematic especially in the handling of scientific evidence by 
international courts and tribunals, as it creates a misbalance between the parties. There 
are, however, ways to interpret scientific evidence which can rebalance the parties, based 
on the idea that scientific facts, by their nature, ask for a different treatment than other 
facts. Such technical complexities can also impact the duration of the disputes, problem 
that can be tackled by a greater use of provisional measures orders, especially since 
international courts have not shied away from some collaboration with specific relevant 
environmental bodies in the implementation of their orders. Indeed, they have used 
their inherent powers in order to collaborate with specific environmental institutions at 
the provisional measures level. In the Certain Activities case for example, the ICJ 
entrusted the Ramsar Secretariat with the task to supervise and ensure better 
collaboration between the states in dispute. 
International courts and tribunals can also find adequate responses in a greater 
collaboration with non-compliance procedures, although this has not happened yet. 
This suggestion could improve not only the judicial response to the implementation of 
multilateral obligations but also compliance with provisional measures and final 
judgments. 
Moreover, international adjudication has a public role to play. International dispute 
settlement mechanisms have not been created just for settling disputes between states. 
This has been emphasised in the nature of provisional measures orders and the role of 
the courts in their intervention during the fact-finding process. The award of provisional 
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measures can clearly be justified on the basis of the non-aggravation of the dispute, 
justification that goes beyond the mere interests of the parties. International courts and 
tribunals have indeed used their powers to protect broader interests, such as the 
protection of the marine environment in the case of the ITLOS.  
The possibility offered to international courts and tribunals to participate in fact-finding 
processes is also an element showing their public function. If they consider it necessary, 
international courts and tribunals can get involved in the determination of the facts by 
appointing experts or assessors for example. The motivation to do so will have to be 
based on the principle of procedural fairness, and will aim at allowing the court to make 
a better decision legally. 
Another concern often raised when analysing international adjudication in an 
environmental context is its lack of preventive role. This thesis showed that the 
possibility of ordering provisional measures is an efficient way of using international 
adjudication as a preventive tool. The raison d’être of provisional measures is 
precaution. While awarding different measures, judges will look at whether the situation 
is urgent and creates a risk of irreparable harm. The definition of such threshold and 
their application to environmental cases show that international courts and tribunals are 
ready to protect the environment through provisional measures. 
There are, however, other developments that go towards a more preventive judicial 
attitude. Indeed, the developments concerning evidence and the award of remedies can 
be seen as a more proactive understanding of the shift in environmental protection. By 
understanding that the process of weighing scientific evidence requires an approach to 
the standard of proof, international courts and tribunals would better encompass the fact 
that scientific facts are uncertain. A more cautious approach towards them will improve 
the quality of judicial response as international courts will be able to accept scientific 
facts as sufficient evidence, rendering the whole judicial process more appropriate in an 
environmental context. Moreover, if judicial practices show a greater understanding of 
scientific uncertainty, states will react and adapt their conducts accordingly, improving 
the preventive aspect necessary for environmental protection. 
In conclusion, international courts and tribunals have a margin of appreciation large 
enough to encompass many concerns important for handling environmental disputes in 
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a more adequate way. Some developments have already been endorsed in specific cases, 
and some suggestions I made throughout the thesis can be implemented in the future 
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